Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Mendoza drove a truck from North Carolina to Tennessee with Tavera as a passenger. The truck contained construction equipment. A large quantity of methamphetamine was hidden under nails. The truck was stopped after being followed as part of a sting operation. At trial, Tavera, a roofer, testified that he did not know about the drugs and that he thought he was going to Tennessee to view a construction project. Tavera was convicted of participating in a methamphetamine drug conspiracy and sentenced to 186 months of imprisonment. He subsequently learned that days before the trial Mendoza had participated in plea negotiations in which he told Taylor, the prosecution’s trial lawyer, that Tavera had no knowledge of the drug conspiracy. Mendoza later pled guilty and changed his story. Tavera filed an appeal and a year later moved for a new trial in the district court. The district court has not ruled on the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated the conviction, based on the “Brady” violation, calling the case “not close,” and recommended that the U.S. Attorney’s office conduct an investigation of why the prosecutorial error occurred. View "United States v. Tavera" on Justia Law

Stafford was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment. His guideline calculation was enhanced based on armed-career-criminal status; the fact that the firearm was stolen; possession of a firearm in relation to a felony offense; and reckless endangerment during flight from law enforcement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the district court did not err in allowing gunshot-residue evidence or related expert testimony. The court properly applied the the Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement and enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines. The sentence was procedurally reasonable and the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act is not void for vagueness. View "United States v. Stafford" on Justia Law

Federal agents tracked Rivas from Texas to Memphis, suspecting he might be trafficking drugs. Rivas later met defendants and the three drove around Memphis in multiple vehicles before arriving at a warehouse. One of the vehicles was a tractor-trailer. The tractor was registered to Rivas. When agents moved in to investigate, defendants complied, but Rivas fled. While a search for Rivas was ongoing, a narcotics dog alerted the officers to the presence of controlled substances in the trailer. The agents later recovered, among other things, one ton of marijuana under the floor of the trailer. In the prosecution that followed, the district court ruled that defendants were unlawfully detained and, as a remedy, suppressed the marijuana evidence as to them, but not as to Rivas, whom it found was lawfully seized. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the recovered evidence was not the product of defendants’ detention, so, lawful or not, suppression was not warranted. Given the officers’ reasonable suspicion that Rivas was using the tractor-trailer to traffic drugs and their knowledge that Rivas owned the tractor, they had authority to detain the vehicle at least briefly. View "United States v. Figuerdo-Diaz" on Justia Law

While awaiting a hearing, Zabawa made threats and behaved in an agitated way. Officer Murphy decided to handcuff Zabawa to prevent him from disarming an officer. Before he could do so, Zabawa lunged at Murphy and started punching him. Murphy blocked the attack, and got Zabawa onto the floor by elbowing, kneeing, and headbutting him. After a struggle, Murphy handcuffed Zabawa with the help of other officers. During the fight, Murphy suffered a cut over his eye that required stitches. Murphy testified that he did not know whether the cut happened when he headbutted Zabawa or when Zabawa punched him. A grand jury indicted Zabawa for assaulting and “inflicting bodily injury” on a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b). Zabawa’s trial did not take place for more than five and a half years. After Zabawa was found competent to stand trial, the court denied a motion to dismiss based on the delay. Zabawa was convicted and sentenced to 222 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that “inflict” is a narrower term than “cause” and that Murphy admitted that the injury might have resulted from his application of force to Zabawa, rather than from force Zabawa applied to him. View "United States v. Zabawa" on Justia Law

In August, 1996, Timmerman arrived at her mother’s home, hysterical and bleeding from a laceration on her nose. She said that a man named Gabrion had raped her. Timmerman was 19 years old and had given birth to a baby six weeks earlier. She told her mother that Gabrion had said that, if she reported the rape, he would kill her and her baby. She reported the rape to the Newaygo County Sheriff. Two days before the trial was set to begin, Gabrion, free on bond, abducted Timmerman, took her to a remote location on federal land in the Manistee National Forest, bound and gagged her and weighed her down with concrete blocks, and threw her, alive, into a shallow lake, where she drowned. Gabrion also abducted and killed Timmerman’s infant daughter. The government presented 58 witnesses; a federal jury convicted Gabrion of murder and recommended that he be sentenced to death. The district court sentenced him accordingly. On rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the fact that Michigan has no death penalty should have been considered a mitigating factor and a challenge to the voir dire. View "United States v. Gabrion" on Justia Law

The Michigan Department of Corrections agreed to house LaFountain at Lakeland in exchange for dismissal of his lawsuits. LaFountain wanted assignment to Lakeland to enable family visits and avoid further retaliation from Muskegon correctional officers. After the transfer, LaFountain filed new grievances, alleging selective enforcement of housing-unit rules based on race. He was transferred back to Muskegon. When LaFountain arrived at Muskegon, his typewriter was missing. He filed another grievance. At Muskegon, he was assigned to a cell with Riley, a mentally ill prisoner. Riley threatened LaFountain and kept him awake with lights and noise. LaFountain filed a grievance, alleging retaliation. After Riley threatened LaFountain’s life, LaFountain refused to remain in his cell and spent eight days in segregations. Each new shift ordered LaFountain to continue celling with Riley. Every time that he refused, the officers cited LaFountain for major misconduct, causing forfeiture of 770 days of good-time credits. The district court reviewed his civil rights suit under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and dismissed it, 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) & 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. 1997e(c)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of certain of the retaliation claims based on the transfer to Muskegon, the typewriter damage, and the cell assignment. View "LaFountain v. Harry" on Justia Law

In 2005 the Blewetts were convicted of crack cocaine offenses and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 10 years each under the 100-to-1 crack cocaine law, based on the quantity of crack cocaine possessed. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 as implemented by new sentencing guidelines, has substantially reduced crack cocaine sentences, including the mandatory minimum sentences, 21 U.S.C. 841(b). If the Blewetts were sentenced today, they would not be subject to a statutory minimum because the quantity of crack involved falls below the threshold for any statutory minimum. The district court denied retroactive resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)2 and 28 U.S.C. 994(u)3. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the old 100-to-1 crack cocaine ratio has led to the mass incarceration of thousands of nonviolent prisoners under a law widely acknowledged as racially discriminatory; thousands of inmates, most black, languish in prison under the old, discredited ratio because the Fair Sentencing Act was not made explicitly retroactive by Congress. Judicial perpetuation of the discriminatory mandatory minimum crack sentences for those defendants sentenced under the old crack sentencing law would violate the Equal Protection Clause. View "United States v. Blewitt" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told law enforcement that he had seen cocaine and what he considered to be drug dealing at Brown’s house. An officer sought a warrant to search Brown’s home; in the affidavit, the officer recounted what the informant had told him. A federal magistrate issued the warrant and, upon executing it, law enforcement found cocaine, a Beretta pistol, which Brown admitted was his, and $4,700 in cash, in Brown’s home. Brown moved to suppress the evidence seized, arguing that the affidavit failed to establish probable; in the alternative, Brown argued for a Franks hearing, asserting that the affidavit contained false statements. The district court denied the motion. Brown was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and possession, as a felon, of a firearm, 15 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and sentenced to 17-1/2 years’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the affidavit established probable cause, that the court did not err in refusing a Franks hearing, and that the conviction did not constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Hill, Director of Risk Management for Detroit Public Schools invited Washington to submit a proposal for a wellness program for DPS employees. Washington and others joined Associates for Learning (A4L) and submitted a proposal quoting $150,000 for a pilot study. Contrary to DPS policy, Hill did not open competitive bidding or execute a written contract, and made payments by wire transfer, rather than by check. Hill, who later left DPS testified that he met with Washington to discuss larger amounts. Washington paid Hill five percent of the invoice amount for assistance in getting the invoices paid. Invoices totaling more than a million dollars for “future work” were paid. The partners met in public places to distribute cash. Washington was convicted of conspiracy to commit program fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 666, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956. The district court enhanced Washington’s base offense level by 22 levels, finding that Washington was an “organizer or leader” and that the amount of loss to DPS was more than $2.5 million, and sentenced her to 84 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Washington was not prejudiced by errors made by counsel and that the evidence was sufficient. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Smith, aged 20, took a cell phone charger. The store manager intercepted him and Smith revealed the open package, with part of the charger removed. Smith refused to stay while the manager called the police. Officers Stoneburner and Knapp interviewed store employees, reviewed a security videotape and went to the Smith house. Smith’s brother met the officers at the door, then went into the house. Stoneburner followed and asked Smith to step outside. Smith, his mother (Donnetta), and his brother complied. Smith denied stealing or cutting the charger and allowed Stoneburner to pat him down. Stoneburner found only a lighter. Stoneburner followed Smith back inside, grabbed Smith by the wrist, and pulled Smith back outside. Stoneburner collided with Donnetta, causing her to hit the side of the house. Stoneburner bent Smith over the railing. Smith stiffened himself. Stoneburner and Knapp each grabbed an arm and pressed his head against the wall as they handcuffed him. Smith pled guilty to disturbing the peace. The Smiths filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Stoneburner unconstitutionally entered their home twice and excessive force. The district court denied qualified immunity on all claims and granted summary judgment in favor of Smith on the second entry into the house. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of immunity. View "Smith v. City of Sturgis" on Justia Law