Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Cleveland is serving a term of life imprisonment for the 1991 murder of Marsha Blakely. On January 21, 2010, Cleveland filed a habeas petition asserting: actually innocence; that the state presented testimony that it knew, or should have known, was false; that the state failed to disclose favorable evidence; prosecutorial misconduct; and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. He argued that his “actual innocence” of the crime mandated equitable tolling of the limitations period and that the discovery of a new factual predicate for his habeas claims entitled him to statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Cleveland has presented a credible claim of actual innocence that entitles him to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year limitations period and review of his habeas petition on the merits. The court noted a witness’s unsolicited recantation, evidence that Cleveland was in New York a couple of hours before Blakely’s murder and could not have flown from New York to Ohio in time to commit the murder, and that there was no other evidence tying Cleveland to the crime.

In 1992 an Ohio jury convicted Carter of murdering a store clerk while robbing a convenience store and recommended that the court impose a sentence of death. Although Carter admitted that he entered the store with the intent to rob it, he testified that he never intended to be the one to hold the gun, although he knew the gun had bullets and that a co-defendant had showed him how to shoot it. He further admitted that before the murder they had participated in “a lot” of robberies of drug dealers that same evening. On direct review, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. The district court denied habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of an argument that the state courts improperly used the “nature and circumstances” of the offense as aggravating, rather than mitigating, factors, but reversed and remanded with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Those claims, which concerned counsel eliciting unfavorable mitigation evidence and failing to call Carter’s mother to testify about his upbringing, were not procedurally defaulted.

In 2003, Jamieson was convicted of conspiracy to defraud insurance companies and investors, 18 U.S.C. 371; promotion money laundering and aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 2; international money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(2)(B)(i); concealment money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity and aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. 1957(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2); engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. 1957(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2); and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h) and (a)(1)(A)(i). He was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing. Jamieson and the government entered into a stipulation that the court should impose a term of 168 months and order Jamieson to pay $20,016,498 in restitution. The court did so. In 2009, Jamieson filed a motion to correct a sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, based on 2008, Supreme Court decisions, Santos and Cuellar. The district court denied the motion as untimely and because Jamieson had waived his right to appeal on any ground. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the decisions make no radical difference in the statutory maximum sentence.

DEA agents and police conducted narcotics raids at two homes occupied by members of the Marcilis family. The occupants filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that: the agents and officers engaged in excessive force, illegal search and seizure, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; the township failed to train and supervise its police officers; and the agents and officers violated the “knock and announce” rule. After dismissing all claims against the federal agents, the district court granted the police officers’ motion for summary judgment on all claims except the alleged violation of the “knock and announce” rule. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs failed to allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each federal agent did to violate the asserted constitutional right. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity; a reasonable officer would not have known that the force used here would be considered excessive.

McAllister, a former FBI agent, was charged with making material misrepresentations on loan documents to obtain real estate loans for rental properties, and making material misrepresentations on official documents during bankruptcy proceedings. At trial he raised a Batson challenge to the government’s peremptory strike of two African-Americans in the jury pool. The government offered race-neutral reasons for striking the jurors: one had a conviction; the other was unemployed and had a military background so that he might be sympathetic to the defendant. The district court summarily accepted those reasons, by stating, “All right.” The court also excused a defense witness who had notified the court of his intention to invoke the Fifth Amendment in response to all questions asked by the defense. McAllister was convicted of 15 counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and three counts of bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 151(3). The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting claims of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct and challenges to evidentiary rulings, but remanding for findings concerning racial animosity that might entitle McAllister to a new trial.

Cooper, Brown’s former son-in-law, was one of several co-defendants charged with conspiracy to violate federal drug laws. He allegedly stored proceeds of this criminal activity in a safe at Brown’s residence. After obtaining Brown’s consent, officers searched her residence and recovered $102,570 from the safe. Brown was notified by letter that the money would be subject to forfeiture. Cooper eventually pled guilty and agreed to the forfeiture. Brown filed a claim for the $102,570 in an FBI administrative proceeding and then moved for return of the money under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), 18 U.S.C. 983, and the Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. 853(k)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Brown’s assertion that the government unlawfully included the $102,570 in the criminal case against Cooper makes no difference until Brown establishes a legal interest in the money, which she can only do now through a 21 U.S.C. 853(n) proceeding. Brown has an adequate remedy at law.

