Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Deen was convicted of distributing five grams or more of cocaine base and sentenced to prison for 66 months, followed by four years of supervised release. Deen began his supervised release in 2011. Months later, at a revocation hearing, Deen pleaded guilty to violations stemming from domestic violence incidents, alcohol use, and failure to report and to attend behavioral therapy. The government pushed for “a significant term of imprisonment where [Deen] hopefully can get some treatment for alcohol abuse, and perhaps counseling in terms of anger management.” The court sentenced Deen to 24 months’ imprisonment, followed by 24 months of supervised release. The judge explained her decision in terms of the goal of rehabilitation. In 2012, Deen and the government jointly requested that this court vacate Deen’s sentence and remand for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court decision, Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011), that hat the Sentencing Reform Act does not permit a court to “impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the bar on sentencing decisions based on rehabilitative needs applies equally to supervised-release sentences. View "United States v. Deen" on Justia Law

In 2004 Stout pleaded guilty to second-degree escape (KY Rev. Stats. 520.030) from the prison where he was incarcerated. Stout admitted to scaling the wall and escaping through a hole in the fence, but denied cutting the hole in the fence. The government proffered no evidence indicating that Stout cut the hole in the fence. In 2009 Stout pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing body armor after having been previously convicted of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 931(a)(2), after unsuccessfully arguing that the prior conviction for escape did not constitute a “crime of violence,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. 16. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court reasoned that Stout’s actions were “purposeful and aggressive” and “created a serious risk of the use of physical force against guards and members of the general public.” There is substantial risk that offenders who choose to escape from secured settings will engage in physical violence during the course of the escape. View "United States v. Stout" on Justia Law

Wyko sold parts to tire manufacturers, but in the U.S., provided parts for steel tire-assembly machines only for Goodyear. Wyko contracted with HaoHua, owned by the Chinese government, to supply parts unlike any it had previously built. Goodyear used machines like those Wyko needed. Goodyear asked Wyko to repair tire-assembly machines. Wyko sent engineers. Before their visit, both signed agreements that they might have access to trade secrets or other confidential information and that they would not disclose that information. A security guard reminded them that no cameras were allowed inside the factory. Unescorted for a few minutes, one engineer used his cell-phone camera to take photos that were forwarded to the design team. Wyko’s IT manager forwarded the e-mail to Goodyear. Goodyear notified the FBI. Convicted of theft of trade secrets (18 U.S.C. 1832(a)) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349), the engineers were sentenced to four months of home confinement, community service, and probation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting an argument that the photographs did not meet the statutory definition because Goodyear did not take “reasonable measures” to protect secrecy. The court reversed the sentences because the court had not adequately explained its calculation of loss. View "United States v. Howley" on Justia Law

Stoudemire, then age 23, entered the Michigan Department of Corrections system in 2002, suffering from systemic lupus erythematosus, a chronic, painful autoimmune disease; hypercoagulapathy, a related disorder involving tendency to develop blood clots; and depression. Stoudemire bore a significant risk of experiencing kidney and liver damage, heart attacks, amputations, and chronic pain. Stoudemire’s health quickly deteriorated. She experienced a heart attack, liver failure, and life-threatening embolisms. She underwent three amputations, losing both legs below the knee. At her 2007 parole, she suffered from chronic depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and conditions related to medications. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132; and Michigan law, Stoudemire, alleged that she was placed in a segregation unit following her amputation that lacked accommodations for disabled persons, and was subjected to a strip search that served no legitimate purpose. The district court denied motions by the warden and an officer, seeking summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit vacated with respect to the warden, stating that the court did not adequately analyze deliberate indifference, but affirmed with respect to the officer, stating that the excessively invasive nature of the search outweighed any need to conduct it. View "Stoudemire v. MI Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Luedtke, a pro se federal prisoner, sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241, alleging that prison officials violated his Thirteenth Amendment rights by refusing to pay him the wages he earned in his prison job, failed to require all inmates to work, discriminated against white inmates in favor of black inmates and “illegal aliens from Mexico,” and improperly placed him on refusal status for the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. The district court dismissed under its screening authority, 28 U.S.C. 2243. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, stating that section 2241 is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement. Luedtke’s fourth claim is cognizable under 2241 as a challenge to the execution of a portion of his sentence and the district court erred in dismissing it as unexhausted at the screening stage. Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, generally and in the context of prisoner lawsuits. Even under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, an inmate’s section 1983 claim “may not be dismissed at the screening stage for failure to plead or attach exhibits with proof of exhaustion.” The court denied Luedtke’s motion for appointment of counsel View "Luedtke v. Berkebile" on Justia Law

Catchings pleaded guilty to one count of identity theft; he had fraudulently opened personal credit-card accounts using his former clients’ personal information without their knowledge. When calculating the amount of loss pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1), district courts include losses stemming from relevant conduct under section 1B1.3. In Catching’s case, the district court included losses stemming from credit cards that were in the name of U.S. Investments & Construction, a business that Catchings started with a friend. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. Relevant conduct under United States Sentencing Guidelines 1B1.3 must be criminal conduct to be relevant for the purpose of calculating a defendant’s guidelines range. The conduct involved in opening the U.S. Investments cards involved taking advantage of a trusting friend, but was not criminal. View "Unted States v. Catching" on Justia Law

Susan called 911, seeking help for her 21-year-old son, Andrew, who had “overdosed on some kind of drugs.” EMS personnel waited outside for police per township policy. Sergeant Hunt informed dispatch that he had previously arrested heroin addicts who lived at the address. Hunt was admitted by Andrew’s father and observed Andrew looking very pale. Learning that Hunt was a police officer, Susan demanded that Hunt leave. Hunt explained that rescue personnel have a duty to check the victim, but will not enter a home without a police officer. Susan told Hunt that she was a nurse and that there was no longer any need for EMS. Hunt left and waited in the driveway with medical personnel. Other officers arrived and demanded that the door be opened or that Andrew be sent outside to be checked out. The Strickers continued to resist. A state police dispatcher recommended forced entry to help Andrew, considering Andrew’s history as a heroin user. Assistant Prosecutor Riley agreed that a forced entry was warranted. The officers entered and handcuffed the parents while they administered care to Andrew. The district court granted defendants summary judgment in the Stricklers’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, finding that exigent circumstances justified all of the police’s actions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Stricker v. Twp. of Cambridge " on Justia Law

McClellan, then age 19, was convicted of first degree murder in connection with a barroom conflict between two groups. McClellan received a mandatory life sentence without parole and a consecutive two-year sentence for a firearm conviction. The district court granted a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that McClellan’s defense lawyer did not provide the effective assistance of counsel required by the Sixth Amendment because the lawyer did not interview numerous eyewitnesses who would have testified that McClellan acted in self-defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the state’s assertions that the defense lawyer did not violate the ineffective assistance of counsel standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); that the district court should not have reached the merits because McClellan defaulted his claim by not raising it in a procedurally correct way; and that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and recent Supreme Court cases so limit the federal courts’ authority to decide habeas cases on the merits that McClellan’s petition must be dismissed. View "McClellan v. Rapelje" on Justia Law

In the boarding house where both lived, Perry pointed a revolver at Tibbs’s head. He shut the door and called police. Perry left. When she returned, her landlord stated that she needed to move out. Minutes later she pointed her gun at another resident and forced herself into his room, threatening to kill him. Police arrived and found Perry in the hallway. She complied with an order to put her hands up. Officers withdrew their guns and handcuffed her. Perry’s room was nearby, with the door open. According to witnesses, she consented to a search. Officers saw a revolver sticking out from under a pillow. Their report said that they found the gun during a “protective sweep” and did not mention consent. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Perry entered a conditional plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g).; her presentence report said that she was subject to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act based on three prior convictions, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). At sentencing, Perry disputed that a 2001 aggravated-assault conviction qualified as a “violent felony.” The district court rejected her argument. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

Columbus motorists reported a person driving erratically. One saw that the driver was a woman and that there was a child in the truck. Both witnessed the truck jump onto the median at least twice. One followed the truck, trying to help the police locate it. The truck crashed into a tree. At the scene, the police found Volpe, intoxicated and trapped behind the steering wheel. Volpe’s daughter, ejected from the truck, died days later from multiple injuries. Volpe was convicted on two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide (operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI) and recklessly causing her daughter’s death), each with a specification that she had been convicted of three or more OVI or equivalent offenses within the last six years, and of OVI with a specification that she had been convicted of five or more equivalent offenses within the last 20 years. Volpe received a total prison term of 20 years and six months. She argued that convictions of both OVI, Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and aggravated vehicular homicide as a proximate result of OVI, 2903.06(A)(1)(a), violated the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of her habeas corpus petition. View "Volpe v. Trim" on Justia Law