Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Reichert was a forum moderator for Xbox-scene.com, a website dedicated to discussion of installing “modification chips in video game consoles so that they could run software for which the consoles were not originally designed. Reichert sold an undercover agent a modified Nintendo Wii, able to play both legitimate and pirated video games. After obtaining a warrant, agents seized modification chips, a soldering iron, computers, and business cards advertising Reichert’s services. Reichert was convicted under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which gives copyright owners a remedy against those who do not themselves infringe a copyright, but circumvent technological controls and enable others to infringe. The Act establishes circumvention liability for digital trespass, 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1), and trafficking liability, 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(2). Circumventing or trafficking in circumvention tools is a criminal offense if committed “willfully” for financial gain. With a two-point “special skills” enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.3, Reichert’s advisory Guidelines range was 15 to 21 months. The district court imposed a sentence of 12 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury received an inaccurate “deliberate ignorance” instruction that negated the “willful” conduct requirement,” that exclusion of certain defense testimony violated Reichert’s constitutional right to present a defense, and that the “special skills” enhancement should not apply to Reichert’s self-taught technical expertise.View "United States v. Reichert" on Justia Law

After 20 years on Ohio’s death row, D’Ambrosio was granted habeas corpus relief on the grounds that the Cuyahoga County prosecutor violated his obligations under Brady v. Maryland. The state attempted to reprosecute him through mid-2009, but continued to fail to disclose exculpatory evidence and failed to alert D’Ambrosio or the court that its key witness had died. Ultimately, the district court granted an unconditional writ of habeas corpus, citing “extraordinary circumstances” and barring Ohio from reprosecuting. The state conviction was never vacated. After his release, D’Ambrosio filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that defendants violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the complaint did not plausibly allege any viable constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed after rejecting a statute of limitations defense. The prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for the non-disclosure of exculpatory information at trial and the complaint’s allegations were insufficient to plausibly allege the existence of an official county policy of violating criminal defendants’ constitutional rights. View "D'Ambrosio v. Marino" on Justia Law

In 1993, a Tennessee jury convicted Sutton of premeditated first degree murder and felonious burning of personal property. Sutton’s trial counsel represented him through direct appeal, and filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In 2000, Sutton dismissed his trial counsel. New counsel amended his petition, raising ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims for the first time. The state trial court denied relief. Sutton was appointed new counsel for his federal habeas petition, which included new claims that his trial counsel failed to object to jury-selection procedures and to use of a “moral certainty” standard in jury instructions regarding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court denied the petition, finding the newly raised claims procedurally defaulted and that Sutton did not show “cause” for the default and “prejudice” from the error, or that a manifest miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Days later, the Supreme Court heard argument in Martinez v. Ryan, ultimately holding that ineffective assistance by post-conviction counsel can establish “cause” to excuse procedural default of an ineffective assistance at trial claim where state procedural law prohibits defendants from raising such claims on direct appeal and requires they be raised in post-conviction proceedings. The district court found Martinez inapplicable because Tennessee’s procedural law does not prohibit ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court considered Trevino v. Thaler, and held that the rule also applies where state procedural law permits defendants to raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal, but makes it highly unlikely that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise such a claim. The Sixth Circuit remanded, holding that the Trevino ruling applies to Tennessee decisions. View "Sutton v. Colson" on Justia Law

Driving a stolen vehicle and wearing face masks, Jackson and Ivery arrived at a bank, intending to commit robbery, but were confronted by an off-duty Canton police officer working security. The officer drew his weapon and yelled “police!” After gunfire between Ivery and the officer, Jackson ran across the street. In a parking lot, he approached Sara Binegar, driving her car. Jackson opened the door, pointed a gun, and told her to “scoot over,” then tried to sit on her. Bineger escaped through the passenger door. Jackson drove away in Bineger’s car. Jackson was convicted of aggravated robbery and attempted kidnapping. At sentencing, Jackson argued that the convictions were for allied offenses of similar import under Ohio law and requested merger. The court denied the request, after comparing the elements of the offenses and stating that “one could [commit] the offense of kidnapping without committing the offense of aggravated robbery and vice versa.” The court imposed consecutive sentences of 10 years for aggravated robbery and five years for attempted kidnapping. State courts rejected appeals. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state court decision was not contrary to or unreasonable application of clearly established federal law concerning Double Jeopardy. View "Jackson v. Smith" on Justia Law

