Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

More than 10 years ago, Barbour and accomplices robbed a convenience store and a motorist sitting in his vehicle in front of the store. Barbour was convicted of both aggravated robberies in a single proceeding. In 2013 Barbour pleaded guilty to possessing ammunition as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The district court concluded that the robbery in the convenience store’s lot and the robbery of the store constituted two offenses “committed on occasions different from one another” under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), so that Barbour had three qualifying offenses under that statute and was subject to a 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the burden to show that the offenses were committed on occasions different from one another, like the burden to show that the offenses were qualifying violent felonies, rests with the government. The prosecution did not show that the robbery of the motorist ended before the robbery of the convenience store clerk began. View "United States v. Barbour" on Justia Law

The prosecutor offered petitioner a plea that would have eliminated the mandatory-minimum sentence of 10 years for drug trafficking with a sentence of three to 10 years. Petitioner was then 18 years old and had no felony record. The prosecutor disclosed the nature of “exceptionally compelling” evidence planned for trial Petitioner did not accept the plea because, he alleges, his attorney encouraged him to go to trial “if I got 10 years on a plea bargain, I had no chance to appeal … I was never told that if I had never been to prison before, the Judge was required to at least consider giving me the minimum sentence … that if I took the plea bargain and got the maximum 10 years sentence, it could be appealed.” After his conviction, petitioner’s mother explained the rejection of the plea to his first counsel on appeal, Long, who viewed the conviction as “shooting fish in a barrel.” He did not advise them of the filing deadline, but let the 180-day period for challenges outside the trial record pass. After the Ohio appeals court affirmed the conviction another attorney unsuccessfully tried to reopen the appeal on the basis of ineffective assistance by Long. Petitioner then sought federal habeas relief, acknowledging that his ineffective trial counsel claim should have been raised in a post-conviction proceeding, but arguing that failure to do so should be excused by Long’s actions. The district judge denied relief, reasoning that appointed appellate counsel was not obligated to provide advice outside the direct appeal, for which there is no constitutional right to an attorney. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "Gunner v. Welch" on Justia Law

Kilgore was performing community service at a police station when he stole two unloaded firearms from an evidence room and took them home. Convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2), he was sentenced to 70 months. He did not contest a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4) for “stealing” the pistols that created his status as a felon in possession of firearms, but argued that the court erred in applying a four-level enhancement to his base offense level for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense” under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The Seventh Circuit agreed with his argument that the “another felony offense” language from the guideline means that the offense triggering application of the enhancement must be separate and distinct conduct from the underlying offense. The enhancement violated the language of the guideline, amounted to double counting and appeared to subject Kilgore twice to punishment for the same offense. View "United States v. Kilgore" on Justia Law

The Smith brothers and others operated Target Oil, which conducted speculative resource drilling in Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. Wells they represented as sure-fire investments often produced virtually no oil and many wells were never completed. From 2003 to 2008, Target Oil received about $15,800,000 in investor funds but, according to the postal inspector, distributed only $460,000 in royalties. The brothers were arrested and accused of conspiring with others to defraud investors of millions of dollars. Michael was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and of 11 substantive counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and sentenced to 120 months in prison and ordered to pay $5,506,917 in restitution. Christopher was convicted by the same jury on seven counts of mail fraud and was sentenced to 60 months in prison and ordered to pay $1,652,075 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; the government offered evidence that constructively amended or varied the indictment; their sentences are procedurally and substantively unreasonable; one of the forfeiture judgments was excessive; the district court erred in excluding a defense expert witness; and items of evidence relating to the alleged fraud were erroneously admitted. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

From 2007 until 2011, J.W., then a minor, spent time with Weems and had sex with prostitutes hired by Weems. Weems filmed the encounters. In 2011, J.W. went to the police, who searched Weems’ home. They found a cell phone containing seven videos of J.W. having sex with the prostitutes and audio tapes of Weems, J.W. and prostitutes. Weems pleaded guilty to production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The district court sentenced him to 180 months. J.W. filed suit under18 U.S.C. 2255, seeking $1 million in damages. He offered the affidavits of two psychologists identifying the impact of the abuse and describing likely future treatment, but never attempted to prove actual damages. He relied on statutory presumptive damages ($150,000) and requested that the court multiply that number by the number of times Weems violated the criminal statute. The court agreed and concluded that Weems violated the criminal production statute seven times, multiplied the $150,000 presumed-damages floor by seven, and reduced the total ($1,050,000) to reflect the $1 million award requested in J.W.’s complaint. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The text, structure and context of the statute, together with the structure of related civil-remedy laws, establish that the $150,000 figure creates a damages floor for a victim’s cause of action, not for each violation.View "Prewett v. Weems" on Justia Law