Goldberg, a medical malpractice attorney, appeared before Judge Maloney in several cases. Following complaints that Goldberg concealed assets and retained unearned fees, Maloney ordered Goldberg to pay the estates involved. Goldberg failed to do so. Maloney directed him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Following a hearing, Maloney found Goldberg to be in criminal contempt and cited Goldberg for attempting to suborn witnesses, charges that did not appear on the hearing notice. Goldberg received a sentence of 18 months. An Ohio appellate court affirmed. Before the Ohio Supreme Court, Goldberg argued for the first time that he had not received sufficient notice of the charges and ineffective assistance because his attorney failed to raise this notice claim. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2004, the district court granted habeas relief on the basis that Goldberg received constitutionally inadequate notice. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Goldberg had procedurally defaulted on his lack-of-notice claim by failing to raise it in the state court of appeals. On remand, the district court determined that Goldberg had not demonstrated sufficient cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural default, and denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Benton, a pre-trial detainee was hospitalized for seizures. Benton resisted return to jail. Officers used double handcuffs, shackles, and a belly chain. Gray and others escorted Benton to the jail’s Medical Unit. Benton was supposed to be placed on a bed without restraints. Benton resisted and made threats. While Benton was restrained, Gray placed Benton in a carotid restraint or a “sleeper hold.” Benton lost consciousness. Gray ordered removal of Benton’s restraints. Officers heard choking sounds, but Gray did not stop. After the restraints were removed, Gray ordered the others to leave. Benton was silent and motionless when they left. Despite a requirement that officers seek medical attention when force is used or an inmate is injured, Gray did not inform medical personnel. Minutes later, a deputy entered Benton’s cell. Benton was not breathing. Benton was later declared brain dead. Following fabricated reports, Gray lied to Internal Affairs; the coroner pronounced death by natural causes. An external investigation began four years later due to statements by a correctional officer. The coroner changed her verdict to homicide. Convicted of civil rights violations, 18 U.S.C. 242, falsifying and making false entries in a document, 18 U.S.C. 1519, and making false statements to an FBI agent, 18 U.S.C. 1001, Gray received a below-guidelines sentence of 36 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Tennessee law allows individuals with gun permits to carry handguns in public places owned or operated by the state (Tenn. Code 39-17-1311(b)(1)(H)) and defines a “handgun” as “any firearm with a barrel length of less than twelve inches” designed or adapted to be fired with one hand. Armed with a Draco AK-47 pistol, Embody went to Radnor Lake State Natural Area, near Nashville, on a Sunday afternoon. Dressed in camouflage, he slung the gun with its eleven-and-a-half-inch barrel across his chest with an attached loaded, 30-round clip. Embody anticipated attention and carried an audio-recording device. With assistance from police, a park ranger disarmed Embody at gunpoint to determine whether the AK-47 qualified under the law, releasing him about two-and-one-half hours later, after determining it was. Embody sued, claiming violations of Second, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted defendant summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The scope of the investigation was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the stop. To the extent Embody argues that the Second Amendment prevents Tennessee from prohibiting certain firearms in state parks, qualified immunity applies. No court has held that the Second Amendment encompasses a right to bear arms within state parks.

Adkins, a state prisoner, sued corrections officer Wolever under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Wolever assaulted Adkins by yanking his hands through a slot in the cell door before removing his handcuffs. Before Adkins filed suit, an inspector at the prison reviewed color Polaroid photographs of Adkins’s injuries and stationary video footage of the area. During discovery, Adkins asked Wolever to produce photographs and video footage. Prison officials could not locate the video footage or the color photographs. Because Wolever produced only black and white copies of the original photographs and did not produce the video footage, Adkins asked the trial court to instruct the jury that it could presume that the missing evidence would be favorable to Adkins. The district court applied state law and denied the request; Michigan’s spoliation instruction required Adkins to demonstrate that the spoliated evidence was under Wolever’s control, which it was not. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The en banc court reversed, concluding that federal law governs spoliation sanctions in federal court litigation. On remand, the district court allowed the parties to conduct more discovery and held an evidentiary hearing, then concluded that Adkins was not entitled to the requested inference. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.