Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Based on acts of arson committed to collect insurance proceeds, Bazazpour was convicted of six counts of a 21-count indictment against multiple defendants. He appealed his 240-month prison sentence and claimed that the definition of “monetary transaction” in the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. 1957(f)(1), was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for conspiracy to commit arson, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and aiding and abetting arson; and that the prison sentence imposed was excessive. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Bazazpour’s convictions, but remanded for resentencing. The district court should not have applied a two-level sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. Threats made by Bazazpour to potential witnesses did not qualify for the enhancement because the statements were made before and not after the initiation of the official federal investigation leading to Bazazpour’s indictment and conviction.

After a participant in West’s operation was stopped carrying $362,000 to a marijuana supplier, DEA authorities learned that Apodaca would send marijuana from Mexico to Tennessee via couriers, using pay-as-you-go cell phones for couriers to communicate. Apodaca provided false names and addresses and was unaware that these phones were equipped with GPS technology. Authorities obtained orders authorizing interception of wire communications from two phones subscribed in West’s name and learned that a truck driver, Skinner, would meet Apodaca in Tucson to pick up marijuana in a “nice [RV] with a diesel engine,” with his son driving an F-250 pickup truck. Authorities obtained an order authorizing the phone company to release data for two secret phones and discovered that one was in Candler, North Carolina, West’s primary residence. Continuously “pinging” the other phone, authorities located Skinner and his son at a rest stop near Abilene, Texas, with a motorhome containing 1,100 pounds of marijuana. The district court denied Skinner’s motion to suppress; Skinner was convicted of drug trafficking and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data emanating from his cell phone that showed its location.

Convicted of conspiring to distribute or conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute oxycodone, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), and attempting to possess oxycodone with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, LaPointe was sentenced to concurrent terms of 63 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded for a new trial on the first count, holding that he should have received an instruction on the lesser-included offense of conspiracy to possess oxycodone, a misdemeanor. The court affirmed on the second count, rejecting an argument that the prosecution failed to prove that he took a “substantial step” toward possession.

Officers attempted to stop Austin, an African-American, for speeding through a construction zone. Austin fled and a high-speed chase ensued. When Austin’s car was blocked in a dead-end, he exited his vehicle and approached the officers with his palms open. Officer Paul’s canine attacked Austin, Officer Riley fired a Taser and Austin fell back to his car. The parties dispute what was said and other aspects of the incident. Austin filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the police department and officers Riley, Paull, and Morgan, alleging defendants used excessive force and engaged in ethnic intimidation in violation of Michigan law. The district court granted Riley summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to his initial deployment of a Taser, but denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to Riley’s subsequent use of the Taser, Paull’s use of the police dog, and Morgan’s use of the Taser. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence or allegation that Austin was belligerent, threatening or assaulting officers, or attempting to escape. Use of non-lethal, temporarily incapacitating force on a handcuffed suspect who no longer poses a safety threat, flight risk, and is not resisting arrest constitutes excessive force.

Morgan and his wife were in the bedroom, apparently smoking crack with others. Earlier in the day, a drug dealer had threatened to kill Morgan. Morgan’s friend, similarly threatened, had been attacked. Officers, arriving to execute a warrant, banged on the door and announced their presence. Having no response, they kicked in the door and entered the living area. Officers streamed in, continuing to announce their presence loudly, and crossed the living space to a hall that led to the bedroom, less than 20 feet away. Shots were fired from the bedroom. Debris hit an officer. The officers ordered the occupants to drop their weapons. Beverly then realized that the intruders were police officers; Morgan immediately pushed the gun between the mattress and box spring and dropped to the floor with his hands behind his head. Morgan pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 201 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court impermissibly double counted discharge of the firearm, for which a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence was imposed (section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)), by both applying the cross-reference to attempted murder in USSG 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) and imposing a 24-month upward departure for the section 924(c) conviction. Application of the attempted-murder Guideline under the prohibited-possession count was erroneous because of lack of intent to kill.

Morales and codefendants were indicted on 40 counts relating to conspiracy to fraudulently purchase and export firearms to Guatemala. Morales misrepresented on statutorily required purchase forms, (Form 4473), that he was the actual buyer of semi-automatic pistols. At trial, Morales conceded that he had attempted to purchase firearms on behalf of codefendant Lopez, a longtime friend who, he claimed, inexplicably failed the background checks. Morales, then working as a police officer, testified that he had believed that straw purchases of firearms were lawful so long as both parties were eligible purchasers and, as a precaution, he had verified that Lopez was a non-felon. He was convicted of making false statements during the purchase of a firearm from a federally licensed dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly excluded a 1979 ATF circular as irrelevant. Morales did not claim that he was aware of this circular at the time of the attempted purchases or that he relied on it in interpreting disclosure responsibilities; he conceded that the circular had not been in effect since 2005.The court rejected an argument that the statute was ambiguous.

