Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officers of the Internet Crimes Against Children task force, browsing Craigslist, saw Babcock’s ads in offering money for sex with someone of any age. An officer responded by e-mail, as 14-year-old “Amber.” Babcock steered the discussion toward sexual topics and arranged a meeting in Columbus, Ohio. He pled guilty to attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Babcock had been the victim of physical and sexual abuse as a child, and claimed to have been diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. His father was absent and his mother was a substance abuser. His criminal history began at age 12, with juvenile adjudications for breaking and entering, assault, theft, and burglary. He had 17 adult convictions, most related to narcotics, but had pleaded no contest to three counts of corruption of a minor, based on allegedly engaging in consensual sex with 14-to-15-year-old girls. He was convicted of providing a pornographic video to an eight-year-old and for failing to register or verify his address as required by his status as a sex offender. This history resulted in a Guidelines sentencing range of 120–150 months, but the probation office concluded that the repeat child sex offender enhancement of U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(a) should apply, which increased his range to 235–293 months. The court sentenced Babcock to 190 months’ imprisonment and a life term of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Babcock" on Justia Law

A video recording taken from Ohio Trooper Kline’s cruiser shows Kinlan's Nissan move into a narrow space between cars in the left lane of the four-lane street. Kline followed for about 30 seconds until its driver signaled a turn. Kline activated his lights and siren and pulled the Nissan over. Kline approached and informed Kinlin that he had nearly cut off the car behind him and had “cut left of center” before the intersection. Kline asked how much alcohol Kinlin had consumed. Kinlin answered: “two beers.” Kinlin exited the car and appeared disheveled, but not off-balance. Kline ushered Kinlin out of camera range for a field sobriety test. Kinlin said: “I’m not doing a test…. I’m not drunk.” Kline informed Kinlin that he was under arrest. Kinlin replied: “You’re kidding.” Kline said: “One more chance … take my test?” Kinlin again refused. Kline responded that he could smell alcohol and that Kinlin’s eyes were glassy. While Kline was patting him down, Kinlin agreed to submit to a test. The test, administered later, indicated a blood-alcohol content of .012%, below Ohio’s limit of .08%. Kinlin sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that Kline had probable cause to stop Kinlin and probable cause for arrest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Kinlin v. Kline" on Justia Law

J.H. has known Reid, an acquaintance of her family, since early childhood. In 2011, Reid (age 48) began to send J.H. (age 13) text messages and phone calls that led her to think of him as her boyfriend. He eventually had sex with her, first in Memphis, Tennessee, then in a hotel across the Mississippi border. J.H. told Reid that she wanted to run away from home. Reid encouraged her to leave, picked her up on her way to school, and headed to Las Vegas, having sex along the way. When they reached Las Vegas, J.H. called her family, who had been searching for her. Reid was convicted of violating the Mann Act, which prohibits knowingly transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent that the minor engage in illegal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and sentenced to 198 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges concerning being allowed only nine peremptory challenges in the selection of the jury that convicted him; to the admission of evidence concerning his in-state sexual encounters with J.H.; in the application of an “undue influence” enhancement at his sentencing; and in the calculation of his criminal history score. View "United States v. Reid" on Justia Law

Brown claimed that he injured his shoulder while paving a road for his employer Ajax Paving, and sought workers’ compensation. Ajax introduced medical testimony suggesting that the injury occurred outside of work. While the case remained pending before the Michigan administrative agency, Brown and Ajax settled. Brown, however, thought that Ajax had introduced false medical testimony and that it had done the same to other employees, and sued Ajax and its insurers, claims administrators and the doctor, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Act, Brown must show that illegal racketeering activities have “injured [him] in his business or property.” The Sixth Circuit has held that “loss or diminution of benefits the plaintiff expects to receive under a workers’ compensation scheme does not constitute an injury to ‘business or property’ under RICO.” View "Brown v. Ajax Paving Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Jackson pleaded guilty to possessing, with the intent to distribute, more than five grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The offense then carried a maximum penalty of 40 years of imprisonment. Because Jackson had two prior felony controlled-substance convictions, he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a). Because Jackson’s offense level for a career offender from the table (34) was greater than the offense level otherwise applicable (29), the career-offender offense-level applied. His criminal-history category was VI. Jackson received a reduction of three levels for acceptance of responsibility, so his final offense level was 31, resulting in a range of 188 to 235 months. In 2010, the district court, citing the “crack versus powder cocaine disparity issue,” exercised its discretion to depart downward and imposed a sentence of 150 months. Later that year, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, and the Sentencing Commission amended the crack-cocaine guidelines. Following a remand by the Sixth Circuit, the district court used the amended guidelines, noted that, were Jackson not a career offender, his new sentencing range would be 84 to 105 months, applied the offense level from the career-offender table, but reduced Jackson’s sentence below the bottom end of his amended guideline range. The Sixth Circuit vacated with instructions to reinstate the sentence of 150 months. U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(b)(2) prohibits courts from reducing a defendant’s term of imprisonment to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

From 1998 to 2010, Dimora was one of three elected Cuyaho County commissioners. From 2005 to 2010, Gabor worked for the county weights-and-measures office, which inspects gas pumps, grocery store scanners, truck scales and the like for accuracy. In 2007, the FBI began investigating public corruption in Cuyahoga County and discovered that Dimora handed out public jobs, influenced Cleveland decision-makers and steered public contracts in return for about 100 bribes worth more than $250,000. Gabor bought his job for $5,000 and spent most of his time on errands for Dimora that were unrelated to the job, including acting as a go-between in arranging kickback schemes on county projects. When Gabor learned that the FBI was investigating him, he warned his co-conspirators about the investigation and tried to convince them to lie. After a 37-day trial, they were convicted of 39 violations of anti-corruption laws. The district court sentenced Dimora to 336 months in prison and Gabor to 121 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a jury instruction for the RICO charge, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d); to the sufficiency of the evidence; and to various evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Dimora" on Justia Law

