Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for being in possession of child pornography (Count One) and using a facility of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a juvenile to engage in sexual activity (Count Two). The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of Count Two; venue was proper in the Western District where the phone calls and text messages sent from defendant was in the district and defendant's presence was in the district; the court rejected defendants arguments that he did not have an adequate opportunity to prepare for trial; the government did not violate Brady v. Maryland and defendant's claim to the contrary had no merit; and the district court did not clearly err in determining that defendant consented to the search of his cell phone and the consent was voluntary. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Rounds" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief. The parties' experts agreed that petitioner suffered from some degree of deficit in adaptive functioning. The experts sharply disagreed as to whether these deficits were related to petitioner's subaverage intellectual functioning. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner was not mentally retarded where, having heard and evaluated the testimony of each expert, the court found that the State's expert was more persuasive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Ladd v. Thaler" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of capital murder of a police officer, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner argued that the voluntary-intoxication instruction required by Texas Penal Code 8.04 unconstitutionally limited the jury's ability to consider mitigating evidence. The court rejected petitioner's claim, concluding that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of Boyde v. California, Penry v. Lynaugh, or Penry v. Johnson. Because clear Fifth Circuit caselaw foreclosed each of petitioner's five additional challenges, the court did not grant a certificate of appealability (COAs) on any of them. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of petitioner's habeas petition and denied petitioner's request for COAs on additional issues. View "Sprouse v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). On appeal, defendant challenged his 120-month sentence. The court concluded that the district court did not plainly err by sentencing defendant and defendant failed to demonstrate that the district court improperly balanced the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court concluded that the district court erred in finding that failure to register is a sex offense but the error was not clear or obvious. Even if the error was clear or obvious, defendant failed to demonstrate that it affected his substantial rights. The court declined to exercise its discretion in reversing the sentence and therefore, affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Segura" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to avoid federal income tax and of filing false tax returns. The district court erred in not clarifying that plaintiffs' good-faith belief need not be objectively reasonable. Nevertheless, the erroneous jury instruction in this case was harmless because the evidence showing that plaintiffs intentionally underreported their income was so overwhelming that the error could not have contributed to the jury's decision to convict. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in calculating the total tax loss resulting from the offenses and declining to accept plaintiffs' tax-loss estimate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Montgomery, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed his habeas petition in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. After petitioner was transferred to FCI Sandstone in Minnesota, the Pennsylvania federal district court dismissed the petition without prejudice, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because petitioner's immediate custodian was outside the district. Petitioner appealed, the Third Circuit reversed, remanding the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. Petitioner was then transferred to a federal prison in Illinois and then eventually to Mississippi. The U.S. Magistrate Judge in Minnesota transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The district court in Mississippi concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania district court attached upon petitioner's filing of his petition while he was confined there and jurisdiction was not destroyed by petitioner's subsequent transfer to another prison. The court vacated the dismissal order and transferred the case back to Pennsylvania. The court concluded that petitioner stated a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the Pennsylvania district court was the proper forum. The court concluded that jurisdiction attached on that initial filing for habeas corpus relief and it was not destroyed by the transfer of petitioner and accompanying custodial charge. View "Griffin, Jr. v. Ebbert" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 application challenging his convictions for various sexual assault offenses. The district court denied petitioner's motions for a COA. Subsequently, in light of the new rule announced in Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme Court granted petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the district court's prior order, and remanded to the district court to reconsider his petition for COA. The district court found that, under Trevino, it may be possible for the district court to hear at least some of petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel which would otherwise be procedurally defaulted, to the extent petitioner either lacked counsel or had ineffective counsel in his initial collateral review proceeding in state court. However, the court was unable to determine from the record which, if any, of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be preserved for review under Trevino. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for reconsideration of petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in accordance with Trevino and Martinez v. Ryan. View "Neathery v. Thaler" on Justia Law

Defendants Garner and Shoemaker were charged with various federal crimes arising from a bribe and kickback scheme involving a community hospital. In No. 12-60754, the Government appealed the district court's judgments of acquittal and grants of new trials for defendants. In No. 12-60791, Defendant Shoemaker appealed the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial on the remaining counts, of which he alone was convicted. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions under Count One, conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. 666 by committing federal program bribery; Count Two, federal program bribery in violation of section 666; Count Four, the conspiracy to pay kickbacks to Shoemaker; and Count Five, healthcare fraud in violation of 32 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(2)(B). Because the district court has no power to grant a new trial under Rule 33 on a basis not raised by the defendant, the district court abused its discretion in granting a new trial on these grounds. Because the jury instructions adequately explained all requisite elements of liability under section 1320a-7b(b)(2)(B), and because the evidence did not preponderate heavily against the verdict, the interest of justice did not require a new trial. Because the court concluded that sufficient evidence supported Shoemaker's remaining convictions, and otherwise found no errors warranting reversal or a new trial, the court affirmed Shoemaker's convictions on Counts Three and Counts Six through Twelve. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grants of defendants' motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial; affirmed Shoemaker's other convictions; and remanded for reinstatement of the jury verdict and for sentencing. View "United States v. Shoemaker, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, 50 grams or more of cocaine base, and 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of a Secret Service agent regarding the meaning of code words used by the conspirators on wiretapped recordings; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of a DEA Group Supervisor concerning the interpretation of coded drug slang; the evidence was sufficient to convict defendants; the district court did not err in assigning Defendant Edwards an aggravating-role sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b) and for firearm possession under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1); the district court did not err in applying a career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 to Defendant Gage's sentence; in Defendant Atkins' case, any error committed by the sentencing judge in looking to the higher crack cocaine calculation of 280 grams was harmless; the sentencing judge did not violate United States v. Booker in sentencing Defendant Perkins; and Akins' argument that the district court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey by increasing his maximum sentence based on his two prior felony drug convictions was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Akins, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The court found that the Government initially breached the express terms of the plea agreement by objecting to the original PSR on the basis that U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) should have applied. However, this breach was sufficiently cured by the withdrawal and the actions of the district court. Further, the court found that the Government did not implicitly breach the plea agreement by advocating for the U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a) adjustment. Accordingly, the court found that the appeal waiver was still applicable and barred plaintiff's appeal. View "United States v. Purser" on Justia Law