Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Hogg, charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine and possession with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of cocaine, pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment. He sought to withdraw his plea, based on newly-discovered evidence of criminal charges against the prosecution’s lead detective and violation of Fed.R.Crim.P.11(b)(1)(H)-(I) by incorrectly advising him of the penalty range for the offense to which he pled guilty. The court denied both arguments. On appeal, Hogg argued that the government offered him an inducement that was not included in his written plea agreement and that he was entitled to sentencing under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The court had applied provisions in effect at the time he committed his offense. The Sixth Circuit remanded to allow withdrawal of the plea. Neither the court nor counsel correctly anticipated the effect of the new enactment on the statutory penalty range for the offense to which Hogg pled guilty. The court cautioned, “be careful what you wish for,” because in exchange for the deal Hogg wants to reject, he was allowed to plead guilty to an offense involving significantly less crack cocaine than he admitted responsibility for in his agreement. View "United States v. Hogg" on Justia Law

Capozzi, a federal prisoner, rolled out of a transport van and fled. Personnel pursued him, firing shots. Two days later agents discovered Capozzi hiding in a wooded area. He was indicted for escaping from custody, 18 U.S.C. 751(a) and sought to present a defense of necessity, arguing that he faced an imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury due to post-traumatic arteriovenous fistula originating from a chest stabbing. Capozzi claims that he believed that escape at that moment was his only chance at saving his life. The district court denied the motion and refused to instruct the jury on the defense. During deliberations, the jury submitted a note stating that without a transcript it could not make a decision. The court gave a supplemental instruction designed for deadlock, to which neither party objected. After additional deliberation, the court concluded that the jury was deadlocked, polled the jurors, and over Capozzi’s objection, declared a mistrial. A retrial was scheduled, but Capozzi pled guilty. The government objected to a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The court found that because the government did not move for a reduction, Capozzi was entitled only to a two-level reduction and sentenced Capozzi to 51 months, the top of his Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Capozzi" on Justia Law

Nichols, a Tennessee state prisoner awaiting execution, had an “oppressive and forlorn childhood, due to his father’s abuse, his mother’s illness, their poverty, and the church-dominated society into which he was born” in 1960. Nichols graduated high school; he enlisted in the Army in 1981. He was discharged two years early. In 1984, he pled guilty to burglary and assault with attempt to rape. A psychological report found nothing remarkable. He married and had a stable relationship. In 1987 Nichols returned to jail for a prowling conviction and parole violation. He was released and returned to his wife and job. He began disappearing at night. Following rapes or attempted rapes of 12 women (Pulley died as a result) in 1988-1989, police received an anonymous tip identifying Nichols. Police showed photo-arrays to four victims, each of whom identified Nichols immediately. Nichols waived counsel and Miranda rights and videotaped a confession to four rapes. After being allowed to sleep, Nichols confessed to other rapes. Additional victims identified Nichols. Nichols directed a detective to recover the board used to murder Pulley. Nichols’s wife stated that Nichols had confessed to her. A Ph.D. and an M.D. found Nichols competent to stand trial. State courts rejected his appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief. In 2005 DNA testing confirmed Nichols as the source of sperm on Pulley’s clothing. The district court rejected his federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance and multiple procedural arguments. View "Nichols v. Heidle" on Justia Law

In 2009, the district court sentenced Defendant to incarceration, followed by two years of supervised release, for the sale of counterfeit obligations. Supervised release began in November, 2010. In 2012, the district court transferred jurisdiction of Defendant’s supervised release. Before the transfer, Defendant left the district without permission on four occasions and was arrested twice for promoting prostitution. Defendant entered a guilty plea and waived his right to appeal. The district court sentenced Defendant to 13 months of incarceration, as recommended. Defendant appealed, arguing that his plea was invalid because the violations upon which it was based occurred before transfer of jurisdiction of his supervised release and that he was then unaware of potential issues with the court’s jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to revoke release and that Defendant’s guilty plea was valid under 18 U.S.C. 3605, which authorizes a transferee court to revoke a term of supervised release for violations committed prior to transfer and gives transferee courts equal power to terminate or reduce the conditions of supervised release. The court noted the need to avoid creating a “twilight zone” whereby supervisees would obtain immunity for violations committed, but not discovered, before transfer. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Romo was sleeping in the driver’s seat of a parked car, intoxicated, when he was approached by Officer Largen, who arrested Romo for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, based on Largen’s observation of Romo’s having driven the car minutes earlier. Romo claimed that he had not been driving and filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit claiming that Largen violated his constitutional rights and committed several intentional torts. The district court denied Largen’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified-immunity, finding that a jury could disbelieve Largen’s claim that he had seen a very similar car being driven in violation of traffic laws. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that it was bound by the district court’s finding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed. View "Romo v. Largen" on Justia Law