Williams pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute, and conspiring to distribute, 50 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A). As part of his plea agreement, he agreed to cooperate. The mandatory minimum sentence for Williams’s offense was 120 months, of imprisonment. He had an offense level of 27 and a criminal-history category of III, for a Guidelines range of 87–108 months of imprisonment. However, because the mandatory minimum sentence for Williams’s offense was 120 months, the district court calculated his offense level as 28. In the Sixth Circuit, downward departures start with the mandatory minimum, “at the lowest level that gets you into [a] 120 [month sentence]. That’s 28.” Before sentencing, the government moved for a downward departure of two levels, 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) and USSG 5K1.1, because of Williams’s substantial assistance. The district court granted one level more than requested and varied further downward because of a policy disagreement with then-applicable crack cocaine guidelines, so that he was ultimately sentenced to 48 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The only permissible basis for a below-minimum sentence is the defendant’s substantial assistance.

Byrd drove Woods to a bank. Woods entered, grabbed $2,150 from teller drawers, and returned to the car. A witness followed to an apartment complex, where they got into a car driven by Byrd’s half-brother, Jalil. Police arrived; Jalil sped away at over 90 miles per hour, running several red lights, eventually crashing into an embankment. The three fled, jumping fences and running through yards. Byrd pled guilty to robbing the bank, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). The Presentence Report calculated a Guidelines offense level of 21, including a two-level enhancement (3C1.2) for recklessly endangerment, a two-level reduction (3E1.1(a)) for accepting responsibility, and a one-level 3E1.1(b) reduction because the probation officer anticipated a motion stating that Byrd had assisted authorities. But, because the government did not move for this reduction, the offense level was actually 22. Byrd’s extensive criminal history produced a category of IV, yielding a range of 63-78 months. The district court agreed that neither reasonable foreseeability nor merely participating as a passenger was enough to impose the reckless endangerment enhancement, but found sufficient evidence to infer that Byrd was responsible for some of the driver’s conduct. The court varied down to offense level of 21 and sentenced Byrd to 57 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Judge DeWeese sentenced Griffeth to prison for sexual battery and later oversaw his supervised release. Mayer supervised the agency responsible for monitoring Griffeth and suspected that his wife, Leech, was having an affair with Griffeth. Plaintiffs alleged that Mayer conspired with other officers and DeWeese to harass Griffeth. Mayer’s marriage ended. Plaintiffs allege that Mayer, who had been drinking, saw Griffeth and Leech in a car, pursued them, and called police to have Griffeth arrested for violating curfew. Mayer’s supervisor ordered that Mayer have no further involvement in Griffeth’s case. Plaintiffs allege that Mayer met with DeWeese and arranged to transfer Griffeth’s case to Mayer’s friend. DeWeese imposed a condition prohibiting Griffeth from contact with Leech or with her minor daughter. Griffeth was accused of associating with Leech and lying about it. Judge DeWeese refused to recuse himself, sentenced Griffeth to six months in community control, and ordered Leech removed from Griffeth’s home. The district court held that DeWeese had not established absolute judicial immunity to a claim concerning removing non-party Leech from her home. The Sixth Circuit reversed. DeWeese’s order requiring compliance with the no-contact condition of supervised release by removing Leech from the house fell within DeWeese’s subject matter jurisdiction over supervised release.

Welch took genuine $5 notes, cooked them in a microwave, scrubbed the ink off with bleach, and used a copier to counterfeit $50 and $100 notes on the paper. Although counterfeit notes were passed in Ohio, Welch was arrested Arizona, convicted in state court of five counts of forgery, and sentenced to five years on each. He was arraigned in federal court for the Ohio conduct. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture and pass counterfeit obligations or securities with intent to defraud the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 371 and three counts of falsely making, forging, counterfeiting or altering, or altering, and passing, obligations or securities of the U.S. with intent to defraud, 18 U.S.C. 471, 472 and was sentenced to concurrent 42-month sentences on each count: 24 months to be served concurrently with the Arizona sentence and 18 months to be served consecutively to the Arizona sentence. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing. The court violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when it calculated his offense level relying on an amendment to U.S.S.G. 2B5.1 that became effective after the illegal conduct, but before sentencing, impermissibly subjecting Welch to a harsher sentence than he was subject to at the time of the illegal conduct.