Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Johnson stored marijuana in his Arkansas home for distribution in Tennessee. A conspiracy headed by others obtained large quantities of marijuana from a Texas supplier, who delivered to Johnson’s Blytheville home. Police observed three incidents of drug trafficking at Johnson’s home. Following a group of the conspirators in Blytheville, DEA agents arrested one of the drivers, who admitted to delivering four 300-pound loads of marijuana to Johnson. The officers subsequently stopped Johnson at his new Blytheville home and received permission to search it. In one bedroom and in a hallway closet, the officers found 237 pounds of marijuana and a handgun. They also seized $15,000 in cash, a black scale and three vehicles. Johnson pleaded guilty to conspiring to sell marijuana. Johnson accepted the facts as stated in his pre-sentence report, but objected to a two-level enhancement for using his home to distribute drugs. The district court applied the enhancement, sentencing Johnson to 97 months in prison, the low end of the guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed application of the U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement. The amount of marijuana and the length of time he kept it there (eight months) justified the enhancement.View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Ortega, a U.S. citizen, began an 11-day sentence of home confinement for driving under the influence on March 18, 2011. He had to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times. With prior approval, he could go to work, the doctor and church. The corrections department received a detainer for Ortega from federal immigration authorities, who issued the detainer after seeing Ortega’s DUI conviction and noticing that Ortega’s name and birth date resembled, but did not exactly match, those of an unlawful alien. As a matter of policy, the local department incarcerates any individual with an immigration detainer. On March 19, officers took Ortega to the local jail, where he remained until his release on March 22. The department did not conduct its own investigation of Ortega’s citizenship. Ortega filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. The district court dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that city officers violated his rights against deprivations of liberty without due process and against unreasonable seizures when they carried out the detainer and that the immigration agent caused those violations by issuing the detainer, and stating that qualified immunity protects all but “the plainly incompetent,” View "Ortega v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); the plea agreement stated that his offense involved 109 grams of cocaine base and that the parties would recommend a sentence within the range in the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. The district court accepted the plea. Defendant was subject to a statutory minimum sentence of 240 months of imprisonment because the prosecution moved for a downward departure for Defendant’s substantial assistance to its investigation. The district court granted further reductions for acceptance of responsibility and timely indication of intent to plead guilty, yielding an advisory range of 130 to 162 months. The court imposed a sentence of 130 months. Four years later, the Fair Sentencing Act amended the cocaine base sentencing statute (21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)). The district court found Defendant ineligible to have his sentence reconsidered. The Sixth Circuit vacated, to “give effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent that the amended Guidelines achieve consistency.” Plugging the new statutory minimums and amended Guidelines into Defendant’s original sentencing formula would yield a sentence of 70 months. The government petitioned for rehearing en banc and, while the motion was pending, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

In 2005 the Blewetts were convicted of crack cocaine offenses and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 10 years each under the 100-to-1 crack cocaine law. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 as implemented by new sentencing guidelines, substantially reduced crack cocaine sentences, including the mandatory minimum sentences, 21 U.S.C. 841(b). If the Blewetts were sentenced today the quantity of crack would fall below the threshold for any statutory minimum. The district court denied retroactive resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)2 and 28 U.S.C. 994(u)3. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the old crack cocaine ratio led to mass incarceration of thousands of nonviolent prisoners under a law widely acknowledged as racially discriminatory. Although the Act was not made explicitly retroactive by Congress, the court stated that judicial perpetuation of the discriminatory mandatory minimum crack sentences would violate the Equal Protection Clause. On reconsideration, en banc, the court held that the Act does not retroactively undo final sentences. The court noted a 142-year-old congressional presumption against applying reductions in criminal penalties to those already sentenced, 1 U.S.C. 109, and the 2012 Supreme Court decision,n Dorsey v. United States. View "United States v. Blewitt" on Justia Law

Marshall pled guilty to receiving child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a) and (b)) from the time he was 15 until he was 20 years old. The district court varied downward from the guideline range and sentenced him to five years in prison, the mandatory minimum sentence for the offense, expressing concerns about the perceived harshness of that sentence. Marshall has a rare physiological condition, Human Growth Hormone Deficiency, which he believes entitles him to the Eighth Amendment protections accorded to juveniles. Although diagnosed with an I.Q. score of 87 and a mental age of 15, Marshall attended a community college part-time for four semesters, pursuing a career as a lab technician and paying his own tuition. He worked as a machine operator for a commercial bakery. He owned a car and had a credit card. He claimed that he felt like he was viewing images of his peers and that he often felt like a 15 or 16-year-old individual because of his small frame and stature. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Marshall was an adult at the time of his crimes. View "United States v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Volkman, an M.D. and a Ph.D. in pharmacology from University of Chicago, was board-certified in emergency medicine and a “diplomat” of the American Academy of Pain Management. Following lawsuits, he had no malpractice insurance and no job. Hired by Tri-State, a cash-only clinic with 18-20 patients per day, he was paid $5,000 to $5,500 per week. After a few months, pharmacies refused to fill his prescriptions, citing improper dosing. Volkman opened a dispensary in the clinic. The Ohio Board of Pharmacy issued a license, although a Glock was found in the safe where the drugs were stored. Follow-up inspections disclosed poorly maintained dispensary logs; that no licensed physician or pharmacist oversaw the actual dispensing process; and lax security of the drug safe. Patients returned unmarked and intermixed medication. The dispensary did a heavy business in oxycodone. A federal investigation revealed a chaotic environment. Cup filled with urine were scattered on the floor. The clinic lacked essential equipment. Pills were strewn throughout the premises. Months later, the owners fired Volkman, so he opened his own shop. Twelve of Volkman’s patients died. Volkman and the Tri-State owners were charged with conspiring to unlawfully distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a drug-involved premises, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); unlawful distribution of a controlled substance leading to death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 24(c)(1) and (2). The owners accepted plea agreements and testified against Volkman, leading to his conviction on most counts, and a sentence of four consecutive terms of life imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Volkman" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of murder and rape in connection with the 1987 deaths of two officers in the Army Nurse Corps, was sentenced to death in Tennessee state court. After exhausting state remedies, he sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The district court denied his petition in its entirety, but granted a certificate of appealability on a claim that the state improperly excluded mitigation evidence at his resentencing hearing. The Sixth Circuit expanded the certificate to cover claims concerning alleged prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal at resentencing; ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentencing; suppression of favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, improper review of the exclusion of mitigation evidence at the resentencing; and unconstitutional vagueness in the Tennessee aggravating factor applied at resentencing. The court then affirmed, except with respect to the claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The court granted a conditional writ based on the prosecutor’s statements comparing defendant to two of the most widely despised criminals of the then-recent past, repeated references to defendant as “the evil one,” and reference to the Lord’s Prayer, creating an inference “that the death penalty is mandatory through their appeal to a higher authority.” View "Cauthern v. Bell" on Justia Law

While employed at an insurance company, Huff used customer information to obtain credit cards, and, with the help a teenager, cell phone contracts, resulting in loss of more than $350,000. Huff pleaded guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371; identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7); and access device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2). The plea agreement stipulated that the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manual applied, calculated an offense level of 22, and agreed that no other adjustments applied. There was no upward adjustment for abuse of a position of trust or for use of a minor. The pre-sentence report included upward adjustment for abuse of trust, adjustment for more than 10 victims, and adjustment for use of a minor: a net offense level of 25 after acceptance of responsibility. Huff’s criminal history included prior offenses for forgery theft and attempted misuse of a credit card with concurrent sentences. The district court used the 2006 manual, applied the abuse of trust enhancement and imposed concurrent 60-month prison terms. Huff’s attorney allegedly stated that the judge would be unhappy if reversed and would impose a sentence substantially greater than originally imposed. Huff dismissed an appeal. Huff later moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that an evidentiary hearing was necessary on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "Huff v. United States" on Justia Law

Inmate Santiago, complaining of severe pain and a rash, was seen by Dr.Mosher on January 31. Mosher prescribed Tylenol for pain and antibiotics to treat what she thought might be Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). The next day Dr. Ringle diagnosed erythema nodosum (EN), an uncomfortable but non-dangerous skin inflammation that typically disappears in about six weeks but may recur. EN has no known cure. Ringle prescribed an anti-inflammatory and an antibiotic. Four days later, Santiago was transferred to OSU Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with EN and arthralgias, a severe joint-pain condition, and prescribed an anti-ulcer agent and a different anti-inflammatory. Santiago was seen on February 20 by an OSU dermatologist, who recommended a topical steroid, compression hose, and SSKI, which may help treat EN but is not standard treatment. Each day, February 22- 25, Santiago asked prison nursing staff about the treatments. Staff denied knowledge until, on the 25th, nurses found Santiago’s unsigned chart on Ringle’s desk. Ringle had been on vacation. Mosher signed the order on February 27. Santiago received the topical steroid on February 29 and compression stockings on March 10. Santiago waited longer for the SSKI, which is a non-formulary drug. The district court rejected Santiago’s suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) based on the delays. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Santiago did not prove that the delay caused a serious medical need or deliberate indifference.View "Santiago v. Ringle" on Justia Law

Letters sent between LaDeau and his incarcerated brother, David, came to the attention of authorities. The letters, written in code, allegedly communicated ways to obtain and conceal child pornography. Investigators executed a search warrant at LaDeau’s residence and discovered flash drives containing child pornography. LaDeau was indicted for possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(A), which carried a sentencing range of zero to 10 years’ imprisonment. LaDeau moved to suppress inculpatory statements and evidence seized from his home, claiming that officers had interviewed him in a hospital while he was attending to his wife and improperly coerced his responses by threatening to inform his wife about their investigation moments before she underwent life-threatening surgery. The court granted the motion; there was no longer any admissible evidence that LaDeau had possessed child pornography. Five days before the scheduled trial the government obtained a superseding indictment, adding David as a codefendant and charging both with conspiracy to receive child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2), which carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, based on evidence that had been in its possession since before the initial indictment. A charge of conspiracy to possess would not have carried the same mandatory sentence. The district court held that the charging decision warranted a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness, because there was a realistic likelihood of retaliation for the successful suppression motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Ladeau" on Justia Law