Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officer Martin was called to a grocery store following an alleged shoplifting. Martin took possession of a cell phone allegedly dropped by the perpetrator. Based on a conversation with a person listed in the phone’s “contacts” list, he went to Summit Medical Center where Sutton worked. The confrontation between the two resulted in Sutton’s arrest for shoplifting. A jury acquitted Sutton, who subsequently sued Martin and the Nashville and Davidson County Metropolitan Government for federal constitutional violations and state common law and statutory violations. The district court dismissed Sutton’s claims based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments but denied the motion as to Sutton’s Fourth Amendment claim regarding an unreasonable seizure, finding that he had adequately stated a cause of action and that Martin was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Martin is protected by qualified immunity with regard to his initial contact with Sutton and in continuing to detain Sutton after the latter was positively identified by the store’s security guard. Allegations concerning Martin’s conduct between those two events were, however, sufficient to state a claim that precludes qualified immunity at this stage in the litigation View "Sutton v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2003, in the getaway from an armed bank robbery, Parks crashed his car while fleeing police and killed his passenger, a co-conspirator. Parks pled guilty to bank robbery resulting in the killing of another (18 U.S.C. 2113(e)) and agreed to a sentence of 372 months, but reserved his right to appeal whether a 2113(e) violation requires mens rea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but remanded with respect to the mandatory minimum penalty. On remand, the district court held that Congress, in amending 2113(e) when it enacted the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, intended to increase the mandatory minimum sentence from 10 years to life imprisonment or death in all 2113(e) cases where death results. The district court also concluded that it was bound by the prior plea agreement. Parks moved to withdraw his plea and to declare 2113(e) unconstitutional. The district court concluded that the arguments were beyond the scope of remand and re-sentenced Parks to 372 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly applied the Circuit Court’s mandate and found that the statute requires a mandatory minimum sentence of life, even though Parks arranged for a plea agreement of less than life. View "United States v. Park" on Justia Law

In 1998, Rimmer was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Ellsworth. Rimmer later learned that the federal government had conducted a joint investigation of Ellsworth’s murder with the Memphis Police Department, which, he claims, produced exculpatory evidence. Rimmer instituted state post-conviction proceedings, and obtained some, but not all, of the allegedly exculpatory evidence from the police department. Rimmer submitted a FOIA request that sought all relevant FBI documents. The FBI released 189 full or partially redacted pages from a total of 616 pages. The U.S. Department of Justice upheld the limited release. Rimmer filed claims under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702, the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, and FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(b). The FBI then determined that relevant files contained 786 pages and released them, but 704 pages were partially redacted. The district court dismissed Rimmer’s APA and mandamus claims as precluded by an adequate remedy under FOIA and granted the government summary judgment on Rimmer’s FOIA claim, holding that the redactions were proper under FOIA Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D) and that, in the case of the 7(C) redactions, there was not a “countervailing public benefit” to support disclosure of otherwise protected information. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Rimmer v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2008, Baniel (an LLC owned by Coffman), Coffman, and her husband Bryan obtained financing from Bank of America to purchase a yacht, giving Bank of America a secured interest. Months later, the United States filed a civil forfeiture in rem complaint against several properties, owned by Coffman and Bryan, alleged to be proceeds of fraud and money laundering. Given the pending criminal investigations, the district court immediately stayed civil forfeiture proceedings. Coffman filed a verified claim to the yacht in 2009. Coffman was acquitted in 2011, but Bryan was convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering. Payments to Bank of America have not been made since December 2009, and approximately $637,000 is owed on the note. In February 2011, Bank of America and the government filed a joint motion for interlocutory sale of the yacht. Baniel sought release of the yacht to Coffman’s custody. In February 2012, the district court ordered the interlocutory sale, denied release of the yacht to Baniel, and joined the civil action with the ongoing criminal action. Baniel and Coffman sought a stay of the sale pending appeal, which was denied by the district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed all orders. View "United States v. Real Prop. & Residence" on Justia Law

