Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Investigating a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy, officers conducted two controlled purchases of methamphetamine at defendant’s property. Within three days, they executed a search warrant on the property, which contained a house, a recreational vehicle, and a garage. They found a revolver between the bed and wall of the RV, near drug paraphernalia, including electrical tape similar to that used on methamphetamine in controlled purchases. A handgun was found in the garage laundry room; an unloaded rifle and ammunition were in a tool room. Near the garage, officers found a canister of methamphetamine buried in the ground. A smaller package of methamphetamine was wrapped in electrical tape outside the RV. Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine or at least five hundred grams of a substance containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and (b)(1)(A). The district court applied a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon during a drug offense, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1), increasing the advisory range from 70 to 87 months to 87 to 108 months in prison, and sentenced him to 87 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the enhancement violated defendant's Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Because he had prior convictions, two for aggravated burglary and one for robbery committed at age 17, he was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 180 months' imprisonment, because of enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C 924(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an Eighth Amendment argument. Defendant, 33 years old at the time of his felon-in-possession offense, remained fully culpable as an adult for his violation and fully capable of appreciating that his earlier criminal history could enhance his punishment.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and appealed denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. After the officer radioed for a license plate check and discovered a mismatch, he stopped the car, noticed a brake light not working, and noticed that the occupants had a boost phone and were nervous. They could not produce a rental agreement for the car. Learning that one occupant had been investigated by the DEA, the officer called for backup. A canine unit responded and the dog alerted to drugs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress and exclusion of defendant’s expert from testifying at the suppression hearing, but reversed imposition of the special condition of supervised release that defendant obtain and maintain employment outside the field of boxing. Although the officer unreasonably prolonged the initial stop, the circumstances created independent reasonable suspicion to support the canine search.

Aleo pled guilty to production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), and transporting and shipping child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1). The offenses involved his five-year-old granddaughter. His guidelines range was 235–293 months. He was sentenced to the statutory maximum for all three counts, 720 months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively. Aleo’s trial attorney was sanctioned $2,000 for filing a motion to compel the government to make a formal motion regarding any victim who wanted to speak at trial pursuant to the Crime Victim Rights Act, naming the victim, and providing a preview of the victim's statement. The Seventh Circuit reversed the sanction and remanded the sentence as substantively unreasonable. The court stated that it could find no justification within the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) for the sentencing variance and that the attorney did not act in bad-faith to intimidate a victim who wished to speak during sentencing, pursuant to her rights under the Act, 18 U.S.C. 3771.

In 2001, Horn was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 following his guilty plea to bank robbery. In 2007, the Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 709, changing the method by which a court calculates prior offenses, declining to give the amendment retroactive application. Had Amendment 709 been in effect when Horn was sentenced, he would not have been deemed a career offender. In 2008, Horn moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.3582(c)(2). The district court granted the reduction, reasoning that the Commission’s retroactivity decision was not binding under the Sentencing Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 991–998. Based on the 2010 decision, Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, the Sixth Circuit rejected the district court’s interpretation of the SRA, determined that the district court lacked authority to resentence Horn, and remanded. The district court again applied Amendment 709 retroactively, finding the Commission's retroactivity decision arbitrary and that the issuance of binding policy statements violated the doctrine of separation of powers. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The SRA authorizes the Commission to issue binding retroactivity decisions, these retroactivity decisions do not present separation-of-powers problems, and the retroactivity decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Jackson entered a plea of guilty to intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) in June 2009. After waiting for a change in the guidelines with regard to crack versus powder cocaine, the district court imposed sentence in July, 2010. The court did not apply “career offender” guidelines and imposed a sentence of 150 months, below the advisory range for career offenders and within the old range for crack cocaine violations. Less than three weeks after Jackson was sentenced, the Fair Sentencing Act was signed into law and the ratio for crack versus powder cocaine was reduced from 100:1 to 18:1. The Sentencing Commission promulgated emergency amendments to the guidelines, which became effective immediately; other amendments were later promulgated that made the reduced guideline ranges for crack cocaine permanent and retroactive on November 2011. The Sixth Circuit remanded, stating that the case is governed by the 2011 case, Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685. Jackson’s criminal history required the court to consider the career offender guidelines, but in deciding whether the now-amended and retroactive crack cocaine guidelines apply, the focus is on the range that was actually applied.

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); possession of a firearm altered to have a barrel of less than 18 inches in length, 26 U.S.C. 5822, 5861(c), 5871; and possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5822, 5861(d), 5871 and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 180 and 120 months under the Armed Career Criminal Act, U.S.S.G. 4B1.4(a), based on his prior conviction for Class E felony evading arrest under Tennessee state law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in 2010, but the Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration in light of its 2011 decision, Sykes v. United States. The Sixth Circuit again held that Class E felony evading arrest under Tennessee law is a violent felony, reasoning that vehicular flight inherently presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

Defendants, two of three lawyers who represented several hundred Kentucky clients in a mass-tort action against the manufacturer of the defective diet drug "fen-phen," settled the case for $200 million, which entitled them under their retainer agreements to approximately $22 million each in attorney fees. By visiting clients and obtaining their signatures on "confidential settlements," for lesser amounts, the two actually disbursed slightly more than $45 million, less than 23 percent of the total settlement. The lawyers kept the remainder for themselves and associated counsel, transferring much of it from the escrow account to various other accounts, including out-of-state accounts. The scheme was discovered; the lawyers were disbarred and convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349. One was sentenced to 240 months, the other to 300 months. They were ordered to pay more than $127 million in restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a variety of challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and trial procedures.

In 2004, actor John Stamos visited a resort with a group of male friends and met Coss, then 17 years old. Coss and her friend attended a party at Stamos's hotel room. Alcohol was served. Stamos and Coss corresponded for several years and, in 2005, Coss flew to Chicago to visit Stamos while he was filming a television show. In 2008, Coss began dating Sippola. After Sippola saw photographs that Coss had of Stamos, the two devised a plan to obtain money from Stamos in exchange for the photographs. They created two fictitious personas. Emails from a fictional 17-year-old girl whom Stamos had purportedly impregnated while on vacation resulted in a cease-and-desist letter. Coss then indicated that another party had pictures of them using drugs and trashing the hotel room. Stamos's lawyer contacted law enforcement. The FBI stepped in and reached an agreement with Sippola’s fictional character to purchase the photographs for $680,000. Sippola and Coss were convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion 18 U.S.C. 371; 875(d) and sentenced to 48 months.. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence and a claim to downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under USSG 3E1.1.

Petitioner operated a licensed business buying and selling automobile parts to consumers and mechanics. He solicited, bought, and sold parts that he knew were stolen. Petitioner cashed a $9,000 check every morning and used cash to purchase stolen parts. He shipped some stolen goods across state lines. In 2000, he was convicted of conspiracy to transport stolen goods and conspiracy to launder money, 18 U.S.C. 371; interstate transportation of stolen goods, 18 U.S.C. 2314; aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. 2; structuring financial transactions, 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3); and money laundering in the amount of more than $2,000,000, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). He was sentenced to 188 months imprisonment. Petitioner twice unsuccessfully appealed to the Sixth Circuit and moved to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner subsequently sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, asserting that he fell within the "savings clause" of section 2255. He argued that the 2008 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Santos, changed the definition of "proceeds" in 18 U.S.C. 1956 and that he is "actually innocent" of money laundering under the new definition. The district court dismissed the petition as time-barred and stated that Santos was not retroactively applicable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.