Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officers activated their lights and approached defendant's vehicle, which was parked in an otherwise empty coin-operated carwash in an area in which several drug arrests had been made. After seeing furtive movements, and observing marijuana on the dashboard, they requested that defendant leave exit the vehicle. He complied. The officers arrested defendant and searched the vehicle. They discovered a gun, crack cocaine, and marijuana. Defendant was charged with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The Sixth Circuit upheld denial of a motion to suppress. Defendant and the officers had a consensual encounter; no seizure occurred when the officers parked their cruiser and approached defendant's vehicle. They did not block his exit. Even if a seizure had occurred, the officers had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop.

Ohio law gives certain mayors jurisdiction to "hear and determine any prosecution for the violation of an ordinance of the municipal corporation, to hear and determine any case involving a violation of a vehicle parking or standing ordinance ... and all criminal causes involving any moving traffic violation occurring on a state highway located within the boundaries of the [city],” OH Rev. Code 1905.01(A). Plaintiff represents a 750-member class in a case under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the Due Process Clause based on the mayor presiding over no-contest traffic violation cases in Mayor's Court. The district court rejected the claim, relying on non-binding Sixth Circuit precedent stating that entering a judgment of guilty after a plea of no contest is a purely ministerial function that a mayor can undertake without violating due process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a mayor presiding over a Mayor’s Court is per se unconstitutional. A mayor presiding over a Mayor’s Court does not violate due process when he acts in a purely ministerial capacity.

Defendant was convicted for failing to register under the Sex Offender Registration Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). Though the state's own sex registration form included notification of the federal duty to register and alerted registrants to federal criminal penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment, Tennessee had not taken additional steps required to achieve substantial implementation of SORNA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that SORNA is effective in a state, even prior to its complete implementation. Refusing to address theoretical situations in which a state law would make compliance with federal law impossible or impractical, the court noted that defendant did not register under any possible definition of the term. Alternate arguments, that SORNA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, the nondelegation doctrine, and the Tenth Amendment, were found to be without merit.

Police responded to a call, about a shooting, spotted a car that matched the description, and stopped defendant, who briefly resisted and was handcuffed. After police patted him down and discovered no weapons, they entered his vehicle to retrieve identification from the console. A records check turned up an outstanding warrant. The police arrested defendant, searched him and the car, and found cocaine on his body and cocaine and firearms under the front seat. He was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 860 and 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and sentenced to 120 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court should have instructed the jury that the proximity-to-a-school component of section 860 is an element of the offense. While proximity is an element of the offense, not simply a sentencing enhancement, the issue was entirely uncontested. After defendant was convicted, the Supreme Court held that search of a vehicle incident to arrest is unconstitutional unless the arrestee has access to the passenger compartment, but the police followed the rule in place at the time of the search, so evidence from the search was properly admitted.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to the mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Defendant did not comply with the officer's commands to stop and was not seized until the officer physically restrained him by taking him down and handcuffing him. The officer had reasonable suspicion based on: his knowledge that the area was known for drug activity; his observation that defendant and another man engaged in an apparent hand-to-hand transaction; defendant's fleeing and throwing items to the ground. The court upheld sentencing under the ACCA.

In 2006, U.S. Marshals worked with officers in 24 states on a fugitive round-up that led to arrests of 10,733 people, including plaintiff, who was wrongfully arrested because of clerical mistakes. All charges were eventually dropped, but news reporters had filmed her arrest and aired the story, including plaintiff's name and a statement that she was wanted for identity theft, after the dismissal. One station also placed the video on its website, along with a written story. Plaintiff's attorney faxed a cease and desist letter to the station, which removed the story, although it remained accessible by keyword search for several days. Most of plaintiffs' claims against the federal and city governments, the U.S. Marshals Service, the broadcast company and employees, and various named and unnamed Marshals, were resolved. The district court rejected defamation and false light claim against the broadcast company, based on the fair report privilege requirement of proof of actual malice, and a Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), claim against the U.S. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the discretionary function exception. Investigating and apprehending plaintiff was discretionary and not within the safe harbor for intentional torts.

Perkins was convicted of a fatal stabbing. He exhausted appeals. The conviction became final in 1997. He did not file a petition for habeas corpus within one year, as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). In 2008, he filed a habeas petition, raising sufficiency of the evidence, jury instruction, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance claims. Arguing that the petition should be governed by AEDPA’s "new evidence" statute of limitations, Perkins introduced new affidavits that alluded to his innocence and to the guilt of a witness. The latest was signed in 2002, so that the limitations period expired in 2003; Perkins argued that the period should be equitably tolled because he is actually innocent. The district court denied the request because the evidence was not of the sort needed to pursue an innocence claim, was substantially available at trial, and pointed to the same theory argued at trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. While equitable tolling generally depends on the petitioner's diligence in pursuing his rights, a petitioner with a credible claim of actual innocence should be treated differently.

In 2003, petitioner pled guilty to unarmed robbery of $10 that occurred when he was 17 years old and had no prior criminal history. He suffered from A.D.H.D. and had been in special education since first grade. After being sentenced to “boot camp,” petitioner returned to court for violating rules. After a 20-minute hearing, at which supporters offered counseling and employment, the judge sentenced him to 1 to 15 years in prison. He served six years. He did not pursue direct appeal. The judgment became final in 2005. Efforts to obtain post-conviction relief in state court were unsuccessful. In September, 2006, a Michigan court rejected a second post-conviction motion as prohibited by state law. The supreme court denied appeal. In 2007, petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus. The district court found that the limitations period was tolled while the second motion was pending in state court despite the motion being barred. The court issued an unconditional writ on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and due-process grounds. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of whether equitable tolling of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2) applies. The second motion could not be accepted and, therefore, was not “properly filed,” so the petition was not timely.

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, felonious assault, (with firearm specifications) and possession of cocaine and sentenced to 258 months' imprisonment. On direct appeal he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice due to the failure to suppress the photographic array identification, and insufficient evidence. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner did not file a timely appeal, but almost six years later, filed an unsuccessful motion for leave to file a delayed appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court. He also pursued post-conviction relief in state courts without success. The district court denied a habeas corpus petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Petitioner was aware of the factual predicate of his claims at the time of his direct appeal, and the claims do not implicate sections 2244(d)(1)(B) or 2244(d)(1)(C). The limitations period began to run on the date that his judgment became final, at the expiration of the time for seeking direct review. Neither statutory nor equitable tolling apply and petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. .

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(5)(B). He challenged denial of a motion to suppress floppy disks discovered in his house and five conditions imposed on supervised release. He claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in his attorney's failure to preserve his right to appeal denial of the motion to suppress. The conditions restrict his ability to access the internet, to associate with minors, to associate with persons who have sexual attraction to minors, to seek employment involving interaction with minors, and to engage in activities involving minors, and to frequent places where minors gather. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the record insufficient for review, with respect to the ineffective assistance claim. In light of defendant's unconditional plea, the court declined to review denial of the motion to suppress or the conditions.