Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

An internal investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office found evidence suggesting that during the Jefferson trial on drug-conspiracy charges, the prosecution failed to disclose to the defense the extent of the promises of leniency that the prosecution made to cooperating witnesses. In a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, Jefferson alleged that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor violated his obligation under Brady v. Maryland to disclose material impeachment evidence. Following a remand, the district court again denied Jefferson’s motion, finding that Jefferson’s claims were not timely filed, that equitable tolling was not warranted, and that even if timely, Jefferson’s Brady claims failed on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the claims filed on the merits, because the material at issue was not prejudicial. The court rejected the conclusion that Jefferson failed to exercise due diligence in these circumstance. A section 2255 petitioner is permitted to rely on the government’s representation that it has fulfilled its Brady obligations. Reasonable diligence does not require a section 2255 petitioner repeatedly to scavenge for facts that the prosecution is unconstitutionally hiding from him. View "Jefferson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1993, Dixon and Hoffner beat their friend Hammer, tied him to a bed, stole his wallet and his automobile, drove him to a remote area, and buried him alive. One month into the investigation, Hoffner led police to Hammer’s body and Dixon provided a tape-recorded account of the events. Dixon was indicted for aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. At trial, the defense presented no evidence and cross-examined only three of 15 prosecution witnesses. The jury convicted Dixon on all charges and recommended the death penalty, which the court imposed. The Ohio Court of Appeals consolidated Dixon’s direct appeal and post-conviction appeal, arguing ineffective assistance, and affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court also affirmed. Dixon then filed a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, improper exclusion of mitigating evidence at sentencing, and violation of his Miranda rights. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit ruled that his confession was coerced, deeming his remaining claims pretermitted. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed. After review of the remaining claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instruction, and exclusion of mitigating evidence at the penalty hearing, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of habeas corpus. View "Dixon v. Houk" on Justia Law

In 2003, Bell pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), and possession of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 844. He agreed to 124.7 grams of crack. With a three-point acceptance of responsibility reduction, his offense level was 29. His criminal history category, II, produced a Guidelines range of 97 to 121 months, but the quantity had a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months. The district court sentenced Bell to concurrent terms of120 months for the crack conviction and 12 months for the marijuana conviction with a consecutive 60 months for the 924(c) conviction In 2009, the district court denied a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act lowered the penalties for crack offenses and directed the Sentencing Commission to amend the Guidelines. The amendment was made retroactive. A recalculation assigned Bell a new offense level of 25, producing a new Guidelines range on the crack charge of 63 to 78 months. The district court denied a sentence reduction because his sentencing range, based on the mandatory minimum, had not changed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Bell’s sentence was not based on a range that was subsequently lowered. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Inmates at a federal prison celebrated Super Bowl Sunday by drinking liquor. MacAnally, become belligerent and told inmate Church that he intended to stab inmate Reisdorfer. Church, who outranked Reisdorfer and MacAnally in the Aryan Brotherhood, hit MacAnally to force him to abandon the plan. MacAnally apologized, but eventually became belligerent again. The three had another confrontation later, in MacAnally’s cell. Reisdorfer hit MacAnally in the head, knocking him down. Church told Reisdorfer to “kick [MacAnally’s] ass and put him to bed” and left the cell. Reisdorfer beat and stabbed MacAnally and went to get Church. When they returned to the cell, MacAnally was unconscious on the floor, making “a funny noise,” and bleeding profusely. Guards found him later. MacAnally suffered massive head trauma, a collapsed lung, and two stab wounds He has not regained consciousness. Church pleaded guilty to assaulting an inmate resulting in serious bodily harm, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(6) and received a below-guidelines sentence of 57 months. Reisdorfer pleaded guilty to the same charge and was sentenced to 65 months of imprisonment. The judge ordered Reisdorfer to pay restitution of $121,496.56. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to denial of Church’s motion for a downward departure based on his claim that the victim provoked his conduct and to the restitution order, payable to a third party, the Bureau of Prisons. View "United States v. Reisdorfer" on Justia Law

In 2007, Gillis was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 4.12 grams of crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, 21 U.S.C.841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 860(a) and sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment. On remand for reconsideration of the career-offender sentencing guidelines, in 2009, the district court resentenced Gillis to 191 months. Six months after the deadline to appeal his resentencing, Gillis wrote to the judge, acknowledging that his appeal was not timely and requesting that the court permit late appeal. His attorney subsequently filed a belated notice of appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed that appeal as untimely filed. Gillis filed a pro se motion to set aside his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not timely appeal. Gillis did not respond to a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed because Gillis had not filed his 2255 motion within the one-year limitation period. The Sixth Circuit held that, although Gillis did not file his appeal for 201 days, there was appellate jurisdiction; when a district court fails to issue a separate judgment in denying a 2255 motion, a petitioner effectively has 210 days to submit an appeal. However, the district court properly dismissed Gillis’s 2255 motion as time-barred under 2255(f). View "Gillis v. United States" on Justia Law

