Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to an act of juvenile delinquency, 18 U.S.C. 5032, for possession of heroin with intent to distribute. He was 16 years old when arrested. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that he was responsible for distribution of 647 grams of heroin and sentenced him to five years’ official detention. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The maximum period of a juvenile’s official detention is the lesser of five years or “the maximum of the guideline range ... applicable to an otherwise similarly situated adult.” The district court’s finding that defendant was responsible for 647 grams of heroin raised his maximum period of detention so that the district court was required to make the drug-quantity finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying the “Apprendi” holding, the court stated that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” is treated as an element of the crime itself, rather than as a sentencing factor. Juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when charged with violation of a criminal law.

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requires a sex offender to “register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides.” 42 U.S.C. 16913(a). After failing to persuade the district court that SORNA violates the federal Constitution, Stock pleaded guilty to failing to register. The district court set Stock’s base offense level at 16, presuming that Stock had been required to register as a “Tier III offender,” U.S.S.G. 2A3.5(a)(1). Stock’s base offense level, reduced by three levels for acceptance of responsibility and combined with Stock’s criminal-history category of VI, yielded an advisory Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Stock to 72 months with lifetime supervised release. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court selected the wrong base offense level.

A woman, who had worked as an informant in the past, was arrested for solicitation or prostitution and agreed to cooperate as a confidential informant in a controlled buy of crack cocaine. After the controlled buy, officers obtained a warrant and searched an apartment at which defendants were present. Officers discovered crack cocaine on Jenkins, a large amount of cash on Archibald, and a loaded pistol and a substantial piece of crack in the kitchen. A canine search of Archibald’s car, in the driveway, revealed $12,000 cash. The state court suppressed the evidence; the appellate court affirmed. A federal grand jury indicted Archibald, Jenkins, and Muse, the leaseholder, on charges including use of premises to manufacture controlled substances, possession with the intent to distribute cocaine near public housing, making false statements to federal agents, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the affidavit presented probable cause, but the probable cause had gone stale when officers executed the warrant, eight days after the controlled buy. Without conducting a Franks analysis, the court concluded that the affidavit contained knowing or reckless falsities regarding the reliability of the informant. The Sixth Circuit reversed.

Brinley operated an investment company; his investors were friends, neighbors, and family. He told them that the certificates of deposit were FDIC insured and that their principal was not at risk, and promised above-market returns. He used their money to pay returns to other investors, overhead and living expenses. Brinley lied to investors who attempted to withdraw funds. In 2009, unable to continue the scheme, Brinley, accompanied by his attorney confessed that he owed investors approximately four million dollars. He entered a plea of guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The probation officer calculated a Guidelines sentence range of 63-78 months. Brinley presented evidence of depression and argued for downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5K2.16 for acceptance of responsibility. The court rejected a claim that the offense would not have been detected absent disclosure, concluded that the guidelines failed to capture the severity of the offense, given the number and vulnerability of the victims, the need for deterrence, and the amount of loss, and imposed a sentence of 108 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court failed to notify of intent to vary upward, gave unreasonable weight to certain factors, considered impermissible factors, and imposed an unreasonable sentence.

In 2001 Bunch, then age 16, committed robbery, kidnapping, and repeated rape of a 22-year-old female university student. He was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 89 years. Ohio courts rejected appeals. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments by sentencing him to the functional equivalent of life without parole for crimes he committed as a juvenile. Even if the 2010 Supreme Court holding, Graham v. Florida, that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide” applies on collateral review, it does not clearly establish that consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juveniles who have committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are unconstitutional when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole.

Sypher alleged that University of Louisville’s head basketball coach, Pitino raped her; Pitino testified that they had consensual sex. Sypher learned that she was pregnant and contacted Pitino. Sypher alleges that Pitino raped her a second time. Eventually, Pitino, arranged for an abortion. Goetzinger, a friend of Sypher’s, testified that Sypher asked Goetzinger to call Pitino to request $200,000 to $400,000. Goetzinger testified that he made three anonymous calls to Pitino’s cell phone. Eventually, Sypher admitted her involvement to FBI agents. Sypher was convicted of willfully causing another to transmit threatening communications in interstate commerce with intent to extort, 18 U.S.C. 875(d); making threatening communications with intent to extort, under 875(d); mailing threatening communications with intent to extort, 18 U.S.C. 876(d); making false statements to the FBI, 18 U.S.C. 1001; and retaliating against an individual for providing truthful information about a crime to law enforcement, 18 U.S.C. 1513(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments of ineffective assistance by counsel and that the district court erred by denying a change of venue; creating a web page for public access to trial materials; releasing completed juror questionnaires before seating a jury; denying post-trial access to documentary and other evidence; and denying her motion for recusal.

In 1993, Lancaster, a former police officer with a long history of mental illness, shot his girlfriend and was charged by the state of Michigan with first-degree murder and with possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At his 1994 jury trial, he was convicted on both counts despite his asserted defenses of insanity and diminished capacity. The judgment was overturned, however, due to a Batson violation. When Lancaster was retried in 2005, he opted to be tried without a jury. Lancaster had planned to limit his defense to diminished capacity. But the trial court prohibited Lancaster from asserting the defense because, in the interim between his two trials, the Michigan Supreme Court had abolished the diminished-capacity defense (Carpenter decision). Lancaster was convicted and sentenced to life plus two years in prison. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Lancaster claimed that his right to due process was violated by the state court’s retroactive application of Carpenter. The district court denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed, granting the petition unless the state commences a new trial within 180 days in which Lancaster is permitted to assert the defense of diminished capacity.

Convicted of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. in a check cashing scheme, Vreeland was sentenced to imprisonment, supervised release, and restitution. While on supervised release, he committed a home invasion and larceny. Co-defendant Russell later testified as to Vreeland’s role, disposal of stolen items and the getaway vehicle and their agreement to deny knowing each other. Vreeland informed Probation Officer Bobo that he and Russell were suspects in the case, but denied knowing Russell and stated that his vehicle had been sold to a junk yard. Officer Bobo requested documentation regarding the car, but Vreeland did not comply and was arrested for a supervised release violation and placed in a halfway house. Bobo began his own investigation and concluded that Vreeland had violated supervised release by committing the home invasion. Vreeland signed a written statement that he did not know Russell. Vreeland’s release was revoked when he was convicted of two counts of making false oral and written statements to a probation officer, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) (a)(3). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. False statements during monthly supervisory meetings are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and do not fall within the “judicial function exception” to prosecution of 18 U.S.C. 1001(b).

Three petitioners received separate jury trials in Kent County, Michigan in 2001 or 2002. At jury selection, the petitioners did not object to racial composition of their respective venires; they were subsequently convicted. A few months later, the Grand Rapids Press published a story detailing how jury selection software had a computer glitch that had systematically excluded African-Americans from the jury pool. Petitioners each filed motions for post-conviction relief in state court. The state court found that the petitioners had waived these claims by failing to object to the racial composition of the jury venire during voir dire. A federal district court denied two habeas petitions, but another court granted the petition, holding that the petitioner could not have known of the computer glitch and presuming prejudice because the glitch caused a structural error. The Sixth Circuit remanded all three cases. Petitioners have shown cause to excuse their defaults, but federal-state comity requires that the district court find actual prejudice before granting relief.

Amos’s third wife died of a cocaine overdose while in a hotel room alone with Amos. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree murder by poisoning and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On remand, the judgment was amended to reflect only one conviction of first-degree murder under two theories. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. After state courts denied habeas relief, the district court found that three of the claims were procedurally defaulted and rejected remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no merit in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations in the forms of prosecutorial misconduct and false testimony or withholding evidence with regard to the level of cocaine in the victim’s system.