Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Ferguson was found guilty in a bench trial of knowingly possessing 14 images of child pornography and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, the mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court constructively amended the indictment by finding Ferguson guilty based on conduct that was not the subject of the indictment. He argued that his possession of 14 images after his deletion of 2,300 images was unintentional and was a separate and distinct act from his possession of the 14 images before this mass deletion. The mandatory minimum sentence was ultimately the proper sentence, so that its imposition did not violate Ferguson’s substantial rights.

Plaintiff was arrested after police officers found her intoxicated, sitting in the driver’s seat of her running, but legally parked, Hummer. She was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, but the state trial court dismissed her case, finding that she was not "operating" her Hummer as that term is defined under Michigan law. Plaintiff sued her arresting officers, arguing, among other things, that they unconstitutionally detained her without reasonable suspicion and arrested her without probable cause. The district court held that the officers had qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was a reasonable basis to believe that plaintiff was operating her Hummer while intoxicated, and was therefore violating Michigan law.

In 1985, petitioner was convicted of distributing cocaine and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment to be followed by a mandatory ten-year term of special parole, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 841, repealed in 1984. In 2000, he was released on special parole. This began a cycle during which petitioner repeatedly violated the terms of his special parole, was incarcerated, and was re-released on special parole. By statute, each time he violated the terms of special parole, he forfeited credit for any time he spent in noncustodial supervision. As a result, the term of special parole is not set to expire until 2017. Petitioner filed a habeas petition challenging the re-imposition of special parole, and the district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the regulation illegally circumvented statutorily required exercise of case-by-case discretion. Regardless of whether the Parole Commission has authority to reimpose a previously revoked term of special parole, petitioner still would have forfeited his time in non-custodial supervision under current parole regulations.

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and felonious assault, each with a firearm specification, arising out of a 1997 apartment robbery that involved shotguns and two deaths. He was sentenced to death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Following limited remand, the district court recommended that the Sixth Circuit grant habeas corpus based on the penalty-phase instruction, but otherwise dismissed the petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, finding no basis for relief. The penalty phase jury instruction did not violate the Eighth Amendment, either by requiring the jury to unanimously agree on the applicability of any mitigating factors or by depriving the jury of the opportunity to recommend life in prison as an alternative sentencing option to a death sentence.

Plaintiff-Appellant Buxton Craig Heyerman was imprisoned for more than seventeen years as a pretrial detainee after a state appellate court reversed his criminal conviction and remanded the matter to the trial court. He filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Defendants-Appellees, Calhoun County, the Calhoun County Prosecutor's Office, the Michigan Department of Corrections and the Michigan Parole Board, alleging that this lengthy detention violated his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights. Upon review, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Defendants-Appellees were not liable for the alleged constitutional violation under section 1983, and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in their favor.

Defendant was convicted of the assault of another inmate. He retained trial counsel to pursue his appeal of right, but the attorney failed to timely file. He filed delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied for lack of merit. The Michigan Supreme Court denied appeal. Defendant pursued state collateral proceedings and filed a motion for relief in the trial court, alleging ineffective assistance for failing to timely pursue appeal. The trial court denied the motion, and the higher courts denied subsequent applications for leave to appeal the denial. The district court conditionally granted a habeas petition, finding that counsel was ineffective for failing to timely pursue appeal of right. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. When counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, prejudice is presumed with no further showing. Appellate review of the denial of collateral relief is not a sufficient substitute for direct appeal; an applicant denied leave to appeal does not receive the benefit of oral argument, nor does the defendant have a right to appointed counsel on post-conviction review.

Defendant entered a guilty plea to two counts of receiving and selling stolen firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(j) and 2(a). Although he claimed to have sold 16-17 guns, the presentence report attributed more than 200 firearms to defendant based on the total number of firearms involved in the theft underlying the conspiracy counts, resulting in a 10-level increase to the base offense level, USSG 2K2.1(b)(1)(E). Defendant did not physically participate in the theft and did not plead guilty to the conspiracy. Neither of the parties, nor the court, noted the discrepancy between the number of firearms charged in the indictment and the number admitted to by defendant during the plea hearing. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. A guilty plea does not constitute an admission of facts included in the indictment that were not necessary to sustain the conviction, and defendant did not otherwise admit the facts in question.

In 1978, 70-year-old Keegan was found dead on the floor of his store. Witnesses saw blood on Strouth’s hands and clothes; the medical examiner testified that the spots were consistent with his having cut Keegan’s throat; Strouth’s girlfriend testified he had confessed; and Keegan’s wound could have been inflicted by Strouth’s knife. The police found items from Keegan’s store in Strouth’s possession and Strouth’s friend testified that Strouth had confessed. Convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and felony murder, Strouth was sentenced to death on findings that the murder was “heinous, atrocious or cruel” and occurred during a robbery. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. His state habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied. In 1988, Strouth filed a federal habeas petition, which was dismissed when the Tennessee Supreme Court held the state may not use the underlying felony as an aggravating circumstance in felony murder convictions. The state court deemed the error harmless, reasoning that the jury would have imposed the same death sentence based on the other aggravating circumstance. Strouth filed a new federal habeas petition in 2000. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.

Petitioner was living with her uncle and his wife, when the uncle died. No autopsy was performed. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was heart attack and the body was cremated. The death certificate was amended to list asphyxia by smothering as the cause of death, with acute alcohol intoxication as a contributing factor, based on photographs showing scrapes around the nose consistent with impressions of a woven pillow. Petitioner’s paramour informed police that petitioner told him that the wife paid to be rid of uncle and that petitioner and wife found uncle passed out and poured vodka down his throat. Petitioner apparently left and wife smothered uncle. Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to manslaughter and testify against wife, but withdrew her plea. Convicted of second-degree murder, she was sentenced to 20-to-40 years, rather than seven-to-15 for manslaughter. At sentencing, petitioner stated that she would have testified, "had I not been persuaded to withdraw my plea … because an attorney promised me he would represent me." The district court denied habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Petitioner established an ineffective-assistance claim. The Michigan court’s conclusion that her second attorney was not deficient in advising her to withdraw the agreement was unreasonable because the attorney failed to investigate before making the recommendation.

In 2010 defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and without a license. He admitted that he had reentered the U.S. without permission in 2007, having been removed to Mexico in 2003. The 2003 removal followed a conviction in New Mexico for aggravated assault involving a deadly weapon. He pled guilty to reentering the U.S. after being removed following a conviction for an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). The presentence report utilized U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, which provides for a 16-level enhancement if the defendant previously was deported after conviction for a felony that is a crime of violence. The PSR subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The recommended guidelines range was 57-71 months of imprisonment. The court departed downward one criminal history level, which reduced the range to 46-57, and, reasoning that the offense was a relatively minor crime of violence and that defendant would not be able to take advantage of certain rehabilitative programs while confined, the district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 36 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Aggravated assault under New Mexico law is not categorically a crime of violence and available documents do not reveal what version of the offense defendant committed.