Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1992, Hodges pled guilty to first-degree murder in Tennessee and a jury sentenced him to death. The trial court refused to allow his attorneys to ask prospective jurors whether they could consider a life sentence for a defendant with a prior conviction for murder. The evidence indicated that Hodges planned the killing of a stranger to obtain money to move to Florida. Hodges presented mitigation evidence, claiming he had been raped at age 12, had drug abuse issues, and was raised in an unstable household. State courts upheld the conviction and sentence on appeal and denied Hodges’s petition for post-conviction relief. Hodges petitioned for federal habeas relief, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that state courts reasonably applied federal law in determining that restrictions imposed on voir dire did not interfere with Hodges’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial and in determining that Hodges’s trial counsel were not ineffective for advising Hodges to plead guilty to murder and aggravated robbery. The district court properly denied Hodges’s requests for discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and habeas relief on a claim of juror misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Hodges v. Bell" on Justia Law

Omstott told Lexington police that her boyfriend, Kinison, was involved in criminal sexual activity with children and that Kinison had been sending text messages concerning his desire to get involved with a Savannah group that allegedly adopts children and allows people in the group to engage in sex with those children. Agents downloaded 1,646 pages of text messages with her consent; the messages corroborated Omstott’s claims. In one message Kinison suggested that they could babysit a child under two-years-old that would not be able to talk so that they could, perform sexual acts on the child, and take photos to send to the group. Omstott claimed Kinison was viewing pornographic videos on his home computer. After obtaining warrants, agents seized a computer and a cell phone from Kinison’s house and the phone from his car. He was indicted for receiving and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and 2252(a)(4)(B). Kinison admitted in a post-Miranda statement that he authored and sent the text messages. The district court granted Kinison’s motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that there was “no culpable police conduct to deter here.” View "United States v. Kinison" on Justia Law

Williams, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, was convicted in 1999 in New York for a firearms charge and deported. Williams re-entered illegally and in 2002 was arrested for kidnapping, robbery, assault, and marijuana possession; he failed to appear for any court proceedings. Williams relocated to Nashville, where he obtained a driver’s license in the name of Arnold Fordham. The DEA began investigating Williams for distributing oxycodone, but believed that he was Fordham. The DEA executed a warrant on Williams’s home and found more than 1,000 oxycodone pills and 190 oxymorphone pills. Williams stated that his name was Fordham and admitted that he had been selling the pills and that he had a gun in the house. Two months after his initial appearance, Williams told the court his real name. He pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The government argued that Williams had obstructed justice when he lied about his identity and requested a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G 3C1.1. The court applied the enhancement and sentenced Williams to 87 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that misrepresentation of identity was not material to any matter decided by the district court. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 1997, Howell, then 17, and five friends left Kentucky, taking guns and a rickety car. At a rest stop in Tennessee, Lillelid, approached the group, sharing his religious views. Risner displayed a gun, directed the Lillelid family to their van even though Lillelid offered his keys and wallet. Risner, still armed, Howell, and others rode with the Lillelids to a secluded road where the Lillelids and their children were shot. Only two-year-old Peter survived, but lost an eye. When they were caught in Arizona, the group had the Lillelids’ possessions. All pled guilty in adult court in exchange for withdrawal of death-penalty requests and for certainty about other punishments. Howell received three life sentences without the possibility of parole and 25 years for attempted murder, each to be served consecutively, plus 25 years for especially aggravated kidnapping, 12 years for aggravated kidnapping and four years for theft, to run concurrently. State courts rejected Howell’s post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on her attorney’s failure to insist that she undertake a psychological evaluation The Tennessee Supreme Court held that, although the attorney had performed deficiently, Howell could not show prejudice. The federal district court rejected her habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Howell v. Hodge" on Justia Law

In sight of Nixon and Greene, Ballinger had an argument with Jones, retrieved a rifle and began shooting, then fled. Two men died of gunshot wounds. There was no physical evidence tying Ballinger to the scene; the prosecution presented testimony by Nixon and Greene. Before trial, defense attorney Jackson filed a list of potential alibi witnesses, which included Krisel. After the government objected to the notice, Jackson withdrew it. The jury convicted Ballinger. Before sentencing, Ballinger argued ineffective assistance due to Jackson’s failure to call Cunningham, claiming that Cunningham was Krisel’s married name and Jackson was aware of her possible testimony. The court denied Ballinger’s motions. Michigan courts rejected appeals. On a habeas corpus petition, the district court held an evidentiary hearing at which Jackson testified that he did not argue alibi because Ballinger admitted committing the murders. Cunningham testified that she was Krisel and was with Ballinger when the crimes were committed, that Jackson never contacted her, but that she never tried to contact authorities. The district court considered that Jackson was later disbarred on an unrelated matter and granted the petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing, given that a state court had issued a decision on the merits with respect to the claim. State courts did not violate clearly established federal law in rejecting Ballinger’s ineffective-assistance claim. View "Ballinger v. Preslesnik" on Justia Law

When her car was stopped, Villega, then pregnant, failed to produce a valid driver’s license. At the jail, an agent of the U.S. through Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 287(g) program, 8 U.S.C. 1357(g), determined that Villega was not lawfully in the U.S. A detainer was imposed, so that federal immigration officials would delay action until resolution of pending state charges. Unable to post bond, she was classified as a medium-security inmate because of the detainer and held for two days, until she informed a guard that she was about to have her baby. For transportation, Villega was placed on a stretcher with her wrists handcuffed in front of her body and her legs restrained together. At the hospital, the handcuffs were removed, but one of Villega’s legs remained shackled to the stretcher before and after the birth. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment on her shackling and denial-of-breast-pump claims; a jury awarded $200,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, noting material factual disputes surrounding whether Villega was shown to be a flight risk, whether officers had any knowledge about a doctor’s no-restraint order, and the conflicting expert testimony about the ill effects of shackling. View "Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty." on Justia Law

Sims was set to go to trial on charges that he possessed child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2)), and that he attempted to produce child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e)). Four days before trial he pled guilty to the possession charges. The district court then excluded the plea, expected testimony by the mother of one of the minors, and all evidence of Sims’s possession of child pornography from his attempted-production trial. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The trial court did not distinguish between the different types of evidence, incorrectly reasoning that the excluded evidence was relevant only to an issue that would not be important at trial: Sims’s intent. The intent element of the charged offense requires the government to prove that Sims specifically intended to obtain a lascivious image when he stood outside the minor’s bedroom window with a video camera. The district court erred, therefore, when it discounted the probative value of intent evidence in its balancing under Rule 403. The court’s reasoning did not adequately distinguish between prejudice that is unfair and prejudice that is fair with respect to the different types of evidence. View "United States v. Sims" on Justia Law

In unrelated child pornography convictions, Gamble and Crawford were ordered by their respective district courts to pay over $1,000,000 in restitution to “Vicky,” the pseudonym of one of the individuals depicted in the images they possessed or received. Restitution was ordered jointly and severally under 18 U.S.C. 2259, which makes restitution mandatory for “the full amount of the victim’s losses” in child exploitation cases. The Sixth Circuit remanded because the district courts did not require a showing of proximate cause between the losses and the defendants’ offenses. Sixth Circuit case law requires such a showing. On remand the district court must reconsider the extent to which the defendants must pay restitution where they share responsibility for Vicky’s injuries with hundreds of other child pornography viewers. View "United States v. Crawford" on Justia Law

Moore was convicted in Ohio state court of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. The district court conditionally granted his habeas petition based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and improper jury instructions. The Sixth Circuit reversed and rejected Moore’s additional claims of ineffective assistance for failure to employ a mitigation specialist, of prosecutorial misconduct in presenting testimony by the victim’s father and in making comments about the defense, and concerning police treatment of the then-19-year-old Moore. View "Moore v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Quigley was 23 years old, with no known life-threatening physical conditions when he was transferred from one Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) facility to an MDOC guidance center, where he was under the care of CMS, a service provider with which MDOC contracted. CMS employees Dr. Thai and physician’s assistant Garver treated Quigley for moderate depression and prescribed medications. After about a month, Quigley was found dead in his cell. The medication chart confirmed that Quigley had been administered both Amitriptyline and Trazodone the previous three days. The autopsy report concluded that Quigley died of an epileptic seizure disorder. Quigley’s estate obtained affidavits from a forensic pathologist, who concluded that Quigley likely died from a fatal drug interaction between the tricyclic Amitriptyline and tetracyclic Trazodone and from a psychiatrist, who similarly concluded that the fatal drug interaction likely killed Quigley. Thai provided three medical-expert affidavits, all concluding that the best explanation for Quigley’s death is epileptic seizure. Quigley’s estate sued Thai, Garver, and CMS under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied a motion asserting qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that there were unresolved material questions of fact concerning the cause of death. View "Quigley v. Thai" on Justia Law