Good, a Michigan inmate, claims he was convicted based on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The state trial court denied his motion to suppress without holding an evidentiary hearing, and a state appellate court denied his appeal. Good sought, and was denied, a federal writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the prohibition on federal habeas review of exclusionary rule claims that applies to prisoners who received “the opportunity for full and fair consideration” of their claims in state court. Because the Michigan Court of Appeals has rejected Good’s due process argument on the merits, Good may prevail only by showing that the decision was contrary to or unreasonably applied U.S> Supreme Court precedents, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). Good identified no Supreme Court holding establishing that the Due Process Clause ever requires an evidentiary hearing on a Fourth Amendment suppression motion. View "Good v. Berghuis" on Justia Law

Following three Knoxville carjacking and armed robberies of pizza delivery employees lured to vacant houses, Mack was convicted of three counts of aiding and abetting carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 2119 & 2; three counts of aiding and abetting robbery affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1951 & 2; and three counts of aiding and abetting use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) & 2. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the court erred in admitting evidence concerning Mack’s prior involvement in a Georgia robbery; the prosecution failed to prove that Mack had “intent to cause death or serious bodily harm;” the court gave improper jury instructions on the intent element of carjacking and on “proof beyond a reasonable doubt;” the court should have conducted a hearing on possible juror taint; and that resentencing was required in light of Alleyne v. United States, which held that held that the jury, not the court, must make a finding that a defendant brandished a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) before the court may impose the enhanced 7-year statutory mandatory minimum sentence. The court concluded that any errors were harmless. View "United States v. Mack" on Justia Law

Masked law enforcement agents, dressed in black, with guns drawn, broke into a Detroit home and allegedly assaulted and terrorized the plaintiffs. The agents were part of a multi-agency effort targeting drug trafficking and other crimes in the “8 Mile Corridor.” When the plaintiffs asked the intruders to identify themselves, the agents refused, responding instead that they were “Team 11.” In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of state and local officials and, after the close of plaintiffs’ evidence, granted the federal agents judgment as a matter of law. Undisputed testimony indicated that the state and local defendants were not part of the entry team but provided only perimeter security. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to state and local defendants, but reversed with respect to the federal agents. Genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to the personal involvement of the federal officers in the raid and their alleged conduct in violating plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The circumstances of this case, which include an intentional concealment of identity, coupled with an “I wasn’t there” defense, warrants shifting the burden of production onto the federal agents to establish their lack of involvement. View "Burley v. Gagacki" on Justia Law

A security video captured a shooting at a Cleveland gas station. It showed a sport utility vehicle driving through the parking lot and Adkins, who appeared to recognize the vehicle, pulling a handgun from his walking cast boot, walking toward the vehicle, and firing. Adkins pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of ammunition under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Adkins did not challenge the sentencing memorandum recommendation nor did he disagree that he committed the offense after sustaining a felony conviction for a crime of violence (criminal gang activity involving aggravated robbery and kidnapping) which triggered a base level enhancement. At sentencing, the district court calculated a base offense level of 20, added four levels because Adkins possessed ammunition in connection with another felony (aggravated assault) reduced the level by two for acceptance of responsibility, subtracted an additional level at the government’s request, assessed criminal history at four points, and added three points for the attempted criminal gang activity conviction and another point for a juvenile involving carrying a concealed weapon. Adkins argued that he was neither convicted nor placed on probation for the juvenile offense. The district court sentenced Adkins to 46 months of incarceration and three years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence as reasonable. View "United States v. Adkins" on Justia Law

In 1994 an Ohio jury convicted Mason of aggravated murder, rape, and having a weapon while under disability; the court adopted a recommendation that Mason be sentenced to death. Mason’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal; state court collateral attack was unsuccessful. In 1999, Mason sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit granted a conditional writ to “result in the vacation of his death sentence unless the state of Ohio commences a new penalty-phase trial against him within 180 days from the date that the judgment in this matter becomes final.” On remand, the district court entered its own conditional writ recalculating the date on which the 180-day period began. The period set by the Sixth Circuit expired, and no retrial had commenced. Mason was subsequently removed from death row, and a new sentencing proceeding was scheduled. The district court rejected an argument that the state should be prevented from seeking the death penalty for failure to comply with the deadline. The Sixth Circuit modified, holding that the district court erred by recalculating the beginning of the 180-day period without authority, but that the state may, nonetheless, seek the death penalty at the penalty-phase retrial. View "Mason v. Mitchell" on Justia Law