Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and conspiracy and sentenced to 120 months in prison and payment of fines and assessments. In a separate trial he was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering and sentenced to 360 months, to run concurrently. in a consolidated appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly denied an entrapment instruction; there was never any meeting of defendant and the government agents and, hence, no inducement. Wiretap evidence was properly admitted. There was no evidence that the warrant contained intentional or reckless falsehoods and there was probable cause. Evidence concerning the amount of loss was properly admitted with respect to both cases and sentencing was reasonable, regardless of the defense theories about other possible causes of the loss.

Keahmbi Coleman pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court imposed an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on Coleman's three prior Ohio convictions for burglary and attempted burglary. The court then sentenced Coleman to the mandatory minimum fifteen-year prison term. At issue on appeal was whether burglary or attempted burglary in an occupied structure was categorically violent for the purposes of the ACCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence enhancement, holding that because burglary or attempted burglary of an occupied structure creates a risk of physical injury that is similar to the risk posed by generic burglary, the offense is categorically violent under the residual "otherwise" clause of the ACCA.

Larry Gibbs was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin and was sentenced as a career offender to thirty years' imprisonment. Later, Gibbs filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that a prior state conviction for narcotics possession had been improperly assessed as a predicate trafficking offense under federal sentencing guidelines. The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that Gibbs's failure to raise this claim during his direct appeal constituted a procedural default. Gibbs subsequently filed a motion to set aside the Court's judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), claiming that his procedural default should be excused because (1) he was "actually innocent" of the sentence he received, and (2) the claim he pursued was unavailable during his direct appeal. The district court denied Gibbs's motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Gibbs's argument was available to him on direct appeal, his procedural default was not excused; and (2) because a court could have reasonably believed a thirty-year sentence was appropriate in this case, Gibbs could not rely on "actual innocence" to excuse his procedural default.

Defendant, convicted of obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and conspiracy, in connection with offering a bribe for favorable testimony in a business fraud case, was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in refusing to give an entrapment jury instruction, in defining the corrupt intent required to convict as "characterized by improper conduct." Defendant acted for profit, was not reluctant to commit the offense, made the initial suggestion of the offense, and had little to no inducement from the government. The definition amounted to "invited error" and was not manifestly unjust. The sentence was reasonable; defendant knew the size and scope of the underlying crime at the outset.

The executor of the estate's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims that decedent was killed while riding a motorcycle across an empty field, in the middle of the night, after a low-speed chase, when a deputy intentionally rammed that motorcycle. The district court held that the deputy's actions, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, violated decedent's clearly established constitutional rights, precluding qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. If a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.

Petitioner, convicted of 1986 Ohio murders and sentenced to death, obtained a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 on the ground that an exculpatory pretrial police report, in which witnesses claimed to have seen one of the victims alive several days after her alleged murder, violated the Brady rule. The Sixth Circuit reversed the issuance of the writ and rejected petitioner's other arguments, including those based retention of a juror undergoing psychiatric treatment, denial of a venue change in light of negative pretrial publicity. In light of all of the evidence, the Ohio court did not unreasonably apply Brady when it rejected a claim based upon the undisclosed police report, which would not have created a reasonable probability of a different result.

In 2005 petitioner was convicted, under Michigan law, of felony murder for his role in the robbery, fire, and homicide at a gun shop. He had initially invoked his right to counsel, after which an officer made a remark about the possibility of the death penalty. A day later, petitioner stated that he had planned the crime. The trial court refused to suppress the statement. After exhausting state appeals, petitioner was denied habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254) by the district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court decision, that the death penalty statement did amount to an impermissible interrogation and that the coercive effect of this interrogation had subsided by the next morning, so that petitioner had validly waived his right to counsel before giving his statement, did not reflect an unreasonable application of relevant Supreme Court precedent. The court noted that it is not clear that the death-penalty comment qualified as the functional equivalent of interrogation, as opposed to a type of "subtle compulsion" to cooperate that is not foreclosed by precedent.

Petitioner, convicted in 1987 of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit first-degree murder, and armed robbery, was denied habeas corpus relief and filed a motion for relief under Rule 60(b). After several appeals, the district court granted a motion to consider the merit of certain claims that it earlier concluded were procedurally defaulted, but ultimately denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the prosecution withheld two pieces of evidence before sentencing, in violation of Brady v. Maryland: pretrial statements made by an accomplice regarding the influence of a quasi-religious paramilitary group on the crime, and a detective's account of petitioner's self-destructive behavior while in police custody. The petitioner already knew the underlying facts and those facts were not material.

Defendant was discharged from the U.S. Army due to a personality disorder. He was later charged under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. 3261(a), and sentenced, by a federal district court, to life in prison for participating in a sexual assault and multiple murders while stationed in Iraq. Co-conspirators, still on active duty and subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 802(a)(1), were tried by courts-martial and each sentenced to between 90 and 110 years imprisonment; they are eligible for parole in ten years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first noting that Iraq could not prosecute the defendant and that prosecution in the U.S. did not violate international law. The Army completed a valid discharge of defendant, so that he was no longer subject to courts-martial. His trial under MEJA did not violate the separation-of-powers principle or his due process or equal protection rights. Defendant was no longer similarly situated with his co-conspirators when charges were filed.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to charges of conspiracy to distribute the drug ecstacy, (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846) and, after the court granted a 24-month downward variance for his cooperation with the government, was sentenced to 71 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court adequately considered mitigating arguments and did not improperly consider the possibility of future sentence relief under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court is not required to respond to every argument and adequately acknowledged that defendant ended his criminal conduct on his own, apparently wants to be a successful, law-abiding citizen, and requested a facility with a substance-abuse program. The district court would have erred had it imposed a higher sentence than merited at the time of sentencing because of the possibility of future cooperation and a future Rule 35(b) motion, but the record did not clearly reflect that the court committed such an error.