Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, the former leader of the Gulf Cartel, a notorious Mexican drug cartel, was arrested in Mexico in 2003 and the United States took custody of defendant in 2007. At issue was whether the press and public have a First Amendment right to access sentencing proceedings, and if so, whether they are also entitled to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to closure of sentencing proceedings. The court held that, as a preliminary matter, the court had jurisdiction over the case because it fell within the exception to mootness for issues that were capable of repetition yet evading review; that the press and the public have a First Amendment right of access to a sentencing proceeding; and that the district court deprived the intervenor plaintiff of its First Amendment right of access without due process in refusing to give the press and public notice and an opportunity to be heard before closing the sentencing proceeding. Therefore, because the sentencing already occurred, the court reversed the district court's orders denying the intervenor plaintiff's requests for notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as the district court's order denying the intervenor plaintiff's motion to open the sentencing proceeding.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for capital murder where he was under a sentence of life imprisonment for a previous murder and had been on parole for approximately eleven months when he committed the capital murder. At issue was whether the court should grant petitioner a certificate of appealability ("COA") authorizing him to appeal the denial of his habeas relief regarding his claims for ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt and sentencing phases of trial and his claim that he was mentally retarded and entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that issue. The court denied petitioner's request for a COA where the district court's decision denying relief on these claims was not debatable among reasonable jurists and petitioner's claims were not adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.

Petitioner, a Louisiana state prisoner, was convicted for the offense of attempted manslaughter for an attack on another inmate. At issue was whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in denying relief of petitioner's Miranda v. Arizona claim to suppress the statements he made to correctional officers. The court held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the questioning at issue was more like general on-the-scene questioning rather than a custodial interrogation of the type addressed by Mathis v. United States and Maryland v. Shatzer where the questioning was conducted by members of the prison staff, using the prison's routine immediate post-fight procedure to ensure the safety of the general prison population. Therefore, the court held that the state court's determination that Miranda warnings were not required in order to admit petitioner's incriminating statements as evidence in his trial did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal Law and federal habeas relief was denied.

This mandamus proceeding arose out of the public-corruption prosecution centering around former Dallas City Council Member Don Hill and various other members of Dallas city government who conspired to solicit and accept things of value in exchange for providing official assistance to Brian Potashnik in his pursuit of city approval and funding for various affordable-housing development projects. One of the things of value Mr. Hill and his coconspirators solicited was the award of construction subcontracts on Mr. Potashnik's developments to Ronald Slovacek. Petitioners, competitors of Mr. Potashnik who were seeking city approval of their own affordable-housing developments, sought restitution alleging that Mr. Slovacek and his coconspirators had rendered petitioners' $1.8 million investment worthless. At issue was whether the court should grant petitioners' writ of mandamus directing the district court to recognize that petitioners were crime victims within the meaning of the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), 18 U.S.C. 3771(d)(3), and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA"), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. The court denied the petition and held that the district court was not clearly and indisputably wrong to find that petitioners failed to prove that they had been directly and proximately harmed by Mr. Slovacek's criminal conduct. The court also denied each of petitioners' pending motions.

Appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute phencyclidine ("PCP"), a controlled substance. Appellants raised issues regarding the admissibility of certain evidence and contested the basis for their sentences. The court held that the district court properly denied the first defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of a certain house where, under the circumstances and in light of his failure on appeal to demonstrate that Los Angeles police were dishonest or reckless in relying on the house warrant, the good faith exception applied. The court also held that evidence from the second house at issue was inextricably intertwined with evidence tending to prove that the second defendant aided and abetted to possess with intent to distribute PCP and, in light of evidence implicating the second defendant in a scheme to aid and abet possession with intent to distribute PCP, any error in admitting evidence of the July 2008 controlled buy was harmless. The court further held that the district court's factual findings and application of U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 were not erroneous where certain material assertions were not worthy of credence in light of the weight of the physical evidence and were flatly contradicted by other witnesses and the ultimate finding of the jury. The court finally held that the sentencing enhancement for the first defendant's leadership role was based on an erroneous recitation of facts and therefore, was vacated and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant pled guilty to having been found in the United States after deportation following a felony conviction and was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Almost three years after the completion of defendant's prison sentence, he was arrested for criminal trespass. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction to revoke defendant's three-year term of supervised release after his arrest for criminal trespass. The court reasoned that resolution of the issue depended on the date on which defendant was released from imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. 3624(e) and held that defendant was released from imprisonment the moment his administrative detention began, i.e. the moment he was transferred from Bureau of Prisons custody to Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody to await deportation. However, because the record was not clear as to the exact date on which defendant was released from imprisonment, the court remanded for further fact-finding in order to determine the exact date on which defendant was released from imprisonment.