Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Gerald and his adult children, Jeremy and Ashley, grew marijuana on Gerald’s farm. As a “patient” under Michigan’s Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA), Gerald was permitted to grow no more than 12 marijuana plants for personal use. His children, both registered as MMMA “patients” and “caregivers” could grow up to 72 marijuana plants apiece. In 2011, officers executed search warrants at Gerald’s farm, confiscating more than 100 marijuana plants, drug paraphernalia, and firearms. Gerald and Jeremy were charged with conspiracy to manufacture 100 or more marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846; manufacturing 100 or more marijuana plants with the intent to distribute the drug, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a drug premises, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); and possessing a firearm in the furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The government also charged Gerald as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A jury convicted them on the drug-related counts, but acquitted them on the counts related to the firearms. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in concluding that compliance with the MMMA was irrelevant to the warrant application and that the indictment did not allege a federal crime because the Duvals are registered MMMA “caregivers” and because Jeremy qualifies under the “practitioner exception” of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 802(21). View "United States v. Duval" on Justia Law

Reed, who suffers from seizures as the result of a motorcycle accident, filed suit based on two incidents. In the first, inside Reed’s cell at the Franklin County Corrections Center, deputies were unable to handcuff Reed for transport to a hospital following a seizure, due to his resistance. They twice used a Taser to subdue him. The incident was captured on videotape. Later that day at the hospital emergency room, a deputy used a Taser on Reed after Reed lunged at the deputy. Reed argued that the deputies used excessive force and that the county failed to train the deputies on the proper use of Tasers, creating a policy and practice of abuse. Finding that “no rational fact finder could conclude that the defendant deputies acted with conscience-shocking malice or sadism” toward Reed during either incident, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that it would not put the onus on the deputies to assess the seriousness of Reed’s seizure in order to determine whether it warranted immediate medical treatment. The decision to use a Taser to subdue Reed to take him to the hospital “might have been unwise, but it was not unconstitutional.” View "Shreve v. Franklin Cnty." on Justia Law

Responding to a report of underage drinking in a home, officers found a group celebrating eighth grade graduation. Police asked the teens to step outside individually for breathalyzer testing. Seven tested positive for alcohol. Police arrested them and notified their parents. In the morning, a juvenile worker arrived at the police station, and, after speaking with a judge, indicated that the children were to be detained for a court appearance the next day. At the regional juvenile detention center, the minors underwent routine fingerprinting, mug shots, and metal-detection screening. During a hygiene inspection and health screening, they were required to disrobe completely for visual inspection to detect “injuries, physical abnormalities, scars and body markings, ectoparasites, and general physical condition.” A same-sex youth worker observed the juveniles for several minutes from a distance of one to two feet, recording findings for review by an R.N. The minors were required to shower with delousing shampoo. They were released the following day. The charges were dropped. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the juveniles, based on a “clearly established right for both adults and juveniles to be free from strip searches absent individualized suspicion” that negated a qualified immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that no clearly established principle of constitutional law forbids a juvenile detention center from implementing a generally applicable, suspicionless strip-search policy upon intake into the facility.View "T. S. v. Doe" on Justia Law

A 16-year-old girl (SW) ran away from her foster home with only her purse. A friend introduced her to Willoughby, 34-year-old, 360-pound a crack dealer and Toledo pimp. Willoughby told SW that she could live with him and his eight-year-old daughter. SW had no money or driver’s license. Willoughby began having sex with SW. SW felt that she had no choice but to comply with his request that she engage in prostitution, because she was “scared of him.” He instructed her, provided her with various sex trade items, and drove her to customers’ houses, waiting outside. When SW returned to Willoughby’s car, he took the money. Willoughby also took SW to a notorious prostitution “track,” and left her alone, with instructions to “walk” for johns. Willoughby began beating SW. To convince Willoughby to let her leave, SW bit her lip hard enough to draw blood, and made herself vomit, “[t]o make him think I was throwing up blood, I was sick.” Willoughby returned SW to her foster home. SW’s foster parents called the police. The next day, officers obtained a search warrant for Willoughby’s home, where they found evidence of SW’s prostitution. Convicted of sex trafficking a minor through force, fraud, or coercion (18 U.S.C. 1591(a), (b)), Willoughby was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Willoughby" on Justia Law

The dismembered remains of Abby’s friend were found in plastic bags on a lawn in Buena Vista. Technicians found Abby’s fingerprints on the bag and bits of the victim’s flesh on a saw that Abby had borrowed. The police charged Abby with murder. Abby retained attorney Gust. Gust entered his appearance on Abby’s behalf. Abby retained another attorney, Piazza, weeks later. Both appeared on Abby’s behalf, sometimes separately and sometimes together. Only Gust was present when Abby’s trial began. After jury selection, Abby objected to proceeding without Piazza. The court indicated that it was inclined to proceed without Piazza. The next morning, both Gust and Piazza appeared. Piazza indicated that Gust was “lead counsel” but that “Abby is on a different plane with that.” The prosecutor rejected a proposal that he lead with less significant witnesses to accommodate Piazza’s schedule. Abby’s conviction was affirmed. The district court rejected a habeas petition in which Abby argued that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and that Gust was ineffective. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has not held that a defendant’s right to counsel of choice is necessarily violated when his secondary retained counsel has a scheduling conflict precluding attendance at trial. Abby was not prejudices by Gust’s performance. View "Abby v. Howe" on Justia Law

