Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After observing suspicious activity and marijuana in plain sight, drug task force officers obtained and executed a search warrant at the Corlew residence, where they confiscated 93 pounds of processed marijuana plus 1,287 growing marijuana plants. Officers also seized cash, numerous firearms, and tools used for growing and processing large quantities of marijuana. As the investigation progressed, additional participants were identified as being involved with the physical process of growing, harvesting, and processing the marijuana plants. Dado operated liquor stores in Flint, funded the operation and distributed the finished product, but did not participate in the physical process. He was indicted for conspiracy to manufacture marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 846, and for aiding and abetting in manufacturing marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The Corlews and six others were also charged. With Dado’s consent, officers searched the store and his car and recovered marijuana, a digital scale, and a loaded semi-automatic handgun. Dado had a prior felony drug conviction in 2005, so the government gave him notice that his sentence on any count of conviction would be enhanced. His co-defendants all pled guilty and testified. Dado was convicted and received a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Dado" on Justia Law

Under investigation for drug trafficking, Kennedy learned from his attorney that he might be able to reduce his sentencing exposure by pleading guilty to an information. He consulted a second attorney, who promised to beat the case. Kennedy switched attorneys, heard from his new attorney the government might be bluffing, and decided not to negotiate a plea. The government indicted him on multiple drug-trafficking, firearms, and money-laundering charges and then caught him accepting a marijuana shipment. After changing attorneys twice more, Kennedy pleaded guilty and received a below-guidelines sentence of 180 months. Kennedy later moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that he would have negotiated a pre-indictment plea and received a lower sentence but for the ineffective assistance of his second attorney. The district court denied the motion based on precedent holding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in pre-indictment plea negotiations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel at critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including some pretrial proceedings, such as post-indictment interrogations, post-indictment identifications, and post-indictment plea negotiations, but the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel “does not attach until the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings.” View "Kennedy v. United States" on Justia Law

Mazzio, a federal prisoner serving two concurrent 240-month prison sentences for drug distribution, sought to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, relying on the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Alleyne v. United States, and claiming that he is entitled to relief because the factual basis on which his mandatory-minimum, 20-year sentence was imposed was not found by a jury. The Sixth Circuit denied his petition. To secure review of the substantive claim, “[a] second or successive motion must . . . contain . . . a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2). Alleyne has not been made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. View "In re: Mazzio" on Justia Law

In 2002, after buying crack cocaine from Liles, Cunningham and his brother, went to rob Liles at his Lima home. After visiting with the occupants, Cunningham produced a gun. Several adults and children were gathered in the kitchen. Cunningham held the group at gunpoint while Jackson used a second gun to force Liles upstairs, where he robbed him of drugs and money. They returned to the kitchen. The group was ordered to hand over their valuables. Jackson and Cunningham shot every occupant of the house. Liles and five others survived. Two children died of their wounds. The police did not recover either gun. Based on an accomplice-liability theory, a jury found Cunningham guilty of two counts of aggravated murder with death-penalty specifications: committing murder during an aggravated robbery and engaging in conduct involving the purposeful killing of multiple people. He was sentenced to death. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected a direct appeal. In an unsuccessful state petition for post-conviction relief he claimed that a juror obtained negative information about him from colleagues where she worked. The federal district court denied Cunningham’s habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, juror bias, voir dire error, erroneous jury instructions, a Brady violation, and prosecutorial misconduct. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded a claim that the jury foreperson had a relationship with the victims’ families that impacted her impartiality. The claim was not exhausted nor procedurally defaulted and is “not plainly meritless.” View "Cunningham v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Payton would find an accomplice, usually a woman, addicted to drugs or engaged in prostitution, and would convince this accomplice to rob a bank in exchange for part of the proceeds. He would provide a costume, a threatening note to give to the teller, bags, and a toy gun, would perform reconnaissance, and would drop off and pick up his accomplice. The first time he was caught, Payton (then 26 years old) was convicted for six bank robberies and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Released in 2002, he was arrested later that year for robbing seven more banks using his accomplice method. Released again in 2011, he was arrested later that year for robbing four more banks. Payton turned 46 years old before his sentencing hearing. Taking into account Payton’s criminal record, the seriousness of his crime, and recidivism, the presentence report recommended a sentence within the Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months. Neither party objected. The district court found the report accurate. The government urged a sentence of “at least” 300 months. Payton’s counsel requested a sentence within the Guidelines range, arguing that Payton would be released between 63 to 68 years old, and would present little threat. The judge sentenced Payton to 540 months after discussing the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), focusing on Payton’s recidivism and the threat he posed. The Sixth Circuit found the sentence unreasonable and remanded. View "United States v. Payton" on Justia Law

