Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Musgrave, a CPA, became involved in a tire recycling venture with Goldberg. Musgrave obtained a loan, guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA), through Mutual Federal Savings Bank. The venture ultimately lost the $1.7 million loan and Musgrave lost his $300,000 investment. In 2011, the two were indicted. Goldberg pled guilty to one count of misprision of felony, and the recommended a sentence of three years of probation, restitution, and a special assessment. Musgrave was convicted of: conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud and to make false statements to a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 1349; wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. The district court sentenced him to one day of imprisonment with credit for the day of processing, a variance from his Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months and below the government’s recommendation of 30 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that economic and fraud-based crimes are more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity and are prime candidates for general deterrence. The district court relied on impermissible considerations and failed to address adequately how what amounted to a non-custodial sentence afforded adequate general deterrence in this context. . View "United States v. Musgrave" on Justia Law

After his conviction in Ohio state court for two 1999 murders and the aggravated robbery and kidnapping of one victims, Scott was sentenced to death. Scott unsuccessfully appealed and pursued state court post-conviction remedies, then sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments: that Ohio’s “course-of-conduct” capital specification was unconstitutional as applied; that the trial court erroneously failed to merge two other aggravating specifications, for robbery and kidnapping; that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, by giving erroneous advice about the risks of making an unsworn statement, and by failing to present certain mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of trial; and that Ohio’s method of execution by lethal injection is unconstitutional. Scott did not present his first argument in state court, so it was procedurally defaulted. AEDPA’s stringent standard of review applies to Scott’s second and third claims, and Scott cannot show that the Ohio courts reached a decision that contravened or unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. Scott is currently challenging Ohio’s execution procedures in federal district court, in a separate action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and consideration of this issue is properly confined to that forum. View "Scott v. Houk" on Justia Law

Webb pleaded guilty to drug offenses in two different cases. Based on his status as a career offender and a belief that the career offender guideline range was excessive and improper, the district court sentenced him to the pre-Fair Sentencing Act, 124 Stat. 2372, crack cocaine mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months imprisonment. Webb later moved, under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) for retroactive application of the new Sentencing guidelines in effect after passage of the FSA. The district court found that Webb was entitled to seek a reduction of his sentence and resentenced him to 188 months for each count in the first case and for the second case. The government appealed, claiming that the district court lacked the authority to reduce the sentence. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, reinstating the original sentence. The original sentence was not based on a sentencing range that was subsequently reduced and no amendment to the Guidelines had the effect of lowering Webbs’s “applicable guideline range,” sothe district court lacked authority to grant a motion for resentencing, View "United States v. Webb" on Justia Law

Akron police witnessed Nagy rummaging for change in a car that was not his. An officer placed him in handcuffs. Nagy immediately told the officer that he had a gun in his pocket, which Nagy had taken from a car by mistake. Nagy testified that he had intended to dispose of the gun safely by putting it in a U.S. Post Office Box, and was searching for a mailbox when he stopped to take change from a car as the officer drove by. Metzger searched Nagy and found a large amount of change, DVDs, Nintendo games, multiple cell phones, iPods, garments, costume jewelry, cigarettes, medications, and lighters—none of which belonged to Nagy. Convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e), and knowingly possessing a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j), he received a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. Nagy argued that his sentence violated his Sixth Amendment rights because his three prior convictions, which enhanced his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), were not submitted to the jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Alleyne v. U.S. Nagy also argued that his sentence was unconstitutional as contrary to the evolving national consensus and standards of decency. The Sixth Circuit rejected both claims View "United States v. Nagy" on Justia Law

Aaron Hayward was driving home from his parents’ store around 4:00 a.m. when a Cleveland Clinic Police Department SUV followed him into his driveway without using a siren or lights. An officer yelled, “Hey you, come over here, boy,” as Aaron entered his home. It was not communicated to Aaron that he was under arrest. About 10-15 minutes later, five additional officers arrived and began pounding on the Haywards’ front door. Essex Hayward opened the main door and the officers tried to force their way through the outer security door. Essex shut the main door and used his body to prevent the officers from breaking down the door. The officers used the butt of a shotgun to shatter the main door’s window. Annie called 911. An officer stuck a taser through the window and blindly fired into the home, striking Aaron twice. The officers broke through the door, tased Aaron again, as he continued struggling, then dragged Aaron to the driveway, where they allegedly beat him with batons, kicked him in the head and other parts of his body, stunned him with a taser, and called him a “black nigger” before they handcuffed and arrested him. Aaron pleaded guilty to willfully fleeing a police officer and resisting arrest, admitting that he injured an officer. The Haywards brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. At the court’s request, they removed their claims based on pre-arrest conduct. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of the parents’ section 1983 claim for illegal home entry and state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, but affirmed dismissal of other claims, including Aaron’s section 1983 claims. View "Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found." on Justia Law

Williams, who was convicted in Michigan state court for the fatal shooting of the owner of a video store during an attempted robbery, filed a direct appeal, arguing that the introduction of the testimony of an eyewitness who died before trial at the preliminary hearings violated Williams’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of the testimony, and that the lineup in which Williams participated was unduly suggestive and violated the due process clause. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief, concluding that Williams’s constitutional rights were not violated and that, if they were, the errors were harmless. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The federal district court denied a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Williams v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Cordell was an inmate at the Greene County Jail in Xenia, Ohio until he pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter. As Deputy McKinney performed his initial rounds on the floor on which Cordell was housed, several inmates, including Cordell, requested haircuts. A verbal conflict ensued. McKinney commanded Cordell to step into the vestibule area to be placed in handcuffs. The conflict continued as McKinney placed Cordell in "escort position” to take him to a third-floor holding cell. Cordell claimed that during this trip McKinney ran him “head first into the wall” with force sufficient to lacerate Cordell’s forehead, cause severe neck and back pain, and leave him “very, very groggy.” The jail’s nurse (Jordan) found “a little cut above his eye,” and bandaged it. Later, at a hospital, Cordell was diagnosed with whiplash. Based on a witness statement, McKinney received a written warning for use of excessive force. The district court rejected Cordell’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. A genuine dispute as to several material facts exists. If Cordell’s version of events is credited, a reasonable jury could conclude that McKinney inflicted serious pain upon Cordell with malicious and sadistic intent. Any reasonable jail official would know that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the conduct that Cordell described.View "Cordell v. McKinney" on Justia Law

Garrett entered into a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). The district court sentenced Garrett to 151 months of imprisonment, which was the bottom end of the guideline range as calculated in his presentence report. Garrett argued that he was eligible for resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) because his original sentence was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission” and because reduction would be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court rejected the argument. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. When a defendant’s sentence follows from a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the district court is bound by that agreement if it accepts it, and the sentence is, therefore, “based on” an agreement “that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply.” Garrett’s agreement employed a range that was subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. View "United States v. Garrett" on Justia Law

In 1991 Charlene filed a paternity suit naming McCarley as the father of her younger son. McCarley stated that he would kill Charlene before paying support. In January 1992 a neighbor went to Charlene’s apartment and found her dead, with a leather strap wrapped around her neck. Both of Charlene’s children were at home. Three-year-old D.P. repeatedly looked at uniformed officers and stated: “It was him. He hurt mommy.” Four days later, he made related statements in the presence of Charlene’s mother, including “Policeman hit my mommy. Put tape on her.” A child psychologist was able to elicit similar statements. In 1995, police officers made a surprise visit to McCarley’s home on an unrelated matter. In his garage, officer Balogh saw a deputy sheriff’s jacket and cap strewn across a moving dolly. Balogh remembered D.P.’s statements from years before and confiscated the jacket and cap. After a second trial in 2007, McCarley was convicted for aggravated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole in 20 years. The district court denied habeas relief, rejecting an argument that the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established Sixth Amendment law by allowing a child psychologist to read into evidence the testimonial hearsay statements of a three-and-a-half year-old declarant, where the declarant was not subject to any prior cross-examination. The court concluded that the error was harmless. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "McCarley v. Hall" on Justia Law

A Kalamazoo resident heard gunfire and called 911. Hearing additional gunshots, she peered through her window and saw someone “dart off.” She described a person wearing a baseball cap and an orange, thigh-length coat with fur around the hood. Officers arrived at the apartment complex minutes later and saw Garcia, wearing a white jacket. They decided to follow him. Garcia ran, climbed over a fence, and fell to the ground. As he stood up, an officer noticed that “some objects had fallen from his person.” Garcia then continued to run and fell into some brush. Garcia resisted arrest, but once he was in a squad car Garcia expressed concern about “his hat.” A search of the area where objects were seen falling from Garcia’s person revealed a baseball cap and a silver revolver. Snow had fallen within 24 hours, and there were no tracks except those of Garcia and the officers. The temperature was 23 degrees, but beads of water appeared on the revolver. No fingerprints were found on the gun. No gunshot residue tests were performed. Although the gun was swabbed for DNA, no tests were conducted. Garcia was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Garcia possessed the revolver, that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a government witness during closing arguments, and that the sentence was unreasonable. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law