Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005 Jones pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). He was classified as an armed career criminal based on three prior felony convictions and sentenced to a term of 188 months of imprisonment. One of those prior convictions was for reckless homicide under Kentucky law. His pro se motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 on the basis of Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) was denied. Holding that Jones qualified for equitable tolling of the limitations period, the Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing. The conviction for reckless homicide cannot be counted under the ACCA.

After Sharp was arrested on an unrelated warrant, police seized 154 grams of methamphetamine, 10.5 grams of marijuana and drug paraphernalia found inside a shaving kit on the seat of his car. When a police dog and his officer-handler arrived, the driver’s window of Sharp’s car was down. The dog sniffed the exterior of the vehicle, stopped, walked to the driver’s door, and, without formally alerting to the presence of narcotics, jumped through the open window, went into the back seat, then back to the front and looked up or alerted on the front passenger seat. The handler asked the dog to “show me,” and, with his nose, the dog poked the shaving kit on the front seat. Sharp, sentenced to 360 months in prison, appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A dog’s sniff around the exterior of a car is not a search under the Fourth Amendment; the canine’s jump and subsequent sniff inside the vehicle was not a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the jump was instinctive and not the product of police encouragement

Defendant was stopped by state troopers at the request of DEA agents who were watching a site and monitoring wiretaps while investigation a narcotics/Medicare fraud operation. Troopers discovered large bundles of currency and a suspended Michigan driver’s license in her purse. Between the car and the purse, troopers discovered over $11,000, cash, 39 bottles of codeine cough syrup, and mothballs. The incident report that indicated Defendant was pulled over for a vision obstruction (necklaces and air freshener hanging from rear view mirror) and was arrested based on the questionable status of her license and the illegal narcotics recovered from her vehicle; it did not mention the DEA’s investigation or instructions. Defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1); possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and criminal forfeiture allegations, 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C), 28 U.S.C. 2461(c), & 21 U.S.C. 853. The district court granted her motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Because DEA had reasonable suspicion to order the traffic stop and the collective knowledge doctrine applied, the initial stop was valid. Upon detaining defendant, troopers obtained probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception.

Jackson was convicted by an Ohio jury of two murders committed in 2002. The court sentenced him to two separate death sentences. The Supreme Court of Ohio on direct appeal vacated the death sentence for one of the murders based on the trial judge’s errors in limiting the voir dire, but it affirmed the other death sentence. The federal district court denied a habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the “difficulty” of Jackson’s claim that the trial court violated his right to due process of law when, after denying his counsel the right to question the jury concerning pretrial publicity, it denied his motion for a change of venue premised on the extraordinary pretrial publicity present in Lima, Ohio, the small community in which he was tried. There was no clearly established law governing the issue of what questions defense counsel is entitled to ask in order to examine jurors concerning non-racial bias against defendants accused of murdering a child. The court also rejected ineffective assistance claims.

Foster was convicted of second-degree murder in connection with a shooting death. After trial, the Michigan trial court conducted a Ginther hearing and concluded that Foster’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an alibi defense, stemming primarily from the testimony of a witness who said that Foster was with him at the time of the killing. The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the failure to raise the alibi defense was an exercise of sound trial strategy by Foster’s trial counsel. On habeas review, the district court held that Foster’s trial attorney was deficient for failing to raise the alibi defense, but that the deficiency did not prejudice Foster. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the deficient performance finding, but reversed with respect to the prejudice determination, and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus giving the state 180 days to retry Foster or to release him. The relative weakness in the state's case and strength of the potential alibi defense created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different.

Campbell pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, by engaging in a mortgage-fraud scheme that violated 18 U.S.C. 371. As part of the plea agreement, Campbell partially waived the right to appeal his conviction and sentence. In a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Campbell claimed that his attorney’s failure to file an appeal despite Campbell’s alleged express instruction to do so amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Without conducting an evidentiary hearing to answer whether Campbell did unequivocally instruct his attorney to file an appeal, the district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded; a defendant is entitled to counsel who will follow through on express instructions to proceed with an appeal, no matter what the ultimate odds of success.

Holmes, a confidential informant, telephoned a man he identified as Gill and arranged to buy cocaine at a specific location. Police were present with Holmes, but did not record the call. Holmes told officers that Gill would drive a green Acura. Officers set up surveillance and observed Gill arrive in a green Acura, exit the car, and join a group of people. Officers approached and identified themselves as police. Gill ran about 20 feet, dropping keys, then responded to the officers’ commands. Officers discovered a small quantity of marijuana in Gill’s waistband and arrested Gill. Officers found a loaded handgun under a child safety seat at the place on the stoop where Gill had stopped and lain down minutes earlier. After a drug dog alerted on the car, officers used the dropped keys to open the car and found five ounces of cocaine. Gill was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(c); and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of a motion to suppress.

Ogden began online communications with a girl who stated that she was 15; he said he was 25, lived in Pennsylvania, and was a cancer patient. She sent Ogden sexually explicit photos of herself. At Ogden’s request, she masturbated in front of a webcam. He saved the images. She turned 16 and Ogden traveled to California; they checked into a hotel and had sex. When he discovered the relationship, the victim’s father invited Ogden to visit. He was arrested. Ogden was 34, not 25, was cancer-free, and lived in Tennessee. The victim’s chat logs showed that she sent explicit images of herself to other men. The court held that they could not be used as evidence against Ogden. Ogden unsuccessfully sought to use the logs to show that images on his hard drive were produced by the victim for others. Convicted of persuading a minor to engage in sexually explicit activity for the purpose of producing a visual depiction, use of interstate commerce to persuade a minor to perform sexual acts, receipt of child pornography, and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2422(b), 2252(a)(2),(4)(B), Ogden was sentenced 204 months and ordered to pay $64,735 in restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

In 2001, a Tennessee jury convicted Rayner of five counts of rape of a child (his daughter) and five counts of aggravated sexual battery. He was sentenced to an effective term of 51 years: 21 years for each rape conviction, and nine years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, with two rape counts and one sexual battery count to run consecutively, and the remainder to run concurrently. He exhausted state direct and collateral review. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that had not been raised in state court. At trial, the prosecution presented medical proof that the victim suffered from trichomoniasis, a sexually transmitted disease. No evidence was presented that Rayner had trichomoniasis. On cross-examination, defense counsel pointed out that trichomoniasis could be transmitted in ways not involving sexual contact. Defense strategy focused on the theory that the victim was lying about the abuse.

Woodall pled guilty to capital murder, capital kidnapping, and first degree rape in connection with the 1997 murder of a 16-year-old girl. After a penalty trial, the trial court adopted the recommendation of the jury and sentenced Woodall to death on the murder conviction and life imprisonment for the remaining convictions. Woodall unsuccessfully appealed his sentence to the Kentucky Supreme Court and then filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted the petition because the trial court denied him his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by refusing to give a requested “no adverse inference” instruction with respect to Woodall not testifying and made a constitutional error during jury selection in allowing the prosecution to use a peremptory challenge to strike an African-American member of the jury without holding a hearing pursuant to Batson. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.