Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to knowingly possessing more than 7100 images of child pornography on his computer, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). Some of the images involved bondage, torture, and rape of prepubescent children. The USSG recommended sentence was 78 to 97 months' imprisonment. The district court imposed a sentence of one day in custody, a term of supervised release of five years, and a $100 special assessment, based on defendant's lack of criminal history and a psychological assessment that concluded that he was low-risk. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable. While a court may consider the defendant's personal characteristics, it may not disregard other factors, such as seriousness of the offense, deterrence, and avoiding sentencing disparities.

Defendant pleaded guilty to three child pornography offenses, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), 2252A(a)(2), and 2252A(a)(5)(B) and was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that that the district court violated FRCP 32(i) by preparing its sentencing opinion before announcing its sentence. The court conducted "exhaustive" review of submissions and arguments before reaching its decision. The court's reliance on sex offender studies was not excessive. The court properly applied several child pornography enhancements from USSG 2G2.2 and acted within its discretion in discounting a psychological report on defendant, considering defendant's lawful activities, considering the duration of his unlawful conduct, and reviewing images possessed by defendant.

Defendants, convicted of state-law sex offenses requiring them to register before the enactment of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901, were indicted for traveling in interstate commerce in 2009 and knowingly failing to update their registrations, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The district court dismissed each of their indictments, holding that SORNA had not yet been made retroactively applicable to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that SORNA became retroactively effective on August 1, 2008, the effective date of the SMART guidelines, promulgated by the Attorney General.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); one count of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B); and one forfeiture count, 18 U.S.C. 2253 following his sexual assault and exploitation of his 13-year-old niece and was sentenced to 235 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, vacated forfeiture of a computer and payment of restitution for childcare, and declined to consider conditions of supervised release.

After his trial for intentional possession of an unregistered firearm, defendant was instructed to place his hands behind his back for cuffing. Instead he grabbed a plastic water pitcher and hit a deputy in the head with it. The officer was not seriously hurt and did not seek medical attention. Defendant pled guilty to assaulting a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and 1114. At sentencing, the district court found that the pitcher constituted a "dangerous weapon" under the circumstances and applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that examples given in the definition of what constitutes a dangerous weapon should be read as limiting and that the plastic pitcher was incapable of causing serious bodily injury.

On the second day of his trial on 23 counts relating to a series of bank robberies, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The plea stated that the mandatory minimum and the recommended sentence would be 32 years. Three months later at his sentencing hearing, when asked if he had anything to say before sentencing, he attempted to withdraw his plea. His attorney remained silent. The district court denied his request. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Factors concerning delay, defendant's characteristics, the circumstances of the plea, and prejudice to the prosecution, weighed against allowing withdrawal of the plea. The record was inadequate to determine whether counsel was ineffective and such a claim would be better suited for a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255.

Petitioner was indicted in state court on two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, Ohio Rev. Code 2907.04(A), and one count of gross sexualimposition, Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(A)(1). During trial, the court allowed the prosecution to amend the indictment to conform dates to testimony and declared a mistrial. The state proceeded toward another trial. The court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. The district court denied a pretrial petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed after conducting de novo review. The court rejected a double jeopardy argument, finding that the mistrial resulted from prosecutorial negligence, and not from an intentional action by the prosecution because its case was going badly. The court concluded that the prosecution gained no advantage.

Defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea to sexually exploiting a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The district court imposed a within-guidelines 360-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence after rejecting a challenge to federal jurisdiction. The court erred in applying a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(b)(4), for an offense involving materials that depict sadistic or masochistic conduct because it considered only defendant's conduct, not the objective nature of the photographs at issue. The court properly applied a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(b)(1), for engaging in a pattern of activity that involves prohibited sexual conduct.

Plaintiffs, seven couples who sent money to the defendants (adoption agency and individuals) to facilitate adoptions, in some cases of specific children, believed they had been defrauded and filed federal claims. The case was stayed, pending resolution of state criminal charges. The district court subsequently dismissed claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962. The complaint identified the agency as the enterprise; identified predicate violations of mail fraud and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 341 and 1343, extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951; transmitting or transferring in interstate commerce goods, wares, merchandise, or money knowing the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken by fraud, 18 U.S.C. 2314; and traveling in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds of extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1952; and alleged a conspiracy among the individual defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Four of plaintiffs' claims adequately alleged predicate acts of mail or wire fraud and adequately alleged a threat of continued criminal activity and, therefore, a pattern of racketeering activity.

Petitioner, a professor, told the FBI and the university that she had received hate mail at her office. The FBI and the university spent thousands of dollars investigating before she admitted to writing and delivering the mail herself. In light of overwhelming evidence of guilt and unable to obtain testimony to support a claim of diminished capacity, petitioner's attorney encouraged a plea. Because petitioner is a citizen of India, he consulted an immigration attorney, who opined, incorrectly, that the matter was not an aggravated felony and that she would not necessarily be deported. Petitioner pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 1001, was sentenced to six months in prison, and ordered to pay more than $66,000 in restitution. An immigration judge found her removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and the BIA dismissed an appeal. In a companion case, the Sixth Circuit agreed. While in prison, petitioner unsuccessfully challenged her sentence, but not her plea or conviction. After completing her sentence, she filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Petitioner did not show a reasonable probability that she was prejudiced by the incorrect advice.