Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a Mexican citizen, was removed from the U.S. in 1989, following convictions for grand theft auto, second degree burglary, amd receiving stolen property. About one month later, he illegally reentered. In 1990, he was convicted in Missouri of rape and armed criminal action and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. The Border Patrol was not notified of his 2008 release, and no removal order issued. In 2009 he was taken into custody and pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2). The presentence report recommended enhancing his offense level by 16 levels based on his 1990 conviction. The district court found that, after serving his sentence, defendant unlawfully remained in the U.S., applied the 16-level enhancement and calculated a guidelines imprisonment range of 77 to 96 months, then sentenced him to 90 months. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that a defendant alleged to have unlawfully remained in the U.S. following a qualifying conviction under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) is subject to the 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) enhancement only when a removal order is issued or reinstated after that conviction.

This interlocutory appeal was brought by the Government to reverse the district court's order suppressing certain incriminating statements made by defendant. The court held that defendant was in custody at the time he made his incriminating statements where he was awakened from his bed, identified and handcuffed while more than a dozen officers entered and searched his home; he was separated from his family and interrogated by two federal agents for at least an hour; he was informed he was free to use the bathroom or get a snack, but followed and monitored when he sought to do so; and he was allowed to make a phone call, but only when holding the phone so that the agents could overhear the conversation.

Defendant appealed his conviction for wire fraud and his sentence of 30 months' imprisonment, as well as restitution. The court concluded that defendant understood his right to have a lawyer appointed and repeatedly asserted that he wanted to plead guilty and that he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. Therefore, the district court's Rule 11 error did not affect defendant's substantial rights and his conviction must stand. The court held, however, that the district court violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel by denying his request to have counsel appointed to represent him at sentencing. Therefore, resentencing was required because deprivation of the right to choice of counsel was not subject to harmless error review. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed but the sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of defrauding Medicaid and Medicare of $1.4 million. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient; prejudicial evidence was admitted; the jury instructions were flawed; her sentencing level was erroneously increased for obstruction of justice; and the district court erred by denying her request for post-trial contact with a juror. The court affirmed the judgment because there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction and there was no reversible error.

Defendant was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms of cocaine, importing cocaine into the United States, and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence of three concurrent 125-month terms. The court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy and that the district court properly gave the deliberate ignorance jury instruction. Accordingly, the district court did not err and defendant's convictions were upheld.

Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine and unlawful use of a communication facility, in this case a cell phone. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conspiracy conviction; the district court did not err by denying the motion to suppress where officers reasonably believed that they had probable cause to arrest defendant and the information found during the search of defendant's cell phone would have been inevitably discovered during the inventory of his car; and the district court committed no error in sentencing defendant.

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that he be removed based on having committed an aggravated felony. Petitioner was charged and convicted of felonious sexual intercourse without consent. Petitioner did not "necessarily" commit the aggravated felony of rape, rather than a lesser crime. Because the court was not convinced that petitioner pled guilty to a crime that can be categorized as rape under 18 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), the court granted the petition for review and reversed the BIA's decision, remanding to the BIA.

Defendant, a prisoner in the custody of the United States, sought the court's authorization under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) to file a second or successive petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence in the district court where the sentence was imposed. After determining that defendant's petition would in fact be second or successive within the meaning of section 2255(h), the court denied his motion for authorization to file.

Defendant challenged his 48 month sentence that he received after pleading guilty to the crime of illegal reentry of a previously deported alien following a conviction for an aggravated felony offense. The court held that the district court correctly applied the enhancement where defendant's conviction of attempted sexual assault of a child was a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A); there was no procedural error where the district court did not fail to explain adequately defendant's sentence; and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court balanced the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant pleaded guilty of possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine. Defendant appealed the determination that her offense involved the importation of methamphetamine and the amount of methamphetamine was greater than 1.5 kilograms. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that defendant knew the drugs were imported where it was not clearly erroneous of the district court to infer from the the facts that defendant knew of the drugs' source in Mexico. The court also held that the district court did not clearly err in its determination that defendant was responsible for a total of 1.66 kilograms of methamphetamine because there was sufficient evidence on which to base its determinations of the quantity and purity of the methamphetamine mixture. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed.