Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officers tried to serve an arrest warrant on Brown at 3171 Hendricks Avenue in Memphis. On Hendricks Avenue, they could not find a house with a 3171 address, but found two houses on opposite sides of the street with a 3170 address. Noticing that one of the two houses was occupied, they knocked, a woman answered, and she promptly shut the door. While one officer went to the back of the house, the other knocked again. After several minutes, the occupant opened the door. Instead of asking the woman what the address of the house was, whether Brown lived there or whether this was the odd-numbered side of the street, the officer represented to the woman that he had a warrant “for this address.” The woman let the officers into the house, owned by Shaw, where they performed a protective sweep and found a lot of cocaine. They arrested Shaw. The district court denied Shaw’s motion to suppress and pled guilty to distributing cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the officers had no right to enter the house based on a falsity and that their actions were not reasonable. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Officer Parks stopped the car driven by Johnson based on a seat-belt violation. Approaching the vehicle, he smelled marijuana and noticed a license plate on the seat. A passenger admitted she had smoked marijuana in the car and initially provided her sister’s identification information. Johnson stated that he knew he would be arrested because a condition of release for a prior conviction required him to stay away from the passenger and that he was a convicted felon and had a loaded gun underneath the seat. Once the database (NCIC) confirmed that Johnson had been ordered to stay away from LuShanda Giles, Parks handcuffed Johnson; located the passenger’s identifying information, confirming that she was LuShanda; and recovered the weapon. The district court denied a motion to suppress the firearm. Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924. The court held that a Tennessee conviction of facilitation to commit aggravated robbery was not a violent felony, but that a conviction of first-degree stalking did qualify and sentenced Johnson to 180 months, the minimum mandatory under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to both the denial of suppression and the sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Peppel, former President, CEO, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of MCSi, a publicly-traded communications-technology company, conspired with CFO Stanley to falsify MCSi accounting records and financial statements in order to conceal the actual earnings from shareholders, while laundering proceeds from the sale of his own shares in a public stock offering. Peppel pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit securities, mail, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1371 and 1349; willful false certification of a financial report by a corporate officer,18 U.S.C. 1350; and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. The parties stipulated to use of the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manual The district court heard testimony and received reports on five competing amount-of-loss theories and, based almost solely on its estimation of Peppel as “a remarkably good man,” varied downward drastically from this advisory range, imposing a custodial sentence of only seven days—a 99.9975% reduction. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonably low sentence, but did not err in calculating the amount of loss or number of victims. View "United States v. Peppel" on Justia Law

Yeremin, a Russian citizen, lawfully entered the U.S. in 1999; in 2004, he pled guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(f), for conspiracy to traffic in fraudulent identification documents in violation based on “unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, and … possession of 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification. Yeremin was sentenced to five months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. n 2005, DHS initiated removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), which allows removal of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of admission to the U.S., if the crime is punishable by at least one year in prison, and second under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An IJ rejected an argument that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude, because he did not plead guilty to an offense which necessarily involved fraudulent or deceptive conduct. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied review, applying the “categorical approach” because the conduct prohibited by the statute he was convicted under inherently involves deceit. View "Yeremin v. Holder" on Justia Law

Governor Strickland appointed Terry to fill a vacancy on the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Terry sought reelection to retain the seat and enlisted the help of County Auditor Russo, a presence in Cleveland politics. The FBI was investigating Russo and had tapped his phones. Russo had a phone conversation with an attorney about foreclosure cases on Terry’s docket and promised to make sure Terry did what he was “supposed to do.” Later, by phone, Russo told Terry to deny motions for summary judgment. Terry said he would and did so. Russo ultimately pled guilty to 21political corruption counts and received a 262-month prison sentence. Terry was convicted of conspiring with Russo to commit mail fraud and honest services fraud; and honest services fraud by accepting things of value from Russo and others in exchange for favorable official action, 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(2).. The district court sentenced him to 63 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, quoting once-Speaker of the California General Assembly, Jesse Unruh, “If you can’t eat [lobbyists’] food, drink their booze, . . . take their money and then vote against them, you’ve got no business being [in politics],” View "United States v. Terry" on Justia Law

For more than 20 years, Kurlemann built and sold luxury homes in Ohio. In 2005-2006 he borrowed $2.4 million to build houses in Mason. When neither sold, he enlisted realtor Duke, who found two straw buyers, willing to lie about their income and assets on loan applications that Duke submitted to Washington Mutual. Both buyers defaulted. Duke pled guilty to seven counts, including loan fraud and making false statements to a lending institution, and agreed to testify at Kurlemann’s trial. A jury convicted Kurlemann of six counts, including making false statements to a lending institution, 18 U.S.C. 1014; and bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 157. The district court sentenced Kurlemann to concurrent 24-month sentences and ordered him to pay $1.1 million in restitution. The district court sentenced Duke to 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy fraud conviction, based on Kurlemann’s concealment of his interest in property, but reversed and remanded his false statements conviction, finding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that concealment was sufficient to support conviction. The court also reversed Duke’s sentence, finding that the court failed to explain the sentence it imposed. View "United States v. Kurlemann" on Justia Law

Coley was convicted in Ohio of aggravated murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery and firearm specifications, based on events that occurred in 1996. He was sentenced to death on the aggravated murder charges. His petition for state post-conviction relief was rejected at all levels. The federal district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to the indictment; ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to request that the trial judge recuse herself; prosecutorial misconduct for using inconsistent theories to convict; ineffective assistance of counsel during mitigation; ineffective assistance of counsel during mitigation for failing to request that trial judge recuse herself; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; failure to consider mitigating evidence; and of error in the trial court’s decisions to not provide Coley with grand jury transcripts and to not sever certain counts. View "Coley v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana and of aiding and abetting possession with the intent to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and sentenced to 320 months of incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial after testimony of a prosecution witness that purportedly revealed a Brady violation and constituted a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The evidence at issue was neither exculpatory nor material. The court remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to identify particular statements that amounted to perjury, to justify enhancement for obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Macias-Faria" on Justia Law

Johnson was a heroin dealer. After a 17-year-old customer died of acute heroin toxicity, Johnson and customers who had been with the decedent during the fatal overdose were charged in state court. Johnson and one customer were subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury for distribution of heroin resulting in death; distribution of heroin to a minor resulting in death; and possession with intent to distribute heroin. Johnson agreed to plead guilty. The probation office determined a base offense level of 43 (USSG 2D1.1(a)(1)) because he was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C), the offense resulted in death, and Johnson had a prior conviction for a “similar offense,” a 2009 conviction for based on 3.5 grams of heroin found in Johnson’s possession. Johnson received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. His total offense level was 40. He had a criminal history category of IV. The court rejected an argument that his prior conviction was not a “similar offense,” but departed downward by five levels for an advisory guidelines range of 235 to 293 months and an effective range of 240 to 293 months because of a mandatory minimum. The district court imposed a sentence of 240 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Lumbard was arrested by Michigan authorities on warrants charging breaking and entering, destruction of a building, and larceny. He was released on a $100,000 bond. Other outstanding warrants charged aggravated battery, obstruction of justice, receiving stolen property, and more. Eluding capture on the other warrants, Lumbard paid Cheesebrew $500 for his birth date, social security number, and information about his place of birth and his parents. Lumbard used the information to obtain a driver’s license, a copy of Cheesebrew’s birth certificate, and a passport. He traveled to Tokyo, Thailand, and Burma after attempting to stage a “suicide.” Lumbard was eventually located and, during transport, attempted to stab a Burmese officer in order to be charged in Burma, which would have prevented extradition. He entered a conditional guilty plea to falsely representing information in an application for a passport and knowingly providing false identifying documents, 18 U.S.C. 1542 and using the name, social security number, date of birth, and driver’s license of another person to obtain a passport, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) and (c)(7), (aggravated identity theft). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that a purchase of identification can constitute aggravated identity theft. View "United States v. Lumbard" on Justia Law