While being held in Saginaw County Jail on a misdemeanor charge relating to failure to pay court fines, Rouster succumbed to sepsis and died as a result of a perforated duodenal ulcer. Before his death, he had complained of stomach pain, engaged in bizarre behaviors indicative of mental-health problems, and displayed signs of agitation. His estate, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the medical staff members who interacted with Rouster during the final 36 hours of his life, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Experts agreed that prompt medical attention could have saved his life and that Rouster received substandard care. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that it could not conclude that the medical staff became aware of Rouster’s serious medical need and deliberately refused to provide appropriate treatment.View "Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2009, Kamper, Head, and St. Onge began to manufacture and distribute MDMA (ecstacy) in Chattanooga. Kamper first proposed the idea of dealing drugs, supplied start-up funds, and ensured that the process stayed “on an even keel.” Head had access to chemicals through his laboratory job at a water treatment facility, and used his chemistry training to devise a method of producing MDMA from the sassafras plant. St. Onge used his experience dealing other drugs to organize a distribution network among deejays and others involved in the “rave scene.” They initially manufactured MDMA at Kamper’s home, but they later relocated to Georgia. After they sold drugs to a confidential informant, St. Onge cooperated with authorities. Kamper and Head appealed their 144-month sentences as unreasonable. Kamper also argued that the MDMA-to-marijuana equivalency ratio underlying his Guidelines sentencing range was based on faulty science, and that the court erred when it justified its refusal to reject the ratio with institutional concerns. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to Kamper. The district court misunderstood its authority to reject and replace a Guidelines equivalency ratio based on policy disagreements, but the error was harmless. The court vacated Head’s sentence because the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice.View "United States v. Head" on Justia Law

In 2007, Marion County sheriff’s officers found individuals in possession of “ice” methamphetamine during traffic stops. An investigation began, including controlled purchases of methamphetamine by a confidential informant, and led to indictments charging 39 individuals with a methamphetamine conspiracy and associated drug and firearms offenses. Pritchett, Johnson, Rollins and Coffelt, went to trial and were found guilty of conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to possess a listed chemical (pseudoephedrine and iodine) with knowledge that the chemical would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. Pritchett, Rollins and Coffelt were also convicted of associated offenses. Pritchett and Coffelt, were found responsible for 50 grams or more of methamphetamine (actual) or 500 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine. Rollins and Johnson were found responsible for conspiracy concerning five grams of methamphetamine (actual) or 50 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine. Pritchett was sentenced to 240 months in prison; Rollins was sentenced to 360 months; Johnson was sentenced to 97 months; and Coffelt was sentenced to 240 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges: to sentencing enhancement based on prior drug offenses; alleging constructive variance of the indictment; and to testimony by the informant concerning prior drug use.View "United States v. Coffelt" on Justia Law

During the 2000 presidential election, Dewald established and operated political action committees (PACs): “Friends for a Democratic White House” and “Swing States for a GOP White House.” He sent fundraising letters to political donors found on Federal Election Commission donor lists. The PACs collected about $750,000 in contributions, but Dewald remitted less than 20 percent of that amount to the political parties or to outside PACs. He funneled most the money to his for-profit corporation, which provided “consulting and administrative services” to the PACs. Dewald was convicted, under Michigan law, for obtaining money under false pretenses, common-law fraud, and larceny by conversion and ultimately sentenced to between 23 and 120 months. Rejecting Dewald’s preemption claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals reasoned that the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 USC 453 has a narrow preemptive effect. Dewald unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief. Dewald later obtained federal habeas corpus relief 28 U.S.C. 2254, on grounds that FECA preempted state law and that the Michigan court’s determination was objectively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit reversed. There is no clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, holding that FECA precludes a state from prosecuting fraud in the context of a federal election. Even if federal preemption provides “clearly established federal law” in general, the state decision did not unreasonably apply those general principles to this case. View "Dewald v. Wriggelsworth" on Justia Law

In 2012, Wright, Baxter, Stevens, and Hayne were arrested after they placed explosives under a bridge on Route 82 in Brecksville, Ohio, and attempted to detonate them. The explosives were actually inert; one of their co-conspirators was an FBI informant. All were involved with the Occupy Cleveland movement, a loose-knit political group protesting economic inequality. They pleaded guilty to conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. 2332a(a)(2)(B) & (D), attempt to use a weapon of mass destruction, sections 2332a(a)(2)(B) & (D), and aiding and abetting in malicious use of explosives to destroy a structure used in interstate commerce, section 844(i). The district court applied a 12-level terrorism enhancement to each sentence, under U.S.S.G. 3A1.4, which requires that the offense be “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.” Wright had an enhancement for leadership under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). Wright was sentenced to 138 months for each offense, significantly below the guidelines range, calculated as 324 to 405 months. Baxter received a sentence of 117 months and Stevens 97 months; their guidelines calculations were 262 to 327 months and 188 to 235 months, respectively. The court acknowledged that a 60-month minimum applied and sentenced Hayne to 72 months, from a guidelines range of 262 to 327 months. All sentences were concurrent, and all defendants were sentenced to lifetime supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentences.View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law