Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Convicted of killing a Detroit police officer in 1993 and sentenced as a habitual offender to consecutive terms of 40-80 years in prison for murder and five years for a felony firearm conviction, the defendant exhausted his opportunities for relief in state court. Following a remand from appeal of a dismissal for untimely filing, the district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit remanded. Reversal is required because defense counsel faile to file a timely brief in the direct state court appeal and that court denied direct appeal. Review of denial of collateral relief, which does not involve the same rights as direct appeal, is not an adequate substitute. Defendant is not entitled to habeas relief on his jury coercion claim, which was based on the trial judge's urging that the jury continue deliberations. In light of the entire supplemental instruction, the trial courtâs determination that the Allen charge was not coercive was not an unreasonable application of federal law.

The government introduced evidence of defendant's prior sale of cocaine during his trial on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, (18 U.S.C. 922(g)), possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)), and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in holding that the prior acts evidence was admitted for the proper purpose of establishing specific intent; determined that its probative value was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect, based on the evidence and the defense; and gave two strong cautionary instructions to the jury. Any error would be harmless in light of the "wealth" of alternative evidence, including defendant's own statements. The sentence of 420 months was appropriate, in light of the defendant's history.

A member of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community was convicted of destroying trees on the Ontonagon Reservation (18 U.S.C. 1853) and stealing tribal property for his own use (18 U.S.C. 1163). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the defendant had a right to use the land as chief of the Ontonagon Band and that his sentence was improper because he did not receive an acceptance of responsibility reduction. Federal law does not recognize a separate Ontonagon Band; the land is held by the government in trust for the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community. Merely expressing regret for the consequences of criminal conduct, without admitting wrongful intent, does not constitute acceptance of responsibility within the meaning of the Guidelines. The court acted within its discretion in imposing a restitution requirement of $47,200.

Defendant, convicted of murder and aggravated murder in 1984 and scheduled to be executed on May 17, 2011, obtained a stay for additional time to prove that he is incompetent to be executed and additional time to obtain review of the state trial courtâs ruling against him. The Sixth Circuit vacated the stay, holding that the defendant waited too long to file his claim and has no chance of success on the merits. More than a year has passed since the Supreme Court denied certiorari from denial of a habeas corpus petition; despite numerous filings seeking relief, the defendant did not challenge his competency to be executed until a few days before the scheduled execution. The state court reasonably rejected his claims concerning competency.

Defendant, convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)), argued that a prior conviction for solicitation to commit aggravated assault should not qualify as a âviolent felonyâ under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)and that the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea to pursue a suppression hearing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The 93-day period between the plea and the motion to withdraw it, with no valid excuse or assertion of actual innocence, justified denial. The defendant relied on a Supreme Court holding, entered two months before his plea, that police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupantâs arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. The Tennessee offense of solicitation to commit aggravated assault involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and involves the same kind of purposeful, violent and oppressive conduct as the enumerated offenses and qualifies as a violent felony.

The defendant escaped a halfway house where he was serving time for armed robbery and was sentenced an additional 46 months in prison, to be served consecutively with his robbery sentence, with another supervised-release term of three years, to run concurrently with the previously-imposed five-year term of release. The defendant later violated the terms of that supervised release and was sentenced, in the robbery case, to seven months in prison with no supervised release and, in the escape case, to a consecutive eight-month prison term with three years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit remanded with respect to supervised release; the issue of the prison term is moot because the defendant has been released. The statute, 18 U.S.C. 3583(h), provides that the term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized for the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of release; the court was required to deduct the eight months served for escape from 36 months of supervised release, leaving a maximum supervised-release sentence of 28 months.

Defendant entered a guilty plea to knowingly receiving child pornography and knowingly possessing the same child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252A) and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 120 and 240 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, first holding that a double jeopardy claim was not waived by the plea agreement. The offense of knowingly receiving child pornography includes all of the elements of the lesser-included offense of possessing the same child pornography and Congress did not explicitly require multiple punishments. Simply ordering that the sentences run concurrently would be an insufficient remedy.

Petitioner-Appellant Arthur Vanwinkle pled guilty to federal theft and conspiracy charges in exchange for the government dismissal of more serious offenses. The district court sentenced Petitioner to over 120 months' imprisonment. Instead of appealing his plea or sentence, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his sentence, challenging the plea and sentence on constitutional grounds. A federal magistrate denied his motion, holding that Petitioner had no bases to challenge his plea or sentence. The district court adopted the magistrate's findings in their entirety, but noted that "reasonable jurists could disagree" with how the court handled Petitioner's legal sufficiency claim. The court granted Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability on that one claim, and the Sixth Circuit granted this review. The Court found that Petitioner's plea "serve[d] as an admission that he is not innocent of the crimes charged." The Court reasoned that because Petitioner's argument that the same evidence he failed to object to at trial was now legally insufficient he could not challenge his sentence and plea now. The Court affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's motion.

While serving a sentence for planting a pipe-bomb that killed his stepfather, the defendant mailed a letter containing a substance purported to be anthrax to the judge who denied his habeas corpus petition. After representing himself at trial, he was convicted of mailing a threatening communication to a federal judge (18 U.S.C. 876). The district court did not obtain a presentence report and conducted the sentencing hearing by video conference because of concerns that the defendant would be difficult to control. The defendant and his appointed counsel did not object. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that the letter amounted to a threat even though the danger from anthrax is immediate, not in the future, but vacated the sentence. Although the video conference worked well, it is not a substitute for physical presence; the government did not establish that the error was harmless. The district court also erred in relying on the defendantâs waiver of a presentence report, absent a finding that a report was not necessary. The record indicated that the defendant knowingly waived the right to counsel at trial and the court was not required to provide him with funds to purchase non-prison clothing for trial.

The defendant, convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, was sentenced to one day of incarceration and three years of supervised release. Supervised release was revoked when he was convicted in state court of aggravated robbery and voluntary manslaughter; he admitted to possessing and discharging a firearm during the commission of the robbery. Upon revocation of supervised release, the district court sentenced the defendant to 36 months imprisonment, a 15-month upward departure from the Guidelines range, to run consecutively to his 12-year sentence for his state convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court intentionally imposed a sentence that was an upward departure; it considered all of the mitigating circumstances, stated specific reasons for the upward departure, and did not misunderstand the guidelines. The sentence was properly based on violations of supervised release following the original offense.