Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

On May 12, 2009, Stewart arrived from Japan with two laptop computers. A Customs Officer randomly approached him and found Stewart’s responses “confrontational.” Searching one computer, the officer found thumbnail images that he believed to be child pornography; he called ICE Agent Young, who told Stewart that they were detaining his laptops for further examination, but he was free to leave. Young secured a warrant. Forensic examination led to an indictment on September 8, 2009. On February 5, 2010, Stewart moved to suppress, arguing that the “extended border search” was without reasonable suspicion. On May 24, 2010, the district court denied the motion. Stewart moved to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, arguing that his June 15, 2010, trial date meant that he would not be brought to trial within 70 nonexcludable days of indictment. The district court dismissed without prejudide, stating that its calendaring program mistakenly kept Stewart’s motion to suppress under advisement for 67 days, when it should have excluded only 30 days. One month later, a grand jury returned a new indictment, charging two counts of transportation of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed his convictions, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in dismissing the earlier indictment without prejudice, rather than with prejudice; in denying his motion to suppress; in admitting two prosecution exhibits; and by not, sua sponte, instructing the jury on the statutory definition of “identifiable minor.” View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Denson was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). One month later, he was detained for allegedly supplying a shotgun to an informant who planned a robbery. Denson pled guilty to the felon-in-possession charge and a probation officer prepared a presentence report that identified two state felony convictions that increased the base-offense level, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), 4B1.1, 4B1.2. Denson objected to inclusion of an Ohio conviction for inciting to violence as a predicate crime of violence. The district court reasoned that the Ohio incitement statute meets the career-offender guideline’s requirement of “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” The court also rejected Denson’s argument that his sentencing range should be reduced because he accepted responsibility, stating that it was “hard to imagine something” that could negate acceptance of responsibility more than another firearm offense involving the sale of a shotgun to a would-be felon. The district court imposed a sentence of 72 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The facts of the Ohio conviction necessarily establish that the species of incitement to which he pled guilty isa crime of violence. The district court properly declined to apply an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. View "United States v. Denson" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of more than 50 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); the plea agreement stated that his offense involved 109 grams of cocaine base and that, “The parties agree to recommend that the Court impose a sentence within the range determined pursuant to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the computations and stipulations set forth in this agreement.” The district court accepted the plea. Defendant was subject to a statutory minimum sentence of 240 months of imprisonment because the prosecution moved for a downward departure for Defendant’s substantial assistance to its investigation. The district court granted further reductions for acceptance of responsibility and timely indication of intent to plead guilty, yielding an advisory range of 130 to 162 months. The court imposed a sentence of 130 months. Four years later, Fair Sentencing Act amended the cocaine base sentencing statute (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)). The district court found Defendant ineligible to have his sentence reconsidered. The Sixth Circuit vacated, to “give effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent that the amended Guidelines achieve consistency.” Plugging the new statutory minimums and amended Guidelines into Defendant’s original sentencing formula would yield a sentence of 70 months. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

After a physical altercation in 1993, his wife (Carol) told O’Neal and his sons to leave the house. She filed a domestic complaint and planned to change the locks. O’Neal later returned to the house, broke through the front door and fired three shots Carol, one of which fatally wounded her. Carol’s son alleged that O’Neal also attempted to shoot him but that the gun jammed. A police canine unit later found him hiding in a nearby house where he surrendered. He confessed to the shooting. A forensic examination linked the bullet removed from Carol’s body to the pistol in O’Neal’s possession at the time of his surrender. Convicted of aggravated murder, O’Neal was sentenced to death. Ohio courts affirmed and denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that three sub-70 IQ scores were insufficient on their own to prove O’Neal had significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. The court rejected claims, aimed at the aggravated burglary specification, that O’Neal received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to present the actual lease to support his assertion of contractual privilege to enter the house, and of spousal privilege. View "O'Neal v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Three-month-old Jiyen was killed when 11 shots were fired into his home in a drive-by shooting. Prosecution witnesses testified to overhearing Drummond, discussing a retribution for the death of a fellow gang member, seeing Drummond with an assault rifle 15 minutes before the fatal shots were fired, and to hearing Drummond say that “he didn’t meant [sic] to kill the baby. A search of Drummond’s house yielded ammunition consistent with the shooting and a variety of items tying him to the gang. During the trial, the court twice closed the courtroom, once stating that witnesses felt threatened by some of the spectators. A jury found Drummond guilty on all counts; the trial court sentenced Drummond to death. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State courts denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court granted habeas corpus in part, holding that the state trial court violated Drummond’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Drummond’s family was removed from the courtroom after objection without any explanation regarding the scope of the closure and without considering any alternative options. View "Drummond v. Houk" on Justia Law

An officer pulled over a car with expired tags. Booker was a passenger. The officer smelled marijuana. The driver told the officer that he could search the vehicle. The officer had previously arrested Booker and recovered 13 bags of marijuana concealed in his crotch. A drug-sniffing dog alerted near Booker. During a pat-down, the officer noticed that Booker clenched his buttocks, but found no drugs. Booker’s pockets contained large amounts of currency. A search of the front passenger seat revealed plastic bags: one contained .06 grams of marijuana, the others had residue. The officer arrested Booker for felony possession, despite not recovering enough marijuana to justify such an arrest under Tennessee law. At the police station, Booker fidgeted and tried to barricade himself in the room. During a strip search, officers observed a string protruding from Booker’s anus. Booker’s efforts to conceal the item led to an altercation. Booker was shackled and covered in a blanket for transport to the hospital. Although Booker denied having anything in his rectum, had normal vital signs, and refused to submit to a digital rectal examination, the doctor, who claimed to believe that Booker’s life was in danger, sedated him to perform an examination and removed a rock of crack cocaine, greater than five grams, from Booker’s rectum. The Sixth Circuit reversed Booker’s conviction. The unconsented procedure while Booker was under police control must be attributed to the state for Fourth Amendment purposes and “shocks the conscience.” View "United States v. Booker" on Justia Law

Tragas bought information that is encoded in the magnetic strip on the back of credit and debit cards from overseas suppliers and re-sold the information to the Hunter brothers, who created “clone” gift and credit cards with which they purchased goods and bona fide gift cards. Tragas and the Hunters communicated online. Police discovered records of their conversations on the Hunters’ computer. Transcripts of the conversations were read at trial. Although the parties did not use names, a picture of Tragas appeared on the account and Tragas made purchases with card information exchanged during the conversations. Tragas purchased a house in Florida after a conversation about buying a house in Florida. As a result of the scheme, credit and debit card users and their financial institutions lost $2.18 million. Tragas was convicted of conspiracy to commit access device fraud offenses, 18 U.S.C. 1029(b); aiding and abetting unlawful activity under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a); bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344; and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting claims that the prosecutor improperly read evidence aloud, that the court should have given the jury a specific unanimity instruction, that the Travel Act convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence, and that her Vienna Convention rights were violated. The court remanded the sentence; the court used an incorrect version of the Guidelines. View "United States v. Tragas" on Justia Law

Officers on patrol in a high-crime, high-drug area observed a vehicle, occupied by Hinojosa, parked next door to a house that had been the site of past drug activity. After Hinojosa walked up and down the driveway, went into the house, and left after less than one minute, officers followed him. There had been reports of drug manufacturing in an apartment in the building where he stopped. An officer exited the unmarked police car; the other parked the car so that it would not have blocked Hinojosa if he had tried to leave. The officer approached Hinojosa, indicating that he wanted to talk, with his hand on his weapon. Hinojosa, with his window rolled up, asked why he wanted to talk. The officer responded that they had suspicions about his odd behavior in the other driveway. After Hinojosa provided a driver’s license, a dispatcher stated that the license was suspended and that Hinojosa was on parole. Hinojosa was arrested. Hinojosa stated that he was carrying a pistol, which the officer removed from Hinojosa’s waistband. After denial of his motion to suppress, Hinojosa pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed: the questioning leading up to Hinojosa’s arrest and search occurred during a consensual encounter. A reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter. Hinojosa was not seized. View "United States v. Hinojosa" on Justia Law

In 2008, the FBI issued its Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) to implement newly revised Department of Justice guidelines, addressing use of race and ethnicity in investigations. Under this guidance, the FBI may identify and map “locations of concentrated ethnic communities” to “reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities … assist domain awareness,” and collect “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community.” The ACLU submitted a Freedom of Information Act request, seeking release of documents concerning policy on collecting such information, and records containing information actually collected. The FBI initially released 298 pages (48 partially redacted) of training material, previously released for a similar request by the ACLU’s Atlanta affiliate. The ACLU filed suit. With additional releases, the FBI identified 1,553 pages of potentially responsive records: training materials, “domain intelligence notes,” “program assessments,” “electronic communications,” and maps. The district court held that the FBI appropriately withheld records under a FOIA exemption for law enforcement information whose release could “interfere with enforcement proceedings,” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed; release of publicly available information selectively used in investigations may reveal law-enforcement priorities and methodologies and interfere with enforcement. The ACLU’s proposed procedure for resolving the dispute was inadequately protective of sensitive information; in camera review was appropriate. View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

Scozzari was fatally shot by two police officers. Plaintiff, as representative of decedent’s estate, brought a civil rights action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to a known medical need. After the officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds was denied, a jury found in favor of the officers. The district court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was required to prove that deliberate indifference proximately caused decedent’s death. The district court later granted plaintiff a new trial on the deliberate indifference claim because our circuit has held that “in delay-of-treatment cases, it is not necessary to show that the delay in providing medical care proximately caused the injury” when it would be obvious to a layperson that there was a risk of serious harm without immediate medical attention. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for interlocutory appeal. Defendants cannot satisfy the requirement that “a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists regarding the correctness of the decision.” View "Miedzianowski v. City of Clare" on Justia Law