Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, convicted of a 1984 rape and murder, was sentenced to death and exhausted state appeals. While a habeas proceeding was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered the City of Cleveland to release certain documents relating to its investigation of the murder. Without addressing whether the new evidence supported a Brady claim and should be included in the record, the district court dismissed the habeas petition in 1993. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by not expanding the record to include the new evidence and that defendant had established that the prosecution had withheld favorable evidence; the court ordered consideration of newly-available DNA evidence. After considering DNA test results, the district court again dismissed the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court's consideration of the DNA test in analyzing Brady claims was improper, but those claims were properly rejected because the exculpatory evidence that was withheld would have been of little value to the defense.

The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus by the defendant, convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a fellow inmate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Rejecting a claim based on trial counsel's failure to object to the presence of 10 uniformed guards (seven armed) in the court room, the court noted legitimate security concerns and that the guards were not overly conspicuous. The court similarly rejected a claim based on the reactions of counsel and the guards when the murder weapons (shanks) were placed within defendant's reach. Certain closing argument statements by the prosecutor were improper, but not prejudicial. Given the aggravating circumstances of the crime, only evidence with an overwhelming net mitigating value could have produced a reasonable probability of a life sentence; information about defendant's background or prison conditions was not of such an overwhelming nature that its omission likely made a difference.

The defendant entered a guilty plea as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and was sentenced to 120 months incarceration. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). After a Michigan state court amended the judgment of one of defendantâs predicate convictions for the ACCA enhancement, the district court reimposed the same 120-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The resentencing preceded the Supreme Courtâs 2011 decision in Pepper v. United States, in which the court invalidated 18 U.S.C. 3742(g)(2), the subsection that prohibits the district court from resentencing a defendant outside the applicable guidelines range except in two narrow circumstances. The court rejected a challenge to 3742(g)(1), which states that the court should use guidelines in effect at the time of original sentencing, but held that the district court erred in refusing to consider subsequent amendments to the sentencing guidelines under the section 3553(a) factors. Consideration of amendments that benefit the government is subject to ex post facto limitations.

Responding to an assault call, Memphis police located the victim's boyfriend (defendant) near the scene with a semi-automatic pistol. Defendant claimed to have taken the gun from his girlfriend during the fight. Indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g), defendant was diagnosed with mild mental retardation, but found competent to stand trial. He entered a guilty plea and, based on a presentence report showing prior serious drug and violent felonies, was classified as an armed career criminal with enhancement for being a felon in possession of a firearm in connection with another felony, aggravated assault. His guideline range was 188-235 months. Unable to locate the victim for confirmation of his use of the gun, the government agreed to a reduction, with a new corresponding guideline range of 151-188 months, but the mandatory minimum sentence still stood at 180 months. The district court imposed a 180-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an Eighth Amendment argument. The sentence did account for defendant's disability; the defendant is an adult and the sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his culpability.

Officers went to the house at 11:40 p.m. to execute a warrant on the son, who had failed to appear on drunk-driving charges. Waiting in a breezeway, they saw the father in the kitchen and yelled to drop the gun. The father, with poor sight and hearing, asked who the officers were. An officer fired four shots. The father died. Mother and son were cuffed and detained. The district court dismissed several claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but held that the officers were not shielded by qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of qualified immunity for the officer who fired. If he shot while the man was trying to comply, as claimed by the son, he violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from deadly force. The court reversed with respect to the officer who was not a supervisor and did not shoot. The court properly retained the mother's Fourth Amendment claims; the officers had fair notice of constitutional violations inherent in subjecting a bystander to detention, excessive in duration and manner. The district court erred in not dismissing state-law gross-negligence and intentional tort claims. Although the officers may have been objectively unreasonable, they did not act in bad faith under Michiganâs subjective standard for governmental immunity.

Defendant, facing the death penalty, exhausted Ohio state review and was housed in a facility for prisoners with mental illnesses. He refused to meet with attorneys to discuss collateral appeal. They filed a habeas corpus petition and a motion for a pre-petition competency hearing, at which experts agreed that defendant suffered from schizophrenia, personality disorder, and hallucinations and could not fully communicate with counsel. Two years later, an expert informed the court that defendantâs condition was worse. The court dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice and prospectively tolled the limitations period indefinitely. The Sixth Circuit remanded, noting that the "right" to competence in habeas proceedings is not constitutional, but statutory. The district court acted within its discretion in holding a pre-petition hearing and concluding that defendant was incompetent, but erred in dismissing the petition and tolling the limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. With respect to the ineffective assistance claims, habeas proceedings should be stayed until defendant is competent according to 18 U.S.C. 4241. The court must examine other claims to determine whether defendantâs assistance is essential to full and fair adjudication. If not, the court should appoint a next friend to litigate those claims.

The Sixth Circuit previously reversed defendant's conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm in connection with drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), but affirmed other convictions and the 30-year sentence he received for those counts. The government dropped the charge and the court vacated the sentence for that count by written order without allowing defendant to personally appear or re-allocute. peals arguing that the district court erred by not conducting a plenary resentencing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that because the issue was limited to the 924 charge, which the United States declined to pursue, there was no sentencing to be done. The district court did not rely on the 924 conviction in imposing the sentence for the other counts and it was not improper to consider the actual possession of a gun.

In 2004, defendant entered a guilty plea to possession of 7.5 grams of crack cocaine, but failed to appear for sentencing and avoided arrest for several months. The original Guideline range, 60-71 months, was increased by two levels for obstruction of justice; a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility was denied. The final range was 97-121 months. The district court imposed a sentence of 97 months, which was affirmed. On a subsequent motion, the parties stipulated that defendant met the criteria for sentence reduction under retroactive amendments to the Guidelines for crack cocaine and that the new range was 78-97 months. A probation officer agreed with the recalculation and described defendant's adjustment to incarceration as "fair." He had received average work evaluations and had two incident reports for refusing to obey an order and one for fighting. He had not been disciplined in the past two years and had taken classes. The district court reduced the sentence to 88 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded for a statement of reasons for the change; the court did not abuse its discretion in not holding a hearing.

An inmate at a maximum security facility brought a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was injured by prison guards and received inadequate treatment. The district court entered a stay of discovery, based on defendants' claim that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and later dismissed the case without lifting the stay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims related to medical care, stating that the evidence was sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, that the defendants were not deliberately indifferent. The court reversed and remanded summary judgment on the excessive force claim, stating that the inmate's request for a video of the incident was not vague and goes to the essence of the claim.

Petitioner was removed from the United States in 1987, returned and served four years in the Oregon penitentiary for rape, and was deported again in 1994. He returned and used various aliases until, in 2001, after pleading guilty to a felony in Michigan, an immigration judge entered an order of voluntary departure. He failed to depart and was apprehended in 2008. After stating that he would review the presentence report before deciding whether to accept the unconditional guilty plea to illegal reentry after previous deportation following an aggravated felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326 (a), the district judge denied a motion to withdraw the unaccepted plea and to dismiss the indictment as barred by the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. Under Federal Rule 11 (d) the reason or motive for the motion to withdraw could not be questioned; the court lacked discretion to deny the motion. The motion to withdraw the plea was not conditioned on the outcome of the motion to dismiss.