Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Phillips was indicted in 2004 on charged that he had travelled to Thailand and knowingly engaged in illicit sexual conduct (18 U.S.C. 2423(f), 2246) with a minor male, not yet 16 years of age, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2423(c), the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act). Phillips pleaded guilty to the single count and was sentenced to 37 months in prison, followed by lifetime supervised release. Phillips was released from prison in 2007, violated several terms of his supervised release, and was sentenced to an additional 30 months. Released from his second incarceration in 2010, he unsuccessfully moved to vacate judgment under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that PROTECT, which punishes “[e]ngaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places,” applied only to individuals who both traveled in foreign commerce and engaged in illicit sexual conduct after its enactment and that his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto clause. The district court found the motion time-barred and procedurally defaulted, noting that the illicit sexual conduct (not the travel) occurred after the enactment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the “actual innocence exception,” to the limitations period should be applied only in case of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The exception cannot be so broadly defined as to be premised upon changes in statutory interpretation of the term “travels.” View "Phillips v. United States" on Justia Law

Burgess was pulled over for speeding and found to be under the influence of alcohol and a prescription drug. After failing sobriety tests, Burgess was arrested for DUI. His resistance caused officers to perform a “takedown,” a tackle to the ground, to place him in handcuffs. Burgess did not suffer any apparent injuries at the scene. Burgess’ disruptive behavior continued during transport. Upon his arrival at the jail, officers attempted to search him and also performed a takedown. The parties dispute whether Burgess was noncompliant and the effect of the takedown. Burgess asserts that he woke several hours later, with pain in his face and head, and a broken tooth. Burgess signed a “Medical Screening Form,” indicating that he had “no visible signs of trauma or illness,” and “no other medical/physical conditions of which the Jail should be aware.” After release, Burgess admitted himself into a hospital where CT scans revealed fractures that required surgery. The district court dismissed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims of excessive force, failure to intervene, and deliberate indifference, and found the defendants entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The right to be free from excessive force during booking was clearly established so that the claim should have been reviewed for reasonableness. Material facts are also in dispute on the negligence, assault, battery, loss of consortium, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and spoliation of evidence claims. View "Burgess v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Selby is serving a life sentence for murder, a two-year sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and a sentence for attempted escape from prison. Michigan prison authorities confined Selby in administrative segregation for almost 13 years based on a determination that he posed a serious escape risk. Selby served most of those years in a maximum security facility. Correction officials released Selby into the general prison population about 18 months after he filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he had been confined in segregation and denied access to worship services without meaningful review and in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the RLUIPA claim, but held that summary judgment was not appropriate on the due process claim. There were material disputes of fact, including whether Selby’s four misconduct reports over 10 years supported the decision to retain him in administrative segregation, whether the decision to override his qualification for a lower security classification in 2010 was warranted, and whether the aging escape history justified continued restraint in administrative segregation. View "Selby v. Caruso" on Justia Law

Clark was shot and killed outside of his Detroit home. Months later, Peoples, Powell, and Harris, were arrested after leading police on a chase in a stolen Jaguar. According to the report written by an officer who witnessed the crash that ended the chase, Harris was the driver. Police found the gun used to kill Clark on the driver’s side floor of the Jaguar. Only Peoples was tried for murder. The only evidence connecting him to the crime was the gun and the testimony of Powell and Harris, that Peoples was the driver and was sitting closest to the gun, which Peoples owned, and that Peoples told them about killing Clark. Both received lower sentences on car theft charges because of their cooperation. Defense counsel did not cross-examine them on those points and did not call police officers to testify about who was driving the car. Peoples received a sentence of life imprisonment. He exhausted state remedies. The district court denied his habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit partially reversed, holding that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to impeach the credibility of the witnesses based on known false testimony; the state court’s determination to the contrary was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.View "Peoples v. Lafler" on Justia Law

Miller and his pastor Wellons wanted to buy investment land for $790,000. Miller formed Fellowship, with eight investment units valued at $112,500 each, to purchase the land and recruited investors. Miller and Wellons did not purchase units, but Miller obtained a 19.5% interest as Fellowship’s manager and Wellons obtained a 4.5% interest as secretary. Miller secured $675,000 in investments before closing and obtained a loan from First Bank, representing that DEMCO, one of Miller’s development companies, needed a $337,500 loan that would be paid within six months. Because DEMCO pledged Fellowship’s property, First Bank required a written resolution. The resolution contained false statements that all Fellowship members were present at a meeting, and that, at this nonexistent meeting, they unanimously voted to pledge the property as collateral. Fellowship’s members, other than Miller and Wellons, believed that the property was being purchased free of encumbrances. After the closing, $146,956.75 remained in Fellowship’s account. Miller then exchanged his ownership in Fellowship for satisfactions of debts. Despite having no ownership interest, Miller modified and renewed the loan. Later Miller told Fellowship members the truth. Miller was convicted of two counts of making false statements to a bank, 18 U.S.C. 1014, and two counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. The Sixth Circuit affirmed conviction on one count of false statements, but vacated and remanded the other convictions. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2008, Hughes pled guilty to federal drug (crack cocaine) and gun charges. The district court sentenced him to 121 months on the drug charge plus 60 months on the gun charge. Hughes was then subject to a ten-year mandatory-minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) for possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack and a five-year mandatory sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. The Sixth Circuit vacated. By the time of Hughes’s resentencing, the basis for the remand had been extinguished by the Supreme Court’s rejection of a Sixth Circuit decision. The district court resentenced Hughes in January 2011. Hughes argued for application of the Fair Sentencing Act, which had taken effect four months earlier and reduced the mandatory-minimum sentence for the crack offense to five years, rather than ten. The district court rejected the argument and reimposed the same sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting retroactive application of the FSA despite the government’s equitable arguments in favor of resentencing. View "United States v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Moore and friends left a strip club in Lexington, as the club closed, Moore claims that he noticed a SUV that needed a jump start and walked over to help. Moore claims he spotted a pistol sticking out of the waistband of the man who got out of the driver’s seat, heard a click, turned back around and saw the pistol pointed straight at him. Moore “went after the gun,” and the pistol went as the men wrestled for it. King dropped the pistol. Moore grabbed the pistol, ran, jumped into the backseat of his friend’s car and threw the gun at his feet as the car drove away. Three witnesses contradicted Moore’s version of what happened, and one supported it. Police stopped the car in which Moore was riding, found the gun, and he was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court should have instructed the jury about his affirmative defense that he possessed the gun out of necessity. The court noted that Moore bypassed several opportunities to surrender the gun. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Under the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the district court denied pauper status to Coleman-Bey in his civil suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, although one of his previous dismissals was still on appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Counting a third dismissal still on appeal as a strike does not lead to the anomalous conclusion that the third dismissal was itself precluded from being appealed by the three-strikes rule. Each of the three civil cases that Coleman-Bey filed while incarcerated counts as a strike under the PLRA. View "Coleman v. Tollefson" on Justia Law

Shultz, convicted under 18 U.S.C. 2252(a) of receiving and possessing child pornography, including depictions of young children engaged in sadistic, masochistic or violent behavior, appealed the district court’s imposition of two special conditions of lifetime supervised release, to follow 168 months in prison: condition four, which restricts his contact with children, and condition six, which restricts his possession of sexually arousing material. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conditions, rejection challenges of violation of the sentencing statute, the Article III non-delegation doctrine, First Amendment rights of association and assembly, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against vague laws and his right to interact with his own family. View "United States v. Shultz" on Justia Law

Lawrence committed four bank robberies in central Ohio during 2004-2005. During the last attempted robbery, Lawrence shot and killed Officer Hurst. Officer Hurst returned fire, however, and Lawrence was injured. Lawrence aborted fled. He was arrested and confessed to having committed all four robberies. Lawrence was charged with armed robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and (d); brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); brandishing and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii); attempted bank robbery resulting in the killing of Officer Hurst, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), (d) and (e); and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence to commit murder with malice aforethought, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and (j). The indictment alleged that Lawrence was eligible to be punished by death. A jury convicted Lawrence and sentenced to death. The Sixth Circuit held that the sentencing verdicts were not inconsistent or irrational and reinstated the sentence of death. On appeal of the conviction, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting 24 claims, including a challenge under the Federal Death Penalty Act, based on the fact that Lawrence is African American; Hurst was white and all 12 jurors were white. View "United States v. Lawrence" on Justia Law