Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a state-court sentence for probation violation. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, which requires a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for defendants convicted of three or more serious drug offenses or violent felonies, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Defendant's Missouri conviction for third-degree assault qualified as a violent felony.

Defendant was sentenced to 51 months in prison after entering a conditional guilty plea to charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)), making counterfeit money (18 U.S.C. 471), and passing counterfeit money (18 U.S.C. 472). The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from an apartment and car pursuant to a search warrant. The affidavit supporting the search warrant described evidence that someone using the car in question tried to pass counterfeit bills of different denominations at different times, that the car and residence belonged to defendant, that the car was seen in front of the residence, and that defendant was identified as having attempted to pass a counterfeit bill on one of the occasions. There was probable cause to search the residence and car.

Defendant was convicted of knowingly possessing with the intent to distribute approximately 4.9 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. 2. Following direct review, he sought correction of his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise at sentencing that a portion of the 4.9 grams of cocaine base was for personal use and should be excluded from the drug-quantity calculation. The district court held that defendant could not establish either deficient performance or prejudice because the court believed that the conviction amounted to a rejection of defendant's testimony that the 4.9 grams of cocaine base was attributable to personal use. The Sixth Circuit vacated, concluding that the verdict did not establish that all 4.9 grams were intended for distribution and that the record was incomplete with respect to whether defendant suffered any prejudice.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to the statutory of minimum of 180 months on the firearms offense, to be served concurrently with a sentence of one day for the narcotics offense. The court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.924(e), concluding that two prior convictions for domestic violence qualified as "violent felonies," because, although the offense is a misdemeanor under Michigan law, he had faced a two-year maximum sentence on each under the state recidivism provision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A sentencing court should reference underlying enhancements when evaluating whether a predicate offense meets ACCA’s violent felony definition.

Charged with possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver in 1988, petitioner was convicted of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine. At the time, the offense required a mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole. The court held that that sentence violated the state constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment and sentenced him to 40 to 100 years in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the sentence. The court held a new sentencing hearing in 2004. Despite changes in stated law that eliminated mandatory life sentences in such cases, the court imposed a sentence of life without parole. The state appeals court affirmed; the supreme court denied appeal. The federal district court denied habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting the state's argument was untimely because the conviction was affirmed in 1993. Petitioner was no notice that he could be convicted of possession, even though the state charged only possession with intent to deliver. Federal law does not entitle him to retroactive application of amended sentencing laws

Defendant committed several armed robberies in South Carolina and Tennessee. He was convicted in South Carolina state court and sentenced to 25 years. He pled guilty to federal charges of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(d), and carrying a firearm during the robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1), with respect to the Tennessee robberies and was sentenced as a career offender, based on two prior convictions. The court imposed a sentence at the low end of the guidelines: 188 months on count one, to run concurrently with the 25-year sentence, with an 84-month consecutive sentence on count 2. On remand, the government abandoned its contention that defendant was a career offender. Defendant sought a sentence at the low end of the now-applicable guidelines, consistent with the original sentence, at the low end of the career-offender range. A newly-assigned judge imposed a low-end sentence of 77 months, to run consecutively to the 25-year sentence, so that defendant may spend up to six more years in prison than under the original sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The remand was not limited to eliminating career offender status. The court and prosecution were not bound to concurrent sentencing. Defendant took the risk of a harsher sentence.

In 2002, defendant was convicted of sexual battery, requiring him to register as a sex offender under Ohio law. Three days before he was released from prison, in 2005, he signed a notice acknowledging his duty to register personally in each county in Ohio, or any other state where he resided, upon five days of arriving there. He did not register in Ohio. Some time before the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250, went into effect, he moved permanently to Kentucky and did not register. He made sporadic trips from Kentucky to West Virginia, including several after SORNA became effective. In 2009 he was arrested for parole violation. He entered a conditional plea to violation of SORNA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to SORNA as constituting an ex post facto law and invalid exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.

In 2006, petitioner was convicted of rape and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, friend of his girlfriend's daughter and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. The Ohio Court of Appeal rejected a challenge to a ruling that denied him the opportunity to present evidence of the minor's sexual history through her friend's testimony, arguing that the state waived protections of Ohio's rape-shield law when it chose to introduce evidence about the minor's lack of past sexual activity. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law on petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Defendant, charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)), moved to suppress evidence seized in the automobile search (a loaded revolver found under the driver's seat) and his later statements admitting that the firearm belonged to him. The court granted the motion and the government appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the officer had probable cause to stop the car and arrest the driver, based on traffic violations, the occupants were not within reaching distance of the seat when the car was searched. The officer's testimony did not establish reasonable suspicion to justify a protective search.

In 1972, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Paroled 20 years later, he was arrested in 1997 for aggravated robbery. Petitioner faked inability to walk and had to be transported to court in a wheelchair. During transport he attacked the officer, stole her pistol, carjacked a vehicle and killed the owner. He carjacked another vehicle and attempted another carjacking before surrendering and giving a lengthy, videotaped, confession. He was convicted of aggravated murder by prior calculation and design, aggravated murder during commission of a felony and 10 other counts. The jury recommended a death sentence. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. State courts denied post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding that defendant was improperly prevented from presenting voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor but that any error was harmless. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a change in venue, by introducing incarceration records during the penalty phase, and by failing to present mitigating evidence regarding juvenile incarceration, and that the trial court improperly prohibited defendant from arguing voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor.