Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Castleman pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic assault (TN Code 39-13-111(b) under an indictment that asserted that he “did intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to [the mother of his child].” Seven years later, federal agents discovered that Castleman and his wife were buying firearms from dealers and selling them on the black market. Under the scheme, Castleman’s wife purchased firearms, allegedly lied on federal firearms paperwork by stating that she was the actual buyer of the firearms, and turned the firearms over to her husband, who was legally prohibited from purchasing firearms because of his domestic assault conviction. Castleman was charged with two counts of possession of a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). The district court dismissed those counts, reasoning that Castleman’s misdemeanor domestic assault conviction did not qualify as a domestic violence crime requiring the “use or attempted use of physical force.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Tennessee assault statute does not define “serious bodily injury” to require any particular degree of contact.

In 1981, Standifer, a 23-year-old woman with diffused brain damage and mild retardation, was murdered in Knoxville, at the home of Thomas, where Miller was staying. Standifer had gone to the house, by cab, with Miller. When Thomas returned Miller was hosing the basement floor. Thomas found blood inside the house. The next day, Thomas discovered Standifer’s body in his backyard, with a t-shirt belonging to Miller stained with blood of the same type as Standifer’s. Miller was apprehended in Ohio. After waiving his Miranda rights, he admitted to hitting Standifer and dragging her outside, non-responsive and not breathing. A psychiatrist examined Miller and concluded that he did not believe Miller was insane at the time of the offense. Miller moved for appointment of psychiatric expert at state expense. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Miller was not entitled to a second medical expert. The jury convicted Miller of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Miller’s direct appeals and motions for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful in state court. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the state improperly denied him assistance from an independent medical expert and a challenge to jury instructions.

Plaintiffs delivered artifacts from a famous shipwreck to Debtor for display and, according to Debtor, sale in Debtor’s jewelry store. The store went out of business. When Debtor returned the artifacts, an emerald pendant and musket balls were missing. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty, common law conversion, and statutory conversion or negligence. A Michigan state court found that Debtor’s failure to respond to any written discovery requests, file a response to the Motion for Summary Disposition, and appear at the hearing were sufficient basis for entry of summary disposition and awarded $42,706.10. The judgment did not specify the claim upon which it was based. Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Plaintiffs filed an adversary complaint seeking to have the debt declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4), stating that Debtor’s actions constituted “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.” The bankruptcy court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The bankruptcy court erred when it held that the issue of fraud was “necessarily determined” by the state court; the state court judgment cannot have issue preclusive effect as to this element for nondischargeability under the embezzlement portion of section 523(a)(4).

In 2007, Anderson discharged a gun during an altercation at a bar. Cincinnati police spotted Anderson’s vehicle, and pulled him over. After the officers commanded him to turn off his vehicle, Anderson sped off, lost control of his vehicle and crashed. Anderson attempted to flee on foot, but was apprehended. He was read his Miranda rights at the scene. Officers found a loaded handgun 10 feet from the passenger’s side of Anderson’s car. At the police station, Anderson signed a notification of rights form, stating that he understood his Miranda rights, including his right to remain silent, and made a recorded statement in which he admitted to possessing and discharging the firearm, but claimed self-defense. He was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm who had already been convicted of at least three prior violent felonies, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e). His Presentence Investigation Report calculated his final offense level to be 33, noting that under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant, subject to the enhanced sentence provisions of 18 U.S.C. 924(e) is an armed career criminal. The trial judge sentenced him to 293 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence.

The Sheriff’s Office for Boyle County received an arrest warrant and emergency protective order for King, who had allegedly entered his ex-wife’s property, pointed a gun at her face, and said “I’m going to kill someone today.” The sheriff told Deputy Adams that he had seen King the week before, and that King had been acting “strange [and] violent” and to obtain assistance from the Kentucky State Police. Adams was aware that King, years earlier, had allegedly fired shots near a state trooper who entered onto King’s property. Deputies Adams and Issacs and State Trooper Taylor, who told a dispatcher that “one of us will have to kill—shoot him,” went to King’s home. Although no one answered the door, they saw King lying on a couch, knocked again, and showed badges. What happened next is disputed. Taylor claims that King aimed a gun; Taylor’s bullet killed King. King’s estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court ruled that Taylor had not been properly served and, in any event, was entitled to summary judgment on the merits. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating that questions of immunity and superseding cause require resolution of disputed facts.

Defendants, involved in a large-scale drug operation, 1991-1999, were convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Presentence Investigation Reports concluded that criminal activity for each defendant involved more than 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine, and recommended that each receive the highest base-offense level of 38. The court noted concerns about the total quantities involved, but overruled defendants’ objections and sentenced each to the lowest sentence within the range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Defendants later moved for sentence modifications under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) based on Sentencing Guidelines Amendments 706 and 711, which were made retroactive. A district judge found that three defendants were not eligible for modifications because a preponderance of the evidence established that they were responsible for more than 4.5 kilograms of crack. With respect to another, a different judge reduced the sentence by six months, reasoning that finding that he was responsible for more than 4.5 kilograms of crack would be functionally inconsistent with the original finding that he was responsible for “at least 1.5 kilograms.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denials of modifications and reversed the sentence reduction.

In 1997, Hanna was an Ohio state inmate, 19 years into a life sentence for murder and aggravated murder when he attacked his new cellmate, Copas, in his sleep. Copas died from his injuries several days later. Although trial counsel suggested that Copas’ death was at least partially attributable to errors committed in his medical treatment, Hanna did not formally pursue an intervening cause defense. Convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death, Hanna petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of Brady violations, challenges to jury instructions, claims of ineffective assistance, and a claim of failure to discover an ineligible juror.

Gassman and Wottrich went to the Hensley residenceto repossess a car. They requested police presence because Hensley’s conduct during a previous repossession resulted in an assault charge against Hensley. The deputies did not read Gassman’s documents. Sheila Hensley woke up, stated that her payments were up to date, got into the car, started it, locked the doors, and briefly dragged the towtruck. She refused to exit the vehicle, even after the car had been pulled to the road. The deputies used a hammer to break a window, unlock the doors, and pull Sheila from the car. After the car was towed, it was determined that Sheila was correct and the car was returned. Later the deputies obtained a warrant, charging assault with a dangerous weapon, based on her pulling the tow truck toward Gassman and Wottrich while they were on the ground. Sheila pled no contest to felonious assault and to misdemeanor attempted aggravated assault, then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court rejected Fourth Amendment claims, based on qualified immunity, and dismissed conspiracy and state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. A reasonable jury could find that extraction of Sheila from the vehicle she was entitled to possess was unreasonable.

Nixon worked at a law office, doing clerical and bookkeeping work. While the attorney was out of the office for medical reasons, his bank informed him that he was delinquent in paying back his line of credit. An investigation by a forensic accountant uncovered that Nixon had made thousands of dollars of personal charges on the firm’s credit card and had borrowed thousands more, all of which was unauthorized according to the testimony of the attorneys. The FBI charged, and Nixon was convicted of,11 counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; two counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; three counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A; and one count of using an unauthorized access device, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2). She was sentenced to 54 months of imprisonment and ordered to pay $55,236.30 in restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to 16 counts, rejecting assertions concerning evidentiary rulings, but reversed as to the final count. The government conceded that it failed to present evidence at trial that the card was an “unauthorized access device.” The term is defined under the statute as “any access device that is lost, stolen, expired, revoked, cancelled, or obtained with intent to defraud.”

cott was taken into custody near the scene of a robbery, given an oral Miranda warning, and given a written notice. He wrote “no” in response to the written question “Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?” On his second day in custody he confessed to other robberies. He later claimed that the confession was coerced. He was convicted of 16 counts of robbery, attempted robbery, and use of a firearm in connection with the robberies and attempted robbery. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and remanded for further factual findings to determine whether Scott or a member of the police initiated further discussion on the second day in custody. Scott invoked his right to counsel by his response to the written question. According to the language of the question itself, the “no” response is related directly to “these rights,” which include the right to have counsel present while answering questions.