In 1985 Moreland lived with his girlfriend Glenna and seven others. After arguing with Glenna, Moreland left, returned with a rifle, and killed Glenna and four others. An 11-year-old child and another were injured but survived. When Moreland was arrested, he told officers that it was “too late” and was uncooperative. At trial, Moreland presented expert testimony that he would have had a blood alcohol level between .30 and .36 around the time the murders were committed, suggesting that he was too intoxicated to carry out the acts as described. Other witnesses reported seeing Moreland that night and called into question his intoxication defense. A three judge panel convicted Moreland and sentenced him to death. The Ohio Court of Appeals and Ohio Supreme Court affirmed; the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. State courts denied relief in state post-conviction proceedings. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254), rejecting claims of insufficient evidence, that the court did not conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing on a child eyewitness’s competence to testify, that the court wrongly excluded expert testimony concerning the child, and that Moreland was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Moreland v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Evans pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)) and was sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment. When calculating his base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the district court determined that Evans’s 2004 Ohio conviction for trafficking in cocaine was a controlled substance offense and that his 2000 Ohio conviction for knowingly assaulting a police officer was a crime of violence as defined under the Guidelines and applied a four-level enhancement to Evans’s base offense level (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2)). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that both of the convictions qualified as predicate offenses. View "United States v. Evan" on Justia Law

To help defendants resist child-pornography charges, technology expert and lawyer Boland downloaded images of children from a stock photography website and digitally imposed the children’s faces onto the bodies of adults performing sex acts. Boland’s aim was to show that the defendants may not have known they were viewing child pornography. When the parents of the children involved found out about the images, they sued Boland under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(f) and 2255. Section 2252A(f) provides a civil remedy to “[a]ny person aggrieved” by child pornography, while 2255 provides a civil remedy of at least $150,000 in damages to minor victims who suffer a “personal injury” from various sex crimes. The district court granted summary judgment to the parents and awarded $300,000 in damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. If Boland felt compelled to make his point with pornography, he could have used images of adults or virtual children. Instead, he chose an option Congress explicitly forbade: the choice was not protected by the First Amendment. View "Doe v. Boland" on Justia Law

Two former employees of Coca-Cola claim that they were injured while performing their jobs. They reported their injuries to Coca-Cola’s third-party administrator for worker’s compensation claims, Sedgwick, which denied benefits. Plaintiffs claim that the medical evidence strongly supported their injuries, but that Sedgwick engaged in a fraudulent scheme involving the mail: using Dr. Drouillard as a “cut-off” doctor. They sued alleging that the actions of Sedgwick, Coca-Cola, and Dr. Drouillard violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B), 1962(c), and 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that since the dismissal, several of the issues were resolved by its 2012 opinion in another case. The district court misapplied the elements of a RICO cause of action to the plaintiffs’ allegations. The court declined to abstain from exercising jurisdiction pending the outcome of state workers comp proceedings. The alleged acts have the same purpose: to reduce Coca-Cola’s payment obligations towards worker’s compensation benefits by fraudulently denying worker’s compensation benefits to which the employees are lawfully entitled. The allegations suggest that the defendants’ scheme would continue on well past the denial of any individual plaintiff’s benefits View "Jackson v. Segwick Claims Mgmt Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Castilla entered the U.S. for a third time after two deportations and moved to Michigan, where Reyes lived. Reyes made and sold false identification documents to illegal immigrants. Castilla joined the operation. Reyes kept the work room locked, let the others live in the apartment-production facility, gave them false documents for themselves, provided them business cards and cell phones, and kept track of each associate’s sales in a notebook. In 2009, Immigration and Customs Enforcement began investigating. In 2010, executing a search warrant on the apartment, they found Castilla and others. In Castilla’s bedroom, agents found a box of his own fraudulent business cards, a manual with instructions for changing the ribbon on the Zebra card printer, a CD for the Zebra card printer, and a fraudulent driver’s license that was matched to a used Zebra printer ribbon. Convicted of conspiracy to produce and traffic fraudulent identification documents and for possession of document-making implements, Castilla was sentenced to 63 months. The district court applied the three-level managerial/supervisory role enhancement, USSG 3B1.1(b) and a nine-level enhancement under USSG 2L2.1(b)(2)(C), for the offense involving at least 100 documents. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Castilla-Lugo" on Justia Law

In 2004 a jury convicted Middlebrook of assault with intent to murder, felony firearm possession, and unlawful driving away of a motor vehicle in connection with the shooting of his former girlfriend. On appeal, Middlebrook argued that he was denied a fair trial when the jury was exposed to extraneous influences and engaged in premature deliberations. The Michigan Court of Appeals determined that there were no extraneous influences; the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The district court denied federal habeas relief without addressing the issue of premature deliberations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The trial court conducted the necessary inquiry into the allegation of extraneous influences on the jury and the Supreme Court has not entertained a case involving premature deliberations. This is not a case where the state court unreasonably refused to extend a legal principle to a new context in which it should apply. View "Middlebrook v. Napel" on Justia Law