Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

An officer found a tool bag outside the McNamara Federal Building. Thinking it was lost property, the officer stored the bag in the building for three weeks without inspecting it. Eventually, someone x-rayed of the bag and discovered objects consistent with an explosive device. The Detroit Police Bomb Squad detonated the bag, resulting in a sizable secondary explosion. The bag containing the bomb was sold exclusively at a chain hardware store that also sold the particular timer used in the device. Investigation led to identification of Mikulich, who was charged with attempting to destroy a government building by means of explosive while creating a substantial risk of injury to a person, 18 U.S.C. 844(f)(1)–(2); using and carrying a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B)(ii); and possessing an unregistered destructive device, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). Mikulich exhibited erratic behavior during his first appearance. After he was adjudged incompetent and remanded for treatment, the government requested that he be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs. The district court rejected Mikulich’s argument that the government lacked a sufficiently important interest in trying him, that he faced civil confinement in the absence of criminal sanction, and that he intended to raise an insanity defense The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mikulich did not demonstrate that any special circumstances weaken the government’s clear interest in trying him for the serious crimes of which he is accused.View "United States v. Mikulich" on Justia Law

Hampton was charged with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 (18 counts), access device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(5) (four counts), and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1)), based on use of fraudulent merchant accounts, ACH payments, and credit card transactions. The government sought forfeiture of substitute property. Hampton’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement provided that, with dismissal of remaining charges, Hampton would plead guilty to one count each of wire fraud and access device fraud, and included a stipulation that her conduct involved intended losses of $141,769.77 and estimated actual losses of $77,312.86. Hampton agreed to restitution of actual losses and to entry of a judgment of forfeiture of approximately $77,312.86. Because she had insufficient resources to pay restitution, the parties agreed that any assets located through forfeiture would be applied to the victims and the forfeiture reduced accordingly. Because no specific assets derived from the proceeds were identified, the requirements for forfeiture of substitute assets under 21 U.S.C. 853(p) were established. After it was determined that the amount of actual loss was $69,540.01, the district court ordered mandatory restitution in the corrected amount and imposed concurrent (below-Guidelines) sentences of 18 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a forfeiture money judgment may not be entered against future assets. View "United States v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Nurse Turetzky and Doctor Desai opened a clinic in 1976. They fought, and sometimes the fights turned physical. In 1983, they agreed to dissolve their partnership once Desai repaid Turetzky’s investment. Weeks later, police found Turetzky dead in a parking lot, having been strangled. Gorski and Adams worked at Desai’s clinic. Gorski testified that, before the murder, Adams told him repeatedly that Desai wanted Turetzky killed. After the murder, Adams confessed to Gorski that he had killed Turetzky and that Desai wanted him to leave Michigan. State prosecutors charged Desai and Adams with first-degree murder in 1995. The month-long joint trial began in 2001. There was evidence that Desai solicited a hitman in 1982, took out insurance on Turetzky in 1983, asked whether Turetzky’s body had been found before it was discovered, drove to the crime scene that day, and gave Adams $2,000 after the murder. A jury found Desai guilty of murder; the judge imposed a life sentence. The jury failed to reach a verdict for Adams. Desai’s challenge to reliance on Adams’ confession was rejected by Michigan courts. A federal district court granted Desai’s habeas petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Confrontation Clause no longer applied to non-testimonial hearsay such as confession from Adams to Gorski. On remand, the district court granted Desai’s habeas petition based on his due process claim, after it was rejected by state courts. The Sixth Circuit again reversed. View "Desai v. Booker" on Justia Law

Johnson’s plea agreement provided for dismissal of two distribution counts and state weapons charges; Johnson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 280 grams of cocaine base between 2007 and 2010, acknowledging that the plea would trigger a mandatory minimum 10-year sentence and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. There was evidence that a coconspirator and Johnson moved cocaine base three to four times per month. The presentence report sought to avoid possible double counting by including only those quantities attributed to Johnson directly by coconspirators. Together, these amounts exceeded the 2.8 kilograms necessary to trigger a base offense level of 36 under USSG 2D1.1(c)(2). The district court found that Johnson was directly involved in the distribution of 82 ounces of cocaine base during the disputed period. In total, the district court found that Johnson’s relevant conduct involved the distribution of at least 157 ounces (4.45 kilograms) of cocaine base and that he had a base offense level of 36. Further adjustments lowered his offense level to 34, which, when combined with a criminal history category of IV, produced a Guidelines range of 210-262 months. The district court sentenced Johnson to a 210-month term of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Ajan was convicted of several drug-related offenses, aiding and abetting a kidnapping, and two section 924(c) firearm offenses and sentenced to a term of 646 months of imprisonment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, he sought to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court entered an amended judgment and new sentence without conducting a resentencing hearing. Without obtaining a certificate of appealability (COA), Ajan appealed. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, first holding that a COA was not required because Ajan was appealing a previously unreviewed aspect of his criminal case. The district court corrected Ajan’s sentence by excising the unlawful term and reentering Ajan’s original term on the remaining counts. While the court has general statutory authority to correct a sentence, whether it erroneously believed it had to correct Ajan’s sentence in lieu of resentencing is not clear, based on its one-sentence explanation for the sentence correction. View "Ajan v. United States" on Justia Law

