Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

While pursuing a vehicle that fled from the scene of a drug raid, officers saw a 12-year-old, apparently crouched behind a car while walking the dog, and ordered him to stay put. The boy ran into a house, an officer pursued, and "chaos ensued" because the boy's mother did not realize that her son's pursuer was an officer. Officers cuffed and removed mother and son and, subsequently, punched and pepper-sprayed the mother. In a suit alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, the district court denied the officer qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the denial was based on a finding that material facts were disputed.

The district court denied the habeas corpus petitioner's motion for permission to amend or resubmit his prior motion for equitable relief in the form of an "independent action in equity," as provided for in Rule 60(d)(1), the Rule 60 savings-clause provision. Such an action has no time limitation. Petitioner has been before the Federal Circuit four times in the past and that court affirmed the denial. Although petitioner had an incorrect adverse decision on a Batson claim, he cannot establish that this claim of error and the ensuing course of events subjected him to a grave miscarriage of justice, that enforcement of the judgment would be manifestly unconscionable, or even that this is a case of unusual and exceptional circumstances.

Three defendants, two prosecutors and the police chief, were convicted of possessing automatic weapons and making false entries on weapons application and transfer forms in violation of 28 U.S.C. 5861(d), 5861(l), and 7206(2). They made multiple false representations that the weapons were being purchased for law enforcement and were tax-exempt. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected a claim that the statutes clearly permit some governmental employees to possess and transfer automatic weapons, but are silent as to under whose authority that possession is allowed and were therefore, unconstitutionally vague. The court also rejected a claim of double jeopardy, alleging that the sections criminalize the same conduct. The court properly quashed certain subpoenas, refused to give a proposed public authority/ entrapment by estoppel defense instruction, and enhanced sentences based on the abuse of public trust.

Defendant admitted violating the terms of his supervised release, following incarceration on charges of on the charge of conspiracy to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. 846), by engaging in acts of domestic violence. The district court sentenced him to 37 months' imprisonment, above the federal sentencing guidelines range of five to 11 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the district court sufficiently explained the rationale behind its sentencing decision with respect to his history, the nature of his offense, and the sentencing leniency he had already received.

Defendant, convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) appealed denial of a motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that under the totality of the circumstances, officersâ suspicions that the defendant was armed and a danger to them was reasonable. The detention and search occurred at a location where officers had been recently informed that a black man was selling drugs; defendant initially approached the officers in a calm way, but his demeanor subsequently changed once he realized they were police; defendant acted nervously, "like a deer at headlights;" defendant turned away from the officers as if to leave; and defendant frantically dug his hands into his pockets and would not remove them.

The district court denied the petitioner, facing the death penalty for murders in 1990, habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and denied a request to file a successive petition. Petitioner did not show that the Ohio Supreme Courtâs rejection of his claims was contrary to, or involved unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or that it resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. The court noted concerns: the case was not prosecuted until five years after the killings and there was no physical evidence to tie petitioner to the crimes; witnesses have recanted. This "worrisome scenario" is not enough to create a constitutional claim cognizable under habeas and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Newly discovered facts--a cigarette butt with DNA belonging to another person who had a history with a victim-- and all the other evidence do not establish clearly and convincingly that a reasonable factfinder could not have found petitioner guilty.

In 1981 the petitioner killed his wife and mother-in-law. Sentenced to imprisonment for burglary and to death for the murders, he exhausted state court direct appeals. On collateral review, the death penalty was set aside, then reinstated, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. A federal habeas corpus petition was pending for several years while he unsuccessfully pursued additional state remedies. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims; an argument that state courts failed to define extreme emotional distress; exclusion of some evidence of extreme emotional distress during the penalty phase; and an argument that the state's murder statute was vague. The court reversed in part and granted the petition based on based on the Kentucky courtsâ violation of petitionerâs due process rights by shifting onto petitioner the burden of proof with respect to extreme emotional distress. Proof of the absence of extreme emotional distress was an element of murder under Kentucky law, and the state failed to prove this element. The court also found flagrant prosecutorial misconduct at trial, based on closing argument statements suggesting that the defense manufactured the emotional distress claim.

In 1994 defendant entered a plea of guilty to unlawfully furnishing a controlled substance. He was sentenced to 220 days in jail and 3 years of probation. In 1998, he violated probation and was sentenced to 365 days, with 234 days of credit for time served. He was subsequently deported from the United States four times. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon. Investigation revealed the deportations and 1994 conviction, an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). Defendant pleaded guilty to being present in the United States after being deported for an aggravated felony conviction (8 U.S.C. 1326(a) & (b)(2)). The district court sentenced him to 70 monthsâ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly calculated the sentence, based on a finding that the 1994 conviction resulted in a sentence of more than 13 months. The sentence of imprisonment for guidelines purposes is the sentence pronounced, not the length of time actually served, with no subtraction of credit for time served.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to three counts sexual abuse of his minor step-daughter (18 U.S.C. 2242) in exchange for dismissal of seven other counts. The district court granted a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, departed upward by one criminal-history category, and varied upward from the 188- to 235- month advisory guidelines range, imposing a 300-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded on grounds of procedural unreasonableness. The district court policy that a defendant who waited until the final pretrial conference to plead guilty could not receive the one-level reduction in offense level described in the guidelines usurped the discretion granted by Congress and was contrary to a policy favoring individual consideration.

Defendant, sitting in a parked car, was arrested on a warrant for carrying a concealed weapon. He set off the metal detector, but officers were unable to locate the source. After defendant used a toilet, officers found a gun near the toilet, obtained a warrant and matched defendant's DNA to that on the gun. Defendant, having waived Miranda rights, admitted that he had left the gun. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Defendant pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922 (g)) and was sentenced to 180 months incarceration under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the DNA and confession, but remanded on suppression of the gun. In blocking defendant's car, the officer conducted a "Terry" stop without objective reason to suspect defendant of criminal activity. Subsequent discovery of an open container and an outstanding warrant did not remove the taint of illegal seizure, but the DNA and confession did not retain the taint. Significant time passed between arrest and defendant's voluntary confession while lawfully in custody; there were intervening circumstances in discovery of the gun and the DNA test, done pursuant to a warrant. Because the details of a prior conviction for escape were unknown, the court remanded for reconsideration of sentencing.