In 2001 Fitzpatrick killed his girlfriend, her 12-year-old daughter, and a neighbor. There were questions about his mental health. A pretrial hearing was held because of Fitzpatrick’s confession to his cousin that the devil had made him commit the crimes. The court took no action, based on the statement of the lead investigator that officers had no concerns about competence. After opening statements, in a sidebar, defense counsel stated that Fitzpatrick had indicated his desire to plead guilty and that he recommended against such action. The trial court advised Fitzpatrick of its disinclination to accept a guilty plea. Fitzpatrick insisted that he did not want to wait or to “put his family through this.” When the judge disagreed, Fitzpatrick demanded to be taken out of the courtroom and reiterated that he wanted to stop the trial. Following some discussion of competency and inquiries directed to Fitzpatrick, the court accepted the plea. A panel sentenced him to death. Ohio courts affirmed the convictions and sentence, and denied post-conviction relief. The district court denied petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Fitzpatrick’s statements did not give the trial court reason to believe that he did not understand the consequences of waiving a jury trial and pleading guilty. All three attorneys involved consistently represented that they thought that he was knowingly waiving his rights. View "Fitzpatrick v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Eight defendants who held positions with Clay County, Kentucky, were charged with conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), based on participation in a vote-buying scheme in three election cycles, 2002 to 2007. Candidates pooled money to pay “vote haulers” to deliver voters for a particular slate of candidates. To ensure that they voted for the correct slate, co-conspiring election officers and poll workers reviewed the ballots. When the proper slate was confirmed, the voter got a token or marking and was paid in a location away from the polls. Conspirators retained lists to avoid double payments and to keep track of whose votes could be bought in future elections and used absentee voting and voter-assistance forms to implement the scheme. When electronic voting machines were introduced, conspiring poll workers misinformed voters that they did not need to click “cast ballot” after selecting candidates; poll workers would enter the voting booth after the voter exited and change the electronic ballot to reflect the slate before casting the ballot. The Clay County Board of Elections was alleged to be the racketeering enterprise in the conspiracy. They were convicted after a seven week trial. The Sixth Circuit vacated, based on cumulative errors in evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

In 1986, Harrison was charged with second-degree murder and carrying a firearm during commission of a felony, but was convicted of reckless use of a firearm resulting in death (a lesser-included Misdemeanor) and felony-firearm. Harrison received consecutive sentences, although, under Michigan law, the crimes were subject to concurrent sentencing only. Released in 1990, Harrison committed another firearm offense in 1991, was convicted, and returned to prison. On collateral review of the first conviction, the Michigan Court of Appeals held, in 2008, that Harrison had been improperly sentenced and ordered issuance of a corrected judgment. Harrison sued the state and other defendants, seeking damages and reduction of a subsequent, unrelated prison sentence that he was still serving. The district court dismissed, holding that some defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment; that claims against the remaining defendants were time-barred; and that a claim concerning the failure to commute his 1991 sentence was noncognizable. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding no error in the rulings on sovereign immunity and commutation, but holding that Harrison’s claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is not time-barred. View "Harrison v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

Toledo police officers, near a shopping center with few stores and in an area with many complaints of robberies, thefts, drug activity, and loitering, noticed a group of people, not going in or out of stores, but remaining together without any visible purpose. They also noticed a man on a bicycle, who rode across the parking lot. Jeter arrived on a bicycle, but was not a member of the group, nor was he the individual seen traversing the parking lot; he entered a store and purchased a snack and bottled water. Exiting the store, he consumed the snack, placed his water on his bicycle, and then began to leave just as officers arrived to “saturate” the plaza and prevent anyone from leaving. TPD implements this “bum rush” tactic “every couple weeks” in areas of suspected criminal activity, to get “more gun[s] off the street” or “more person[s] with outstanding warrants.” Thinking he was the person they had seen earlier, officers stopped Jeter, who ran. When officers caught Jeter, they found a handgun. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Jeter pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion. His advisory Guidelines range was 30 to 37 months. The district court sentenced Jeter to 45 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Jeter" on Justia Law

Bistline pled guilty to knowingly possessing 305 images and 56 videos of child pornography on his computer, many of which depicted 8- to 10-year-old girls being raped by adult men. His recommended Guidelines sentence was 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Bistline to a single night’s confinement in lockup, plus 10 years’ supervised release. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that Bistline’s guidelines range should have been “the starting point” for considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and that the court was entitled to consider Bistline’s age, health, and family circumstances, but that those could not justify the sentence imposed. On remand, the district court again imposed a sentence of one day’s confinement and 10 years’ supervised release, stating: “If I have got to send somebody like Mr.Bistline to prison, I’m sorry, someone else will have to do it. I’m not going to do it.” The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for reassignment and resentencing. View "United States v. Bistline" on Justia Law