Nancy and Lester's Kentucky pain-management clinic closed after the DEA confiscated the doctor’s license for overprescribing narcotics. They then opened two clinics in Ohio. Patients would arrive before they opened, filling the parking lot, where they used drugs and traded prescription forms. Patients often traveled long distances (in groups), although most lived closer to other clinics. After paying their $150 appointment fee (cash only), patients would meet an “assessor” who would review their “day sheet” and provide a completed prescription form for hydrocodone, oxycodone, or other pain medication. Staff completed day sheets and prescription forms in advance. Patients then met the doctor for a minute. About 100 people per day completed this “five minute” process. The clinics also treated phantom patients. Nancy supervised the updating of files for people who had never visited the clinics. The doctor would sign prescriptions for phantom patients, staff would fill the prescriptions, and the pain pills were sold on the street by a Sadler relative. The clinics ordered drugs directly from pharmaceutical companies, but never obtained a license to dispense controlled substances. The Sadlers were convicted of conspiring to distribute controlled substances illegally and maintaining a premises for distributing the substances; Nancy was also convicted of wire fraud and money laundering. The district court sentenced Lester to 151 months and Nancy to 210 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated the wire fraud conviction, but otherwise affirmed. Nancy may have had many bad motives in buying the pills, but unfairly depriving the distributors of their property was not among them; she ordered pills and paid the asking price. View "United States v. Sadler" on Justia Law

Kumar was 19 years old and in his first year in the Aviation Technology Program at Bowling Green State University when he was assigned to fly alone from Wood County Airport near Bowling Green to Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, and back, after 10:00 p.m. The flight plan required him to fly over part of Lake Erie. On the return trip, Kumar observed what he believed to be a flare rising from a boat. He reported this sighting to Cleveland Hopkins International Airport and was instructed to fly lower for a closer look. Kumar could not then see a boat. Fearful of hurting his chances of one day becoming a Coast Guard pilot, he reported that he saw additional flares and described a 25-foot fishing vessel with four people aboard wearing life jackets with strobe lights activated. Kumar’s report prompted a massive search and rescue mission by the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Canadian Armed Forces. A month later, Kumar admitted that his report had been false. He pleaded guilty to making a false distress call, a class D felony per 14 U.S.C. 88(c)(1), which imposes liability for all costs the Coast Guard incurs. He was sentenced to a prison term of three months and ordered to pay restitution of $277,257.70 to the Coast Guard, and $211,750.00 to the Canadian Armed Forces. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Kumar" on Justia Law

Ohio State Trooper Reno noticed a tractor-trailer stopped on the shoulder of the ramp connecting Route 46 to I-80. Worried that the truck posed a safety hazard, Reno approached and noticed that the engine was running and that no one appeared to be in the cab. Reno knocked on the truck door and, after a few minutes, Bradley emerged from the sleeper area of the cab. As he spoke to Bradley, Reno noticed that Bradley’s breath smelled of alcohol, his eyes appeared red and glassy, and his speech was slurred. When asked, Bradley admitted that he had consumed a “couple” “small pitchers” of beer and a “couple” bottles of beer an hour or two earlier at a truck stop 15 miles away. Bradley stated that he had parked on the shoulder to sleep, but he could not explain why he had stopped on the ramp rather than at a rest stop 200–300 feet away. Bradley failed two field sobriety tests and was swaying, losing his balance and failing to follow basic instructions. Reno arrested Bradley. A breathalyzer test at the Highway Patrol office confirmed that Bradley’s blood-alcohol content (.111%) exceeded the Ohio limit for commercial drivers (.04%). Denying a motion to suppress, the state court found that Reno had probable cause to arrest Bradley, but a jury acquitted Bradley. Invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, Bradley sued. The district court awarded the defendants summary judgment, finding that the state court’s ruling precluded Bradley from relitigating probable cause. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that issue preclusion did not bar the suit. View "Bradley v. Reno" on Justia Law

In 2004 Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess, with intent to distribute, 392.2 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. At the time, offenses involving more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, with a defendant, like Taylor, who had a prior conviction for a felony drug offense had a minimum sentence of 20 years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The parties agreed that Taylor had a base offense level of 34 and a criminal-history category of VI. The district judge determined that the extent of Taylor’s cooperation justified a reduction of three levels, determined a range of 210–262 months (U.S.S.G. 5A), but rather than using Taylor’s 240-month statutory minimum as the starting point for downward departure, subtracted an additional three levels from Taylor’s base offense level, for a new guidelines range of 151–188 months, and sentenced him to 151 months. Under the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), Taylor was subject to the same statutory minimum. The 2011 crack-cocaine amendments lowered the base offense levels for crack-cocaine offenses and the guideline range to which Taylor would have been subject absent a statutory minimum. Taylor unsuccessfully moved to modify his sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c). The seventh Circuit affirmed. If a defendant received a sentence below his statutory minimum based on substantial assistance and is still subject to the same statutory minimum, later amendment of the guidelines does not lower his “applicable guideline range.” Taylor is subject to the same statutory minimum sentence as in effect at his original sentencing. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law