Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2002 defendant was tried in Michigan for the stabbing death of a police officer after a traffic stop. The jury sent a note to the judge asking to re-hear testimony from five witnesses. Without consulting with counsel, the judge denied the request. Defendant was convicted and exhausted appeals without raising the court's failure to consult with the parties before denying the request. State courts also rejected collateral attacks that did raise the issue. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus, holding that defendant procedurally defaulted all his grounds for relief, except for his ineffective-assistance argument, because he did not raise them on direct appeal. The court rejected the ineffective-assistance argument on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Defendant made no argument that he suffered actual harm from the failure to consult the parties; the trial court had good reason to conclude that the request to re-hear testimony was unreasonable. Not all communications between a judge and jury are critical or per se harmful. The state court reasonably concluded that defendant failed to demonstrate his appellate counsel's deficiency.

After a man stole a car at gunpoint, the FBI agent learned that about an hour later someone attempted to use the owner's stolen bank cards. Surveillance video showed an unshaven, African American man wearing a red and white patterned shirt and a hooded jacket. Agents found the car in an apartment complex parking lot, searched the apartment and found the keys and items stolen in another robbery. They arrested defendant in the apartment and, in the car, found pictures of defendant, wearing the patterned shirt. Other items in the car were traceable to similar car thefts. At trial on charges of carjacking (18 U.S.C. 2119) and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)) the court admitted evidence of a 2006 assault and of the uncharged theft of a gun from another car, under the res gestae doctrine and 404(b), and issued a limiting instruction. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The evidence was sufficient to allow a rational fact-finder to infer that defendant was guilty, but the court improperly admitted evidence of the gun theft and the prejudicial impact was high.

Defendant pled guilty to knowingly possessing 305 images and 56 videos of child pornography on his computer (18 U.S.C. 2522). Many of the images depicted 8- to 10-year-old girls being raped by adult men. The Sentencing Guidelines recommended 63 to 78 months' imprisonment. The probation officer recommended a sentence of 24 months, noting that defendant was 67 years old, had no prior convictions, had suffered two strokes within 11 years, and was to some extent a caretaker for his wife. The district court sentenced defendant to a single night of confinement in the courthouse lockup, plus 10 years' supervised release. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable, finding that the court improperly rejected the relevant sentencing guideline. The court's determination that the guidelines were "seriously flawed" did not justify the departure. The court did not properly consider the relevant factors or the government's arguments.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). The district court sentenced him to 168 months' imprisonment, applying a two-point enhancement under USSG 2B3.1(b)(4)(B),applicable where a person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense, and a six-point enhancement under USSG 3A1.2(c)(1), because the offense involved an "official victim." The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Defendant's use of a pistol to force a victim into an office constituted restraint. His reckless act of ramming his vehicle into a police car justified the "official victim" enhancement.

Taxpayer took business and individual tax deductions for the cost of "Loss of Income" insurance policies. The policies were back-dated, had a high premium to coverage ratio, were described as tax-savings products, and allowed taxpayer access to and control over the funds. A significant part of the premium was invested for later distribution to the policy holder. He was convicted of: subscribing a false tax return, 26 U.S.C. 7206(1); attempting to evade taxes, 26 U.S.C. 7201; and conspiracy to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. 371. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government presented sufficient evidence of the crimes. The court rejected a challenge to prior bad acts evidence and an argument that the government was required by the nature of the charges to forgo charging him under the general crime of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. The district court properly ordered payment of restitution for the personal income taxes of his co-conspirator.

Defendant was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and of possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). His criminal history included two state felony convictions in 2000 for first degree wanton endangerment, and a state felony conviction in 2004 for first degree complicity to traffic in a controlled substance. The district court sentenced defendant as a career offender pursuant to USSG 4B1.1(a), The Sixth Circuit affirmed. holding that the Kentucky convictions for wanton endangerment qualified as crimes of violence. The court also rejected arguments under 21 U.S.C. 851, that the government was required to file an information giving defendant notice that the prior convictions would be used to enhance his sentence.

After officers saw him put a handgun in his waistband, defendant was arrested on the porch of a house. The officers found marijuana and cocaine on top of defendant's wallet, near where he was sitting. He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm 18 U.S.C. 922(g). A presentence report assigned a total offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of VI, and recommended between 110 and 120 months' imprisonment. Defendant objected to a four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony (USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)), arguing that he did not possess drugs when he was arrested. The district court applied the enhancement and imposed a 108-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The enhancement was unwarranted and the sentence was not procedurally reasonable. The drug possession was a felony rather than a misdemeanor only because of defendant's prior drug convictions. Although there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that he committed a felony under Tennessee law by possessing the drugs, the government did not sufficiently demonstrate that defendant's possession of a firearm facilitated, or had the potential to facilitate, his felony drug possession.

After state court rejected his challenge to the constitutionality of the law, defendant pled no contest to sexual battery for engaging in sexual conduct by means of sexual intercourse with his 22-year-old stepdaughter, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.03(A)(5), which makes it a crime to "engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when . . . [t]he offender is the other person's natural or adoptive parent, or a stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of the other person." He was sentenced to 120 days of incarceration and three years of community control and was classified as a sex offender. State court rejected appeals. The district court denied habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the state's interest in protecting families.

Defendant agreed to plead guilty to three of 26 counts charged two counts of felon-in-possession of a firearm and distribution of more than five grams of crack cocaine. He waived any right to appeal, if his sentence was within the guideline range determined by the agreement. The agreement provided that the guideline range was 188-235 months, but that if the court found that defendant's criminal history category was higher or lower than reflected on attached worksheets and if the finding would result in a lower or higher range, the higher or lower range would become the agreed range. Defendant and his lawyer had written a note in the margin that the range was not agreed. At the sentencing hearing, the government argued for a longer sentence; defendant acknowledged that he would be bound by the court's determination of the range and would not have a right to appeal. The court determined a range of 135-168 months and imposed a sentence of 168 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Even if the government breached the agreement by arguing for a longer sentence than provided by the agreement, defendant's rights wre not prejudiced and he waived appeal.

Police seized defendant's computer and found that he had exchanged child pornography with 49 people, more than 1,000 photos and videos containing child pornography, some involving children as young as four years, and a message showing that he had requested that a woman's three-year-old daughter perform oral sex on him. He pled guilty to distributing child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2)) and moved for a departure under section 5K of the Sentencing Guidelines and a variance under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) based on his extraordinary contribution to his country as a soldier. In 10 years that included three combat tours as an improvised explosive device inspector in Iraq and Afghanistan, he sustained repeated concussions from IEDs and a fractured back, necessitating surgery. A psychologist testified that he had sustained organic brain injury, which, combined with pain medications, led to his interest in child pornography. The district court denied the motion, sentencing him to the most lenient sentence recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, 151 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable.