Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Werth was charged with robbing a convenience store. Before he pleaded guilty to breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny and to possession of burglar’s tools, Werth attempted at least seven times to assert his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The trial court denied his request summarily the first six times. The seventh time, the judge explained the nature of the charges against Werth, told him that she could not give him special training or treatment, and denied his request without giving him an opportunity to speak. Three weeks later, the judge denied Werth’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, in which he argued duress. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court denied his application for leave to appeal. The district court denied Werth’s petition for habeas corpus. Applying AEDPA deference, it held that Werth waived his self-representation claim by pleading guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It did not violate clearly established Supreme Court precedent for the Michigan appellate courts to conclude that Werth’s guilty plea foreclosed his challenge.

Tangled in a prolonged legal dispute over visitation rights to see his daughter, Jeffries wrote a song, “Daughter’s Love,” which contains passages about relationships between fathers and daughters, but also includes complaints about his ex-wife, ranting gripes about lawyers and the legal system, and threats to kill the judge if he doesn’t “do the right thing” at an upcoming custody hearing. Jeffries created a video of himself performing the song on a guitar painted with an American flag and posted the music video on YouTube. He shared it with friends, family and the media. In the video, Jeffries says “This song’s for you, judge.” Agents charged Jeffries with violating a federal law that prohibits “transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to . . . injure the person of another” 18 U.S.C. 875(c). A jury convicted Jeffries. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. All that the First Amendment requires in the context of a section 875(c) prosecution is that the threat be real; there was sufficient evidence to convict.

Seven times, Coles secured firearms in the U.S. and directed co-conspirators to deliver the firearms to purchasers in Canada. For the eighth sale, Coles arranged to deliver, in person on the U.S. side of the border, firearms in exchange for 50,000 tablets of Ecstasy. The buyers were actually undercover Toronto police officers. Coles was arrested by ATF agents. Coles’ continuing dissatisfaction with assigned counsel delayed the jury trial until the district court ruled that Coles waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Coles was convicted of seven counts of aiding and abetting unlicensed dealing in firearms; eight counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm; one count of aiding and abetting attempted possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance; one count of carrying and using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime; and one count of conspiracy. He was sentenced to180 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no reversible error even though the court did not use the exact model inquiry set forth in the Bench Book. The court advised Coles several times about the difficulties in self-representation. An attorney was available throughout trial as stand-by counsel, and subsequent to conviction, assisted him during sentencing proceedings.

Smith filed a numerically second petition for habeas corpus that he claims is not “second or successive” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) because the claims included in the petition are newly ripe. The district court transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit, which vacated the transfer. A district court has jurisdiction to consider numerically second petitions that are not “second or successive” and needs no authorization. A district court may (and should) rule on newly ripe claims. The district court never ruled that Smith’s petition was successive and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction. There is no rule, statute, or case that permits a lower court to transfer a case to an appellate court when it is uncertain of its jurisdiction for an advisory ruling.

Patrizi, an attorney, was at Bounce nightclub in Cleveland with her friend Baron, Baron’s brother, and his girlfriend, Mills. Officers Huff and Connole arrived in the early morning hours in response to a reported assault. They met the victim reporting the incident, Wallace and she led them inside the nightclub to identify perpetrators. The officers escorted the group, which included Mills, toward the exit. Patrizi joined the group. Connole began to question Mills and Patrizi interjected; eventually, Patrizi was handcuffed and placed under arrest. The parties dispute the interactions leading to the arrest for obstructing official business. In Patrizi’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly established that nonaggressive questioning of police officers is constitutionally protected conduct. When the facts are viewed in her favor, Patrizi’s actions fall within the protected ambit because her conduct did not cross the line into fighting words or disorderly conduct prohibiting the officers from conducting their investigation.

Hagans, a middle-aged man under the influence of crack cocaine, became paranoid and went into a rage in his yard. He refused to allow police to subdue him. Officer, Ratcliff applied his taser in drive-stun mode, directly against Hagans’ upper back. Hagans, reached back and tried to grab the taser. Ratcliff applied the taser again, to no effect, then tried, unsuccessfully to use the taser in dart mode. Ratcliff tased Hagans two to four more times in drive-stun mode, then joined two other officers in trying to subdue Hagans. The officers finally secured Hagans’ wrists and legs. A medical squad arrived. Alert at the time, Hagans lost consciousness and stopped breathing about ten minutes later. Paramedics administered CPR in the ambulance, restoring Hagans’ pulse and respiration. Hagans never regained consciousness. He died three days later. The coroner found that the cocaine starved his brain of oxygen, leading to fatal respiratory complications. The report listed hardening of the arteries in the heart as “a contributing factor.” Hagans’ estate filed suit, alleging excessive force. The district court denied Ratcliff’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Ratcliff did not violate a clearly established right.

After September 11, 2001, the FBI assigned informant Griffin to embed himself in the Toledo Muslim community. Griffin enrolled in mosque classes and obtained employment with a Muslim charity. Griffin met El-Hindi, who discussed kidnaping an Israeli soldier or politician; Amawi, who suggested recruiting Mazloum; and Mazloum, who agreed to participate in jihad training. The three were convicted of conspiracy to kill and maim persons outside the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 956(a)(1), and conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists in furtherance of killing U.S. nationals, 18 U.S.C. 2339A. Amawi and El-Hindi were also charged with distributing information regarding manufacture of explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. 842(p)(2)(A) and sentenced to below-Guidelines terms of 240, 144, and 100 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court upheld the district court’s decisions: to delete classified information from discovery under the Classified Information Procedures Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; to exclude defendants’ proposed expert testimony concerning Islamist culture and social norms; to reject entrapment and outrageous-conduct defenses; not to provide requested jury instructions concerning the First Amendment; and rejecting a claim of Miranda violations during interrogation that occurred on a jet returning Amawi from Jordan.

Wooten approached a bank teller, placed his hands on the counter, and twice quietly stated, “I am going to rob you.” When the teller was slow to respond, Wooten finally said, “I have a gun. Give me your money.” The teller handed over $4,130 in cash. The teller later testified that he never felt threatened by Wooten. Wooten told investigators that he actually wanted to be caught and that he committed the robbery because “he was just tired of living in his car and he was running out of money;” he had attempted a similar bank robbery shortly before the one at issue, but left empty handed after the teller at the other bank laughed at him. Wooten pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Based on his declaration that he had a gun, the district court imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) for making a threat of death. Wooten argued that his conduct and demeanor were so nonthreatening as to eliminate the possibility that any reasonable teller under the circumstances would have believed his or her life to be in danger. The Sixth Circuit vacated, based on the specific circumstances.

Watkins, an African-American, worked for the school district, overseeing security systems. Fultz supervised Watkins and, relying on Watkins’s advice, Fultz awarded Vision a $182,000 annual contract for service of security cameras. Vision’s president, Newsome, testified that Watkins called her and talked about a “finder’s fee.. Newsome went to Cleveland for a customer visit. She e-mailed Watkins and he replied: “Absolutely$.” Newsome believed that Watkins expected her to pay him at their meeting. Newsome notified Fultz. At the meeting, Watkins requested “an envelope.” After Fultz contacted police, the FBI recorded meetings at which Newsome gave Watkins $5,000 and $2,000. A white jury convicted on two counts of attempted extortion “under color of official right” (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951), and one count of bribery in a federally funded program, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The court determined a total offense level of 22, applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, another two-level enhancement for bribes exceeding $5,000, and a four-level enhancement for high level of authority, plus an upward variance of 21 months under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and sentenced Watkins to six years’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, the jury’s racial composition, and the reasonableness of the sentence.

McClain pled guilty to three counts of cocaine distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(B) and entered into a plea agreement agreeing to be responsible for at least 150 but not more than 500 grams of crack, corresponding to a base offense level of 34 under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1. The court granted a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. His criminal history category was VI, for a guidelines range of 188 to 235 months. Because of McClain’s prior felony drug conviction there was a mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months on two counts and 120 months on the other. The government moved for substantial assistance, 18 U.S.C. 3553(e); U.S.S.G. 5K1.1; the court granted a two-level departure, for a new offense level of 29, with a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months. The district court imposed a sentence of 151 months. November 1, 2007, U.S.S.G. Amendment 706 reduced the base offense level for most crack offenses by two levels; March 3, 2008, Amendment 713 made Amendment 706 retroactive. McClain moved for modification under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court denied McClain’s motion, reasoning that his sentence was based on the mandatory minimum, not a sentencing range that had been lowered. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.