Williams was convicted on two counts of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute and one count of maintaining a drug-involved premises and was sentenced as a career offender to a total of 360 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that an almost two-year delay between his first indictment and the commencement of his trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Williams did not demonstrate that the delay was caused by bad faith or negligence on the part of the government, or that he was prejudiced by it. The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing his attorney a continuance, despite the absence of Williams’ signature on the motion. The court also rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was wrongly classified as a career offender, rendering his sentence procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Davis pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and two counts of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). The presentence report (PSR) found that defendant had “two or more separate instances of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor” and recommended a five-level enhancement for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor (U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(5)). The PSR also concluded that Davis was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years on the distribution count and to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years on the possession counts. The district court concluded that a 1989 sexual battery conviction did not trigger the mandatory minimums, but that the 2002 attempted pandering conviction did. Regarding a 1989 sexual battery conviction, the district court noted that none of the documents it was permitted to examine contained the victim’s age, nor was the court convinced that it was permitted to take judicial notice of the victim’s birth certificate. The court imposed a sentence of 262 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded, agreeing that the district court erred with regard to the statutory mandatory minimums. The court did not err in imposing the pattern-of-activity enhancement.View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

At Harris's state court trial, the court accepted the prosecution’s rationale that Juror 49 was struck “because she had difficulty following questions ... was joking with a neighboring juror who was subsequently struck for cause, and had a grandson who was convicted for his involvement in a shooting.” It was later discovered that a videotape system, reactivated during a trial recess, had recorded a conversation during which a prosecutor commented, “We’ve got ... 49, she’s the old lady, the black lady. The other one is already off.” The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected a direct appeal. Sixth Circuit remanded Harris’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for a hearing to determine whether the prosecutors at his state trial had exercised peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The district court held a reconstructed Batson hearing and concluded that the strikes at issue were not motivated by purposeful racial discrimination. Harris appealed with respect to the strike of Juror 49. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in concluding that it could hold a meaningful Batson hearing more than 11 years after his state trial and that the prosecution’s strike of Juror 49 was not improperly motivated by racial considerations. View "Harris v. Haeberlin" on Justia Law

An investigation of the Mansfield, Ohio, drug trade involved the Richland County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO) using a confidential informant it had used once before (Bray) to make controlled buys. In 2005, the U.S. DEA joined the Investigation. Bray was registered as a DEA informant. All targets of the Mansfield controlled buys were selected either by Bray or RCSO. The controlled buys resulted in numerous arrests and indictments. The case agent who testified before the grand jury identified multiple corroborative measures generally used to substantiate Bray’s information and to supervise controlled purchases, including: criminal history and driver’s license checks; searches of Bray’s person and vehicle prior to and after a controlled purchase; tape-recorded phone calls to the suspects; copies of serial numbers of buy money; audio and visual surveillance; and, in certain cases, undercover participation by agents. Corruption pervaded the Investigation. Bray, in jail for an unrelated homicide, disclosed that he had framed innocent individuals, stolen money and drugs, and dealt drugs on side. There was evidence that, as to some arrestees, law enforcement knew of, and participated in, Bray’s misdeeds. The investigation fell apart. Bray pled guilty to perjury and deprivation of civil rights. Agents were also indicted. The district court rejected claims by the Investigation’s targets under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and “Bivens,” citing qualified immunity; held that judicial estoppel barred false arrest claims; and held that because the named individuals had not committed constitutional violations, plaintiffs could not prevail on their Monell claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Spires v. Lucas" on Justia Law

In 1999, Phillips was convicted of a third-degree felony for burglary of a structure. The Florida statute defined burglary in the third degree as burglary in which the offender does not commit assault or battery, does not become armed with a dangerous weapon, and required that the structure be unoccupied. In 2012 Phillips pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court determined that Phillips qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), based in part on the Florida conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that under Florida’s burglary statute attempted burglary is a violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA’s residual clause in part because of the potential risk of violent confrontation with passersby. The court reaffirmed that the ACCA’s residual clause is not unconstitutional.View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law