Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and sentenced to 136 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Conspiracy can be inferred from repeated purchases of large quantities of drugs; defendant had an ongoing relationship with members of the conspiracy and there was evidence that they trusted him. The prosecutor commented on defendant's failure to testify, but not in a way that would encourage the jury to find him guilty.

Defendant, convicted of several felony offenses in state court and sentenced to a maximum term of 27 years, exhausted state court appeals and filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court five days after the one-year statute of limitations (28 U.S.C. 2254) had run. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of equitable tolling. Although defendant proceeded pro se after his appellate attorney withdrew and did not turn over documents related to the case, and was limited to one law library visit per week, he was not diligent. His lack of access to the trial transcript and lack of notice of the nearly two-month gap between when he submitted his motion for a delayed appeal to the prison mailroom and when that motion was ultimately filed with the Ohio Supreme Court were "unfortunate" but did not excuse the delays.

When defendant was indicted in Tennessee in 2005 for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. 846, 841(b)(1)(A)) he was in custody in Georgia on unrelated charges. The government obtained writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, but because of superseding indictments, defendant's transfer to another county, and misplaced paperwork, defendant did not appear in Tennessee until August 2008. The district court rejected Sixth Amendment and Speedy Trial Act claims, but dismissed without prejudice under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act and FRCP 48(b). Defendant pled guilty to a new indictment and was sentenced to 110 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for dismissal. The district court erred by finding that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated; there was no basis for concluding that the government was less than grossly negligent and the court should have presumed prejudice, based on the length of the delay.

Defendant was convicted of intentional murder and of possession of a firearm at the time of the commission of a felony. At sentencing, counsel expressed that defendant, due to long term mental illness, was not responsible for his actions and needed extensive psychiatric treatment. The trial court imposed a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and a two-year sentence for the firearm conviction. The court noted that a clinical report classified defendant as suffering from schizophrenia paranoid type in remission in an individual who displays passive-aggressive tendencies, mal-depression and non-compliance with medical treatment, but concluded that his mental issues did not rise to the level of useable defense. After exhausting state appeals, defendant petitioned for habeas corpus. The district court dismissed, denying a motion for equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether the extraordinary circumstances of his mental illness prevented defendant from diligently pursuing his rights.

Petitioner was convicted of murder in connection with a homosexual encounter and sentenced to death in the 1980s. Ohio courts denied relief. After several remands by the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that defense counsel's failure to obtain an independent mental health expert and reliance on a presentence investigation report could not be the basis for issuing a writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the district court denied the writ. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted and petitioner did not establish that the default should be excused do to fault and prejudice. A "Brady" claim concerning evidence of a psychological report indicating that the murder may have occurred as a result of "homophobic panic," failed in light of other evidence.

Petitioner, convicted in Michigan of aiding and abetting a carjacking and of receiving and concealing stolen property, exhausted state appeals and sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court denied. On rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction and rejecting an argument that trial counsel was ineffective in refusing to call a co-defendant, who had already pled guilty to the actual carjacking, as a witness.

Indicted for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute over 1 kilogram of cocaine base and over 100 grams of powder cocaine, defendant entered a plea agreement that stipulated to 180 months of imprisonment. The parties attached a Sentencing Guidelines work sheet showing a range of 168 to 210 months, based on a final offense level of 35 and a criminal history category of I. The presentence report, however, determined that the range was 210 to 262 months, assessing a four-level enhancement rather than the two-level enhancement applied on the worksheet. The district judge accepted the agreement and sentenced defendant to 180 months. After the Sentencing Commission lowered the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses and made the amendments retroactive, defendant filed a motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Because his sentence was "based on" guidelines that changed, defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) and the district court apparently did not consider whether defendant is entitled to a sentence reduction under the circumstances in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors.

Petitioner, 16 years old at the time, was charged with first-degree murder and firearm possession during a felony after admitting that he was present at the scene of the 1984 murder. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction, so that defendant was tried as an adult. His counsel did not appeal and he was convicted. Evidence included three witnesses who testified that defendant had told them that he killed the victim. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus two years for the gun charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Multiple attempts at collateral relief failed. The district court denied a 2006 petition for habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, that it deemed to be "successive" under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed after finding that the petition was not successive because it followed a remedial appeal ordered on a prior petition. The credibility determination of the trial judge should not be overturned; given the evidence against him, defendant cannot show prejudice.

Based on a 1997 killing, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack and to intentionally kill one or more persons in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, preserving the right to appeal denial of his motions to dismiss based on denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.The case, at times, involved 24 other defendants and numerous motions to continue, join, sever, and dismiss that delayed the beginning of defendant's trial. While at times he requested a speedy trial or wrote letters informing the court of the lengthy delay, defendant mostly caused or contributed to the delay through his admitted "vigorous" motion practice and requests for continuances; he never opposed any requested continuance. He did not show prejudice as a result of the delays. Taken as a whole, the "Barker" factors weigh against defendant, even with an 11-year delay from indictment to sentencing, they do not support a speedy-trial claim.

In 2001, petitioner was convicted of criminal sexual conduct. Following his arrest, while on bond for that charge, he was arrested for possession with intent to deliver cocaine. He was convicted of that offense as well. Petitioner became eligible for parole in 2008. The Michigan Parole Board used a guidelines scoresheet and assigned a score that gave him a status of "high probability of parole." Nonetheless, after an interview, the Board denied the application, indicating that petitioner required sex offender therapy and had no insight, empathy, or remorse. Petitioner filed a pro se motion, which the court interpreted as a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. After examining the state's parole system, the court concluded that petitioner identified only a basis for his hope of parole, but did not identify a protected liberty interest to which he is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment.