Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his three-count conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession and sentenced to 30 months imprisonment to be served consecutively to certain state sentences that had yet to be imposed. At issue was whether the government violated defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by referencing, during trial, his silence in response to police questioning; whether the government was required to prove that defendant knew the firearm in his possession had moved in interstate commerce; and whether the district court erred in requiring defendant to serve his federal sentence consecutively to a state sentence that had not been imposed. The court held that the legal error that defendant claimed was not clear under existing law and, even assuming arguendo, that it was error to allow testimony regarding his pre-Miranda silence, the decision to allow that testimony did not constitute reversible error because the error was not plain. The court also held that the government was not required to prove that he knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce where his argument was foreclosed by United States v. Rose when the defendant raised the same argument in that case and the court rejected it. The court further held that the district court did not err in its sentencing order where defendant conceded that his argument was foreclosed by precedent. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence were affirmed.

Petitioner entered a conditional plea where he admitted that he was a citizen and native of Mexico illegally present in the United States and that he knowingly possessed a firearm in or affecting commerce which had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. At issue was whether petitioner's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5), for being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm, violated the Second Amendment and whether his conviction violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court held that the phrase "the people" in the Second Amendment did not include aliens illegally in the United States such as petitioner and that section 922(g)(5) was constitutional under the Second Amendment. The court also held that the text of the conditional guilty plea only reserved petitioner's right to appeal on the grounds that the statute violated the Second Amendment and therefore, did not reach the merits of whether petitioner's due process rights were violated.

Petitioner was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine, using a telephone to facilitate drug trafficking, and money laundering. Petitioner appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition arguing that his conviction of money laundering must be overturned based on the holding in United States v. Santos because no evidence was presented that he engaged in a financial transaction involving profits as opposed to gross revenue derived from his illegal drug activity. The court held that Santos did not decriminalize financial transactions conducted with funds from drug activity and therefore, petitioner could not demonstrate his actual innocence, which was one of the threshold requirements for the petition to proceed. Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of his petition was affirmed.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus where he was convicted of armed robbery. At issue was whether petitioner was denied due process when the trial court admitted an arrest warrant affidavit containing hearsay statements. The court held that defendant failed to establish a due process violation where the admission of the warrant affidavit did not render his trial fundamentally unfair because the warrant affidavit was not at the heart of the case against defendant and the brief references to it at trial did not permeate the entire case. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment denying federal habeas relief.

Appellants brought this appeal challenging criminal convictions related to an enterprise to conspire, possess, and distribute controlled substances. Appellants, individually and together, raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that a review of the record, as well as an examination of the briefs, revealed that appellants did conspire to possess and traffic controlled substances. The evidence yielded proof of the transaction's cessation only when law enforcement personnel interrupted the sale at the Berry Lot. In light of the deference the court's standards of review afford a district court in the administration of the trial, the arguments presented by appellants did not compel reversal on any of the issues discussed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court on all respects.

Defendant pleaded guilty to a drug conspiracy charge involving "50 grams or more" of cocaine base. At issue was whether the Government breached defendant's plea agreement by using his immunized statements to advocate for the presentence investigation report ("PSR") guideline calculation. The court held that such use was inconsistent with any reasonable understanding of defendant's plea agreement, and that the Government's proffered justifications for such use were devoid of merit. Accordingly, the court held that the Government breached defendant's plea agreement and he was entitled to resentencing before a different judge.

Appellant, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a lawsuit against appellees asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), based in part on the allegations that he suffered from certain conditions during his incarceration and appellees failed to provide him with adequate medical care and prevented him from using the community work centers, accessing the satellite and regional prison facilities, working in the kitchen, and attending school. At issue was whether appellees were entitled to sovereign immunity for claims that they violated Title II of the ADA. As a preliminary issue, the court held that appellant had not alleged facts from which the court could reasonably infer that he suffered from a qualifying disability under the ADA and remanded the case to the district court in order to allow appellant to amend his Title II allegations where he had not had an opportunity to amend his claim after being alerted of its deficiencies.

Appellant challenged his sentence after conviction for conspiring to interfere with commerce by robbery, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). At issue was whether the district court erred in applying United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 2X1.1, covering conspiracies, in calculating appellant's Guidelines range. The court affirmed the sentence and held that the trial court did not err in applying section 2X1.1 where it applied to extortion conspiracies under the Hobbs Act in light of United States v. Villafranca.

Defendant was sentenced with a sixteen-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. At issue was whether the district court's application of the enhancement was erroneous where defendant's prior 2006 robbery conviction was not a crime of violence. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that defendant's 2006 robbery conviction qualified as a crime of violence and accordingly applied the sixteen-level sentencing enhancement where the district court was not in error in relying on the Government's proffer because defendant adopted the truth of the proffer of facts, which conceded that the facts in the plea agreement established that his conduct fell well within the generic definition of robbery.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief where he was convicted of capital murder. At issue was whether the prosecution violated petitioner's due process rights by impeaching his post-Miranda silence under Doyle v. Ohio. The court held that the Mississippi Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Doyle in finding that the state's questions were permissible when, in viewing the cross-examination in its entirety, the state court's finding that the prosecutor's intent was to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement was not unreasonable and when the closing argument relied almost exclusively on petitioner's post-arrest behavior, noting that he failed to tell his mother or anyone else about the murder during the two days in which he was running from the police.