Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

One of 14 individuals charged with, among other things conspiring to steal government property, as part of a scheme to defraud the VA of disability benefits, defendant proceeded to trial, but on the third day, changed his mind and pleaded guilty. He entered into a written plea agreement that included an appellate waiver provision. He sent a letter to the court, 80 days later, complaining that he had been coerced into pleading guilty by counsel. The district court appointed new counsel, held an evidentiary hearing, denied the motion, and imposed a 21-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal. The defendant never professed innocence, was competent, and accepted a plea that included a waiver of appeal.

Plaintiff, a new teacher, approached the principal to deny rumors that she had a sexual relationship with a minor student, JS. The principal spoke with JS, who denied the allegations. Days later, JS changed his story. The school called the police. JS stated he had consensual sex with plaintiff at her apartment and described her apartment and a tattoo and skin graft on her body. Plaintiff admitted to exchanging sexually inappropriate text messages, but denied having a physical relationship and that he visited her apartment. Photos matched JS's descriptions of plaintiff's tattop and apartment, and a warrant issued. Prior to execution of the warrant, plaintiff's attorney, asked for a polygraph. Plaintiff appeared for the polygraph, but the exam was never administered. At trial , JS significantly changed his testimony and plaintiff was acquitted. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of due process and claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Kentucky law. The state's attorney acted in the course of his prosecutorial duties, entitling him to absolute immunity, and his actions were not in violation of clear constitutional rights, entitling him to qualified immunity.

Petitioner was convicted in 1993 of a 1991 aggravated murder, was sentenced to death, and exhausted Ohio state court remedies. He filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas corpus in 1999 and amended his petition in 2003 to set forth 28 claims for relief, some with multiple subclaims. After filing, petitioner obtained information that the prosecution had withheld evidence that, before trial, a witness had been adjudicated delinquent for marijuana trafficking, contradicting his testimony that he never sold drugs. The district court held proceedings in abeyance while he exhausted state law remedies on the new Brady claim, then denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court decision on the Brady claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. The court rejected claims of prosecutorial misconduct (vouching, inflaming the jury, and denigrating defendant and defense counsel) and ineffective assistance.

Defendant, a businessman, was convicted on 10 counts of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) involving creation of 10 fraudulent entries on the books of a small bank in Benton, Tennessee. At trial, the government offered the theory that defendant and the bank's president jointly created the phony entries in an effort to disguise earlier, troubled loans to defendant's business. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court improperly excluded evidence that the bank president had, unassisted, previously engaged in a large number of identical frauds. The prosecutor suggested to the jury that acquittal would deliver a financial windfall to defendant. The government offered no direct evidence and insufficient circumstantial evidence to show that defendant knew about or participated in the bank president's fraud, a fraud that the bank president had independent reasons for creating.

Defendant hacked the email account of then-Alaska governor and Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin. After forensic examinations revealed that he took action to remove information from his computer relating to the incident, he was indicted on several counts, including identity theft, but only convicted of obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1519. Section 1519, part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, prohibits knowing destruction or alteration of any record with intent to impede, obstruct, or influence investigation of any matter within the jurisdiction of any federal department or agency or in relation to or in contemplation of any such matter or case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Defendant's posts indicated "contemplation" of a federal investigation.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), admitting possession of a computer thumb drive that he knew contained many images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. At sentencing, the district court considered all of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) before imposing a term of incarceration of 57 months. Although both parties requested a ten-year term of supervised release, the court imposed a lifetime term of supervised release with standard and special conditions. The Sixth Circuit vacated because the court did not articulate a rationale for the length of supervised release and some of the conditions it imposed, such as drug and alcohol testing.

Checking accounts were opened in the name of Diallo by a man with a passport bearing that name. The IRS deposited $3,787 into the account. Diallo withdrew $2,500 before the bank discovered that the money was a tax refund belonging to another. The account was blocked and the bank notified the IRS. The IRS made additional deposits for tax refunds. Diallo attempted to make a withdrawal, but the transaction was blocked. Later that day, at the airport, defendant was flagged for additional screening. The search revealed envelopes containing large amounts of cash and unsealed envelopes containing passports bearing defendant's picture but different names, including the name Diallo. He was indicted for possession of a false passport, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344 and 1028A(a)(1). The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the government failed to establish that the search was constitutional, and barred admission of the bank records. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although actual documentation seized during the search must be suppressed, evidence obtained legally and independently of the search is not suppressible, even if the government cannot show that it would have discovered its significance without the illegal search. The minimal deterrent effect of suppression is outweighed by the burden on the truth-seeking function of the courts.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to knowing possession of child pornography transported via computer, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). He was sentenced to 72 months and appealed sentencing enhancement under USSG 2G2.2(b)(3)(F), which requires a two-level increase for distribution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the evidence at least arguably refuted any claim that defendant was ignorant of the fact that his use of a file-sharing program made the files he downloaded through the program "available" to be searched and downloaded by others.

After months of surveillance, police searched curbside trash and found marijuana paraphernalia, an empty ammunition box, and mail addressed to people including defendant. Executing a warrant, they found numerous firearms. After indictment of defendant and 28 others, police obtained arrest warrants and drove to the house. A woman who was an arrest target answered the door. Within one minute of the officer's entry, defendant appeared at the top of the steps and followed orders to come down and submit to arrest. Officers conducted a protective sweep of places in the house that were large enough to hold a person and discovered a handgun and bag of marijuana on a dresser, a semiautomatic machine gun in a closet , and based on statements of a resident, a gun under a couch cushion. After obtaining a warrant for the house, police found more drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea for conspiracy to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), and 846, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence was found as part of a lawful protective sweep, but vacated the sentence.

The police arrested defendant on February 4, 2009, on charges involving heroin distribution. He appeared before a magistrate the same day and was released on bond. A grand jury returned an indictment on June 17. Defendant was returned to custody and arraignment took place on September 22. The district court dismissed without prejudice, under the Speedy Trial Act, finding that more than 30 non-excludable days elapsed between initial arrest and indictment and that more than 70 non-excludable days elapsed between arraignment and the start of trial (18 U.S.C. 3161(b), (c)(1)). Three months later, the grand jury returned a new indictment charging the same crimes. The court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that defendant's reading of the Act would render all Speedy Trial dismissals "with prejudice." The Act permits a court to dismiss without prejudice and to start the clock anew when the defendant files the motion to dismiss. When the government asks the court to dismiss, the 70-day clock is tolled, not reset. The government delayed indicting defendant for the legitimate purpose of giving him the chance to cooperate and exceeded the 70-day speedy-trial clock by just nine days, so dismissal without prejudice was appropriate.