Mitchell was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A Presentence Investigation Report classified Mitchell as an “armed career criminal” under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) on account of having committed three violent felonies: a 1988 conviction for robbery under now-repealed Tenn. Code 39-2-501(a); (2) a 2003 conviction for robbery under Tenn. Code 39-13-401; and a 2003 conviction for intentionally evading arrest in an automobile. The Report assigned Mitchell a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, which resulted in a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Mitchell to 300 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the two robbery convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Caspeta, a Mexican citizen born in 1973, attempted to enter the U.S. in 1999, using a border pass issued to another individual, and was sentenced to 90 days of custody and 2 years of supervised release for violating 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(3). The sentence was suspended. He was escorted across a bridge back to Mexico and was given an Order instructing him that he was prohibited from re-entering the U.S. for five years and that if he wished to re-enter the U.S. he would first need to obtain the permission of the Attorney General. The Notice included a warning that violation would be subject to prosecution for a felony. In 2012, Caspeta was convicted of a traffic offense in Detroit and was charged with unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). He argued that once more than five years had elapsed since his removal, so that the statute did not require him to obtain consent prior to reentry. He was found guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the statutory scheme does not eliminate the need for consent after five years, but only makes consent possible after five years. View "United States v. Romero-Caspeta" on Justia Law

Elmore pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography and received a below-guidelines sentence of 51 months in prison, followed by 10 years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting arguments that the district judge unfairly treated Elmore’s abusive childhood as an aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor in sentencing; placed unreasonable weight on the need to punish and deter Elmore; and skewed the sentence upward by comparing Elmore’s sentence to a harsher regional subset of cases, rather than looking to sentencing practices nationally, and relying on a “gut feeling,” rather than informed reason. The court properly weighed the various competing sentencing objectives and accorded due weight to factors calling for leniency in Elmore’s case. View "United States v. Elmore" on Justia Law

Howard has been involved with the criminal-justice system since he was 11 years old. In 2006, at age 21, he pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, his attorney objected to several Presentence Investigation Report assignments of criminal-history points for Howard’s juvenile offenses. The district court sustained two objections, leaving Howard in Criminal History Category V, with a guidelines-recommended range of 130 to 162 months of imprisonment. The court sentenced Howard to the statutory maximum of 120 months of imprisonment. Howard later filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255 alleging that his attorney’s representation was constitutionally deficient for failure to object to the PSR’s award of two criminal history points related to his juvenile stay at a school for adjudicated delinquents. The district court denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Howard’s allegations of attorney misconduct and incompetence were troubling, and if proven true, might support a finding of constitutionally deficient performance, but in this case, the attorney’s representation did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment’s basic protections. An objection would have been futile, and Howard did not explain how his sentence would be different but for the other misconduct he alleged. View "Howard v. United States" on Justia Law

King pled guilty to armed robbery and bank robbery while on parole for a prior felony offense. As part of the plea agreement, the state agreed that consecutive sentencing would not apply and the court imposed concurrent sentences for the armed robbery and bank robbery convictions. As required by Michigan law, the court imposed those sentences consecutive to King’s parole sentence. King sought to withdraw his plea, arguing only that the prosecutor impermissibly reneged on the plea deal by failing to abide by his promise of leniency. The state trial court found that the prosecutor never promised something that was not within his power: having the parole sentence run concurrently with the newly-imposed sentences. King then sought habeas relief. The federal district court denied the claim, finding the state court’s determination that there was no breach of King’s plea agreement was not objectively unreasonable. On appeal, King claimed that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered under the Supreme Court’s holding in Boykin v. Alabama. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that, with respect to this new claim, King failed to exhaust state remedies. View "King v. Berghuis" on Justia Law

Miller was convicted in Michigan of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole. The evidence included email and instant-message conversations between Miller and her lover, Cassaday, in which Miller lied to Cassaday that she was pregnant with his children but that her husband abused her, causing her to miscarry; convinced Cassaday that her husband was involved in organized crime and that her life was in danger; and plotted her husband’s murder. Cassaday told his brother Mike that he was leaving town and that, if he did not return, Mike should look for a briefcase under Cassaday’s bed. Bruce Miller was murdered on November 9, 1999. Miller promptly ended her relationship with Cassaday and started dating someone else. Cassaday committed suicide. Mike found the briefcase and notes, which he opened in the presence of an attorney. The case contained copies of the emails and IM conversations. Its contents were admitted into evidence with evidence linking the communications to Miller’s and Cassaday’s AOL accounts. Cassaday’s suicide note was also admitted. Miller claimed that admission of the note violated her clearly established Sixth Amendment right to confront her accuser and sought habeas corpus. Following a remand, after the Supreme Court vacated an earlier decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Michigan Court of Appeals decision upholding the note’s admission did not violate clearly established law. View "Miller v. Stovall" on Justia Law