Grayson was indicted for conspiracy to distribute powder and crack cocaine and other drugs, 21 U.S.C. 846; 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Grayson pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal the determination that his 2004 Michigan conviction for “maintaining a drug house” qualified as a “prior felony drug offense” under 21 U.S.C. 802(44); the enhancement doubled his five-year mandatory minimum sentence. The Michigan law requires that the defendant knew that the structure at issue was used for keeping or selling drugs, the defendant had some general control over the structure, and that he maintained the structure. Violation is punishable by up to two years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the enhancement requires a defendant to have been convicted of a drug offense involving possession or distribution, rather than simply aiding others. View "Unted States v. Grayson" on Justia Law

Youngstown Police receiced a call reporting that a man driving a black Jeep Cherokee was attempting to sell firearms at an auto parts store. The caller identified himself as a store employee and provided the vehicle’s Pennsylvania license plate number. A few hours later, officers encountered a Jeep with a license plate number matching the earlier report. Seeing it turn without signaling, they initiated a felony traffic stop, drawing their weapons, and patting down the occupants. Gray was driving. The vehicle was registered to passenger Hockenberry; neither had a valid driver’s license. There were active arrest warrants for occupant Hunt. The officers did not allow Hockenberry to call someone to retrieve the vehicle before having it towed; the officers performed an inventory search, pursuant to policy. They saw a handgun case and the barrels of long guns. The vehicle also contained tools and drug paraphernalia. An officer admitted there were items in the vehicle that were not inventoried. One week later the officer obtained a warrant and conducted another search, stating that he had received information that there might be stolen property in the vehicle. He found a crow bar and bolt cutters. After denial of a motion to suppress, Hockenberry and Gray pleaded guilty as felons in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Finding that both were armed career criminals,r 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the district court sentenced Hockenberry to 204 months imprisonment and Gray to 216 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, but remanded Hockenberry’s sentence. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

McCloud pled guilty to distributing 19.4 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841,was released on bond, and failed to appear for sentencing. After evading law enforcement for more than three years, McCloud was captured and sentenced to 140 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Between McCloud’s plea and sentencing, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) was enacted, reducing the statutory sentencing range applicable to McCloud from 5–40 years to 0–20 years. McCloud’s counsel did not object to use of the pre-FSA range at sentencing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence as reasonable. Although the court erred in using the pre-FSA statutory range, that error did not affect McCloud’s substantial rights because it is highly unlikely that a proper statutory range with no effect on the Guidelines range would have changed the imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. McCloud" on Justia Law

As part of a separate drug investigation, the FBI began wire intercepts of cellular telephones of several individuals (Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22) including West, Freeman’s co-defendant. They overheard a murder-for-hire plot. West was convicted of paying Freeman to murder Day. Freeman was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1958 for conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire and received a life sentence. At trial, FBI agent Lucas, interpreted the conversations as they were played. His testimony ranged from voice and nickname identifications to substantive interpretations of the meaning of the various statements. Defense counsel objected: “I think this is outside of the scope of both the notice we received regarding this witness’s expertise and his expertise.” Lucas had been qualified as an expert to testify to the meaning of specific code words and drug slang. The prosecution responded: “Your honor, this is not expert testimony. This is based upon his personal knowledge of the investigation.” The objection was overruled, and Lucas continued to testify as a lay witness under Rule 701, interpreting conversations to broadly illustrate the prosecution’s theory of the case. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the district court erred by permitting the testimony. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

In 2003, Henderson was stopped for speeding. The officer discovered that the vehicle had been reported stolen. A Detroit Police Officer attempted to organize a live lineup, but could not locate five males of defendant’s description. The officer then conducted a photographic lineup, at which Henderson was identified as the suspect in a carjacking. Police records indicate that an attorney representing Henderson’s interests, Corr, was present for the photographic lineup. After Henderson’s conviction, Corr wrote a letter to Henderson stating that he had not been present at the lineup. At trial, Henderson’s counsel challenged neither admission of the photographic lineup, nor testimony regarding it and presented no evidence. Henderson was convicted of armed robbery and carjacking. State court efforts were rejected as untimely because the filing arrived one day late due to failings in the prison mail system. Henderson filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The district court found several claims to be procedurally defaulted based on the lateness of Henderson’s application for leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of his first motion for reconsideration, which caused the Michigan Court of Appeals to dismiss his application. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Sixth Circuit law, Maples v. Stegall, (2003), provides that “[w]here a pro se prisoner attempts to deliver his petition for mailing in sufficient time for it to arrive timely in the normal course of events” that circumstance “is sufficient to excuse a procedural default based upon a late filing.” View "Henderson v. Palmer" on Justia Law