Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007 Joiner pled guilty to crimes involving 129.77 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(B). At the time, offenses involving more than 50 grams and a defendant who had a prior conviction for a felony drug offense had a minimum penalty of 20 years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The district judge granted a reduction for substantial assistance, enabling Joiner to be sentenced below the statutory minimum. Rather than using the statutory minimum as the starting point, the district judge increased Joiner’s base level to 33, the lowest level that, coupled with Joiner’s criminal history, would correspond to a guideline range containing 240 months, then reduced Joiner’s base offense level by three for acceptance of responsibility and by five for substantial assistance, and imposed a sentence of 107 months of imprisonment. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the quantity of crack cocaine required to trigger the 20-year statutory minimum to 280 grams. The 2011 crack-cocaine-guideline amendments lowered the section 5A guideline range to which Joiner would have been subject absent a statutory minimum. The district court denied Joiner a sentence reduction, holding that when a defendant was subject to a statutory minimum at his original sentencing but received a downward departure for substantial assistance, a Guidelines amendment that lowered the sentencing range under Section 2D1.1 did not lower an “applicable” guideline range as required by U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Joiner" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of more than 50 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) under an agreement specifying that his offense involved 109 grams of cocaine base. At sentencing, the district court was bound by a statutory minimum sentence of 240 months of imprisonment. The government moved for a downward departure in return for Defendant’s substantial assistance and the court granted further reductions for Defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and timely indication of intent to plead guilty. Ultimately, the district court sentenced Defendant to 130 months of imprisonment, the low end of the advisory range. Four years later the Fair Sentencing Act amended the cocaine base sentencing statute so that an offense must involve at least 280 grams of cocaine base to trigger a 10-year statutory minimum sentence. Following the district court’s original sentencing formula, but using the new statutory minimums and amended Guidelines, Defendant would now be subject to a sentence of 70 months. In 2012, Defendant sought sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the motion, reasoning that Defendant was ineligible for sentence reduction. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating an intent to give “effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent that the amended Guidelines achieve consistency.” View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Officers observed a Chrysler with heavily tinted windows playing loud music and initiated a traffic stop. After the officers knocked on the car’s windows several times, Evans, the car’s driver and owner, and Walker, the front seat passenger, rolled down the windows and began speaking. The officers smelled marijuana and noticed that Walker was agitated. After Evans exited the vehicle and was under supervision, officers asked Walker to step out and keep his hands in sight. As he released the seatbelt, officers believed that Walker was reaching between the passenger seat and the door in an unnatural movement. Walker ignored warnings until he was restrained. An officer found a gun on the floor between the passenger’s seat and the door, near the floor mounting for the front passenger’s seat belt; it was loaded, had a round in the chamber, and was positioned to be grabbed from the front passenger’s seat. Walker was convicted as a felon in possession of ammunition transported in foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) & 924(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed the firearm containing this ammunition; that the government constructively amended or prejudicially varied from the indictment with respect to evidence showing that the ammunition traveled in foreign commerce; and to sentencing himGibb to an additional 24 months because he violated the terms of supervised release. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Greco worked at MetroHealth, a county-owned health-care provider in Cleveland, from 1997 until 2009, supervising independent contractors who worked on MetroHealth construction projects, selecting contractors for small-scale no-bid maintenance projects, and authorizing payment for their work. Greco used his authority to facilitate a bribery scheme set up by his boss and Patel, the vice-president of a construction company. The participants became nervous and Greco took action to hide his involvement in the scheme, but Patel contacted the government and confessed; in exchange for a reduced sentence, Patel provided detailed information about the scheme. Greco was convicted of bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery involving programs receiving federal funds (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and 371), violation of and conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. 1951), making false tax returns (26 U.S.C. 7206(1)), and conspiracy to commit mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349) and was sentenced to 112 months’ imprisonment and required to pay $994,734.84 in restitution to MetroHealth. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court improperly applied a 12-level enhancement based on an erroneous loss calculation; improperly applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice; and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. View "United States v. Greco" on Justia Law

Vandiver filed a pro se civil action against Prison Health Services (PHS) and five medical professionals, alleging that the defendants violated and are continuing to violate his Eighth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to the health care needs associated with his serious chronic conditions, including Hepatitis C and diabetes and that as a result, he has undergone partial amputations of his feet and suffered visual impairment. He claimed that he is at risk of further injury, including additional amputations, coma, and death. He acknowledged having previously filed three complaints that were dismissed as frivolous. The district court denied his application to proceed in forma pauperis, applying the three-strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that alleging a danger of serious physical injury as a result of being presently denied adequate medical treatment for a chronic illness satisfies the imminent-danger exception to the three-strikes rule. Allegations of incremental harm culminating in serious physical injury may present a danger equal to that of an injury that occurs all at once. View "VanDiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Woodruff pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment as an armed career criminal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court improperly calculated his sentence and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Presentence Investigation Report’s finding that Woodruff’s conviction for facilitation was a controlled-substance offense. The Tennessee conviction for facilitation of the sale of cocaine was a “controlled substance offense.” View "United States v. Woodruff" on Justia Law

In 1997, Riley pled guilty to possession, with intent to distribute, of 53.17 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C.841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and, after unsuccessfully challenging his designation as a “career offender,” was sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. At the time, life imprisonment was the statutory maximum penalty. Based on the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and corresponding crack-cocaine guideline amendments implemented by U.S.S.G. Amendment 750, Riley unsuccessfully moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Riley’s sentence was not “based on” the then-applicable crack cocaine guidelines and that he is not eligible for a sentence reduction. . View "United States v. Riley" on Justia Law

Officers responded to an anonymous 911 call reporting that a black man wearing a blue shirt, with a “poofy” afro, riding a bicycle, had a pistol. Officer Meredith arrived and began talking with Nelson, who precisely matched this description. Officer Massey then arrived and Nelson began to ride away on his bicycle. Meredith shouted at Nelson to stop, but Nelson kept riding away. Massey, in his squad car, followed Nelson at a distance of 10 to 25 feet, and saw Nelson reach into his waistband and throw a large, heavy object into bushes. Massey continued following Nelson to a parking lot, where Nelson was stopped. After Nelson was under arrest, officers recovered bullets from his pocket. Officers found a loaded gun at the location where Massey had seen Nelson throw an object. Nelson was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and moved to exclude testimony regarding the 911 caller’s description of the suspect. The district court denied the motion. A jury convicted Nelson, who was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, rejecting a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence, but finding admission of the hearsay evidence prejudicial, notwithstanding the prosecution’s contention that it was admitted only as background information. View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Yancy pleaded guilty to felon-in-possession, carjacking, and use-of-firearm charges, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), 2119, and 924(c), and received a 156-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s application of the use-of-a-minor enhancement, U.S.S.G. 3B1.4; and fact-finding pertaining to uncharged conduct that increased the statutory minimum sentence. Crediting parts of the minor’s testimony, the district court found that Yancy directed the minor to take a phone, to stand in front of the store, and to initiate contact with the first person who came up. Yancy voluntarily admitted facts establishing brandishing during his plea, with full knowledge of their potential effect on his sentence, and he suffered no prejudice from the indictment’s failure to specify brandishing. View "United States v. Yancy" on Justia Law

In 2004, Ray was convicted on five counts of conduct involving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(1), and 2252(a)(4)(B), and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 180 months, 300 months, and 600 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the district court failed to adequately explain its upward departure from the recommended sentencing guideline range, but noting that the evidence of Ray’s guilt was “overwhelming.” On remand, Ray was sentenced to concurrent terms of 180 month, 300 months, and 360 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court dismissed a pro se motion to vacate the sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, in which Ray argued that there was an illegal search and seizure, because the person who consented to the search of his home lacked authority to do so, and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering judgment without an evidentiary hearing. View "Ray v. United States" on Justia Law