Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Based on a mortgage fraud scheme that caused the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to insure loans for unqualified applicants based upon forged documents and false information provided by Wendlandt, he pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371, and was sentenced to 42 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s computation of financial loss for purposes of determining his offense level under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1 and to the court’s decision to vary upward from the advisory Guidelines range of 24 to months in prison. View "United States v. Wendlandt" on Justia Law

Local resident Banks told police that on a specified date, he witnessed manufacture of methamphetamine, firearms, and a bomb at Hodge’s home. He observed a person shaking “sports drink bottles that appeared to have a grayish, sandy, sludge in the bottom with liquid and pieces of black chunks floating on the top,” characteristic of a “one pot style methamphetamine cook.” Banks gave a detailed description of a pipe bomb. Hodge claimed it could “blow up the entire house,” showed Banks a firearm that he called an AK-47, and told Banks that, if confronted, he “would shoot every cop that he could.” Officers obtained a warrant and found a pipe bomb, marijuana, prescription drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a rifle. Indicted for possession of an unregistered destructive device, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), and possession of a firearm while unlawfully using a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Hodge moved to suppress, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause and that statements he made alerting officers to the pipe bomb were obtained through custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. The district court denied the motion. Hodge entered a conditional guilty plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The questioning was permissible because officers had a reasonable belief based on articulable facts that they were in danger. View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Three minors told Cincinnati police that Rose had sexually molested them and had shown them pornographic images on a computer in his bedroom. Police obtained a warrant to search Rose’s computers; its front page identified “Kenneth Rose” as the subject, and immediately below, identified the search location as “709 Elberon Av. [sic], Cincinnati, Hamilton County, Ohio.” The warrant described physical attributes of the address, including that the name “Rose” appeared over the doorbell of apartment number one and included a photograph of the property taken from the Hamilton County Auditor’s website. The supporting affidavit summarized the testimony of the three victims, but did not provide Rose’s address. Forensic analysis of a computer seized during the search revealed numerous images of child pornography, with several of Rose engaged in sexual conduct with male minors under the age of 16. Rose entered into a conditional plea agreement, pleading guilty to three counts of production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251, preserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress and his motion to dismiss. He was sentenced to 51 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the warrant and an argument that the charged activities were only intrastate. View "United States v. Rose" on Justia Law

Grigsby, a middle-age man who lived in homeless shelters, was charged with three unarmed bank robberies, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Psychologists conducted examinations and filed reports that diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia and stated that Grigsby was not competent to stand trial. Neither party objected. The court committed Grigsby to custody (18 U.S.C. 4241(d)(1)) to determine whether he could be restored to competency to stand trial. Forensic evaluators concluded that Grigsby did not understand the seriousness of his legal difficulty; lacked ability to assist his lawyer during trial; and was not capable of waiving his constitutional rights rationally or of testifying on his own behalf. Grigsby refused to take oral medication. Because he was not gravely disabled and did not present a danger to himself, others, or the facility, he did not meet the criteria for involuntary medication. The evaluators requested an order authorizing them to inject Grigsby involuntarily with a first-generation antipsychotic drug, (haloperidol (Haldol) or fluphenazine), or a second-generation antipsychotic drug, risperidone, to restore competency. These medications can cause serious side effects. The district court granted an order under Sell v. U.S. (2003). The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that special circumstances unique to the case indicate that Grigsby’s liberty interest in avoiding involuntary medication outweighs the government’s interest in prosecution. View "United States v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

Officers responded to a call describing a male yelling for help outside an apartment, followed by a report that a naked male entered a nearby apartment. Approaching, Tieber encountered a naked male, Martin, age 19, running and speaking nonsensically. Martin asked for help, then “jogged away.” Tieber ran and fell on Martin’s back. Semanco dropped his knee into Martin’s side, fell on top of both men, and delivered “compliance body shots.” Martin bit Tieber; Tieber struck Martin’s face. Semanco struck Martin’s face, back, and ribs at least five times. Tieber folded his legs around Martin’s hips and gripped Martin’s chin with his arm. As Tieber and Semanco attempted to secure Martin’s arms, Zimmerman kneeled on Martin’s calves. Officers heard a “gurgling sound.” They rolled an unresponsive Martin onto his side, tried to resuscitate him, and called paramedics. Martin died. The coroner determined that Martin died from an acute psychotic episode with excited delirium due to LSD intoxication and cardiopulmonary arrest. The pathologist who conducted the autopsy noted injuries suggesting asphyxiation. A pathologist hired by Martin’s estate agreed. The department had a use-of-force policy, and a “Positional Asphyxia Policy” that warns that a person, psychotic due to mental illness or drugs or alcohol, is particularly susceptible to death. Two officers said they never considered this policy. In the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Martin v. City of Broadview Heights" on Justia Law

Hammond was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. A presentence report noted that the mandatory minimum term was 120 months. At sentencing, the district court determined that a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm did not apply and that category II overrepresented Hammond’s criminal history. Based on a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of I, the district court considered a range of 121 to 151 months and imposed a 121-month sentence. In 2012, Hammond moved for reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which increased the amount of cocaine base necessary to trigger mandatory minimum sentences, 124 Stat. 2372. Revised penalties were made retroactive in 2011. The Probation Office advised that Hammond’s total offense level should be reduced by two levels to level 30, resulting in a guidelines range of imprisonment of 120 to 135 months. The district court reduced his sentence to 120 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court applied all applicable retroactive amendments had no authority to further reduce the sentence. View "United States v. Hammond" on Justia Law

An officer pursued Woods’s speeding car to a parking lot. As Woods began exiting the car, the officer ordered Woods to re-enter the car and place his hands on the wheel. Woods did not comply, but reached toward the passenger side of the car. Concerned that Woods might have a weapon, the officer drew his gun. When Woods complied, the officer lowered his weapon, advised Woods that he had been caught speeding, and asked for identification. Woods provided a false name and said that he did not have identification. The officer waited for backup to arrest Woods for driving without a license. When the officers approached, Woods again reached toward the passenger side. The officers pulled him out of the car. During a pat-down, the officer felt a hard lump in Woods’s pocket and asked “What is in your pocket?” Woods stated twice that he was “bogue,” meaning “in possession of something illegal,” then stated that he had a gun in the car. Through the window, the officer observed what looked like a handgun on the floorboard. He recovered the gun and a bag containing crack cocaine. Woods’s motion to suppress was denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the officer was not required to give Miranda warnings before asking “What is in your pocket?” upon encountering a lump in Woods’s clothing during the course of a lawful pat-down incident to arrest. View "United States v. Wood" on Justia Law

After moving to Tennessee, Doyle was charged with failure to register as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), to which he pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The district court sentenced Doyle to three years and one month in prison followed by ten years of supervised release, upon which the district court imposed special conditions, forbidding Doyle from: possessing any pornography, even legal pornography; from having any direct or indirect contact with any child under the age of 18; loitering near school yards, playgrounds, swimming pools, arcades or other places frequented by children; from using sexually-oriented telephone numbers or computer services; or from possessing or using any computer with access to any “on-line service” or other forms of wireless communication at any location (including employment) without the prior approval of the Probation Officer. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the district court erred procedurally by failing to explain its reasons for imposing the special conditions, and that the record did not otherwise illuminate the reasons. View "United States v. Doyle" on Justia Law

A victim, who knew Daws, told deputies that Daws had crashed a shotgun barrel through a window and charged into his house. Daws thrust the gun in his face, took cash, and warned that if the victim called police, Daws would “come back and kill him.” Officers received a second call and went to another house. The occupant said that Daws and another man had come over asking to hide a weapon. The man turned Daws away. Deputies knew Daws had previous weapons convictions and served time for aggravated burglary after holding a gas station attendant at gunpoint and threatening to kill him. They wore body armor and approached Daws’s rural house, finding his friend outside, confessing on the phone that he and Daws had “done something bad.” Deputies apprehended the man, who told them Daws was inside. Deputies entered through an open door and found Daws asleep. After apprehending him, they performed a protective sweep and found Daws’s shotgun. Daws pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and was sentenced to 210 months, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a public safety exigency justified a warrantless search. View "United States v. Daws" on Justia Law

After a Tennessee state court jury convicted Lovins of second-degree murder, the state trial court judge made additional factual findings, employing procedures that the Supreme Court later found unconstitutional, and enhanced Lovins’s sentence from 20 to 23 years based on those findings. After Lovins exhausted state post-conviction procedures, the federal district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit reversed and conditionally granted the writ unless the state initiates proceedings within 180 days to either reset Lovins’s sentence to the presumptive statutory sentence of 20 years, or provide Lovins a new sentencing hearing under a sentencing procedure that satisfies the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and reasoning that the sentence was enhanced based on facts that were not found by a jury. Lovins’s direct appeal was not final until almost three years after the Blakely decision, and therefore Blakely applies to his case under clearly-established retroactivity rules. View "Lovins v. Parker" on Justia Law