Officers Hampton and Lyons received a radio communication of a report of an ongoing breaking-and-entering. The caller, Mays, was home and people were attempting to break through her front window. The officers arrived about 10 minutes later, parked their marked cruiser a few houses away, and approached on foot. They noticed McMullin standing close to the caller’s home, then walking toward the officers. Hampton advised McMullin to stop and show his hands. McMullin complied, stating that he was “here for [his] people.” Concerned for their safety and believing that McMullin might be a suspect, the officers frisked McMullin. Mays and her boyfriend, testified that they attempted to tell the officers before the search that McMullin was not the perpetrator. Officer Hampton testified that he had no contact with them before searching McMullin. During the search, Hampton felt a gun in McMullin’s waistband and recovered a revolver. McMullin admitted that he did not have a gun permit and was arrested. Lyons then approached the home and that Mays believed that the perpetrator was her landlord. McMullin was not charged with breaking-and-entering, but was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, under 28 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After the district court denied his motion to suppress, McMullin conditionally pleaded guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers’ reasonable suspicion that McMullin was involved in the crime justified their stop and frisk. View "United States v. McMullin" on Justia Law

Hanna, born in 1979, is a citizen of Iraq. Hanna and his family left Iraq in 1990, moving to Canada, with permission to live and work in that country. In 1993 Hanna’s parents obtained U.S. permanent resident status through Hanna’s sister, a citizen. In 1993, Hanna entered the U.S. as a nonimmigrant. Hanna’s parents sought permanent resident status for Hanna. While the petition was pending, Hanna attended school in Canada. By overstaying his visitor’s visas, Hanna attended a U.S. high school, worked at the family business, and obtained a Michigan driver’s license. Hanna was admitted as a lawful permanent U.S. resident in1998. His Canadian permanent resident status expired. In 1996, Hanna, then 17 years old, was arrested for threatening a man with a three-inch folding knife during an argument. Charges were twice dropped, but the state reinstated charges of felonious assault and driving with a suspended license. The court sentenced him to 30 days in jail and two years of probation. The government commenced removal proceedings, charging him as having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), with Iraq as the country of removal. Hanna sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that being a Chaldean Christian placed him at risk in Iraq. After reopening, an IJ stated that an alien who “firmly resettled” in another country before arriving is not eligible for asylum and that Hanna was bound to his first attorney’s concession of removability. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed the holding that Hanna’s admission-concession was binding and remanded for determination of whether Hanna’s offense was a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Hanna v. Holder" on Justia Law

Elyria Detective Welsh asked Powell, a confidential informant and Defendant’s cousin, if he knew of anyone illegally trying to sell guns. Powell called to report that Defendant was trying to sell a handgun and identified a location. Welsh, with officers Fairbanks and Lantz, caught up with Defendant and Powell minutes later at a gas station-convenience store, where Powell was pumping gas while Defendant sat in the passenger seat. When Powell left the gas station, the detectives followed in a marked cruiser. Powell immediately made two left turns without signaling. The detectives attempted to pull the car over. The detectives could see and hear Defendant telling Powell to keep driving. Powell eventually pulled over, but Defendant jumped out of the car and tried to escape on foot. Welsh was right behind Defendant and saw Defendant digging into his waist band. A few seconds later, Welsh saw a handgun in Defendant’s hand. Fairbanks tackled Defendant, sending the loaded gun flying. The detectives searched Defendant and found 2.4 grams of crack cocaine and five hydrocodone pills. Convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Defendant was sentenced to 100 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his motions for discovery and to suppress, but remanded for resentencing bases on the court’s application of the four-point firearm enhancement of U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). View "United States v. Seymour" on Justia Law

Black was arrested for driving without a license. He had a starter pistol in his waistband and a live 7.62 caliber round in his pocket. A search of the car revealed five loaded firearms in its trunk. Black was convicted of three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Because he had three prior convictions for violent crimes, Black was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the National Firearms Act (NFA), 26 U.S.C. 5845(e), resulting in a Sentencing Guidelines base offense level of 34 and a range of 262-327 months. The district court sentenced Black to 300 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings relating to the issue of whether Black suffered from a severe mental disease or defect; to the judge’s refusal to instruct the jury on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity; and to the validity of the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Black also argued that the district court improperly construed the National Firearms Act, which raised his base offense level based on the type of firearm he possessed. See USSG § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). View "Black v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s neighbor, Yassine called the Dearborn police and reported that plaintiff was standing in the yard, staring into his window, and appeared to be intoxicated. Sergeant Peer arrived, interviewed Yassine, and approached plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff claims that he had chased his dog into the yard, then returned to his porch, where officers attacked him without warning. Plaintiff did not identify which officers took specific actions. Another neighbor testified that she saw two officers strike plaintiff and that the officers then departed and plaintiff got up and walked away. The officers and Yassine testified that plaintiff lunged at Officer Peer and that other officers took him down, arrested him, and drove directly to the police station. A video showed that plaintiff hit his head against the cage of the patrol car several times, contradicting plaintiff’s account. Medical examinations showed symptoms “suggestive of impaired consciousness.” Younes sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment on state law claims of gross negligence as to the officers and battery as to Peer, but denied summary judgment on other claims, finding that issues of material fact remained concerning immunity. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, reasoning that the officers did not concede the most favorable view of the facts to plaintiff. View "Younes v. Pellerito" on Justia Law