Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After his transactions with a large-scale supplier of crack were witnessed and recorded by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, which was investigating the supplier, Goree admitted purchasing cocaine. He was convicted of conspiring to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute less than 28 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The government presented “ample evidence” for a jury to conclude that Goree had conspired to purchase a considerable amount of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. View "United States v. Goree" on Justia Law

Officers Mitchell and Bowersock responded to a 911 call by Bumgarner late on a Saturday night in 2008. They learned that Bumgarner and Hawkins had been drinking and got into a heated argument. Hawkins was alleged to have a history of abusiveness, but that night’s argument was “verbal only.” Hawkins had locked Bumgarner out and her keys were in the residence. Bumgarner confirmed with Mitchell that she was not injured. Hawkins did not want to talk to the police. Mitchell prevented him from closing the door, entered his home, and refused to leave after Hawkins called his attorney. Hawkins did not comply with a demand to get off the phone and Bowersock told him he was under arrest, grabbed Hawkins’s left wrist while Mitchell grabbed Hawkins’s right wrist, resulting in a struggle on the floor. The state filed, but later dropped charges against Hawkins. Hawkins sued the officers, claiming that he needed surgery to remove a cyst from above his eye where he was injured and psychiatric counseling for the traumatic encounter. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the officers are liable to Hawkins as a matter of law for seizing him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that on other counts, the court must determine whether his call to the attorney was a motivating factor in arresting Hawkins and whether probable cause existed to arrest Hawkins for disorderly conduct. View "Hawkins v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Farmer learned that a man (Allen), a casino employee, had used a company credit card without authorization. Using an alias, Farmer contacted Allen by cell phone and threatened to inform management unless Allen paid him. Farmer had a female acquaintance travel to Indiana to collect the extortion money. Allen contacted law enforcement. The female associate was apprehended. Farmer pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3) and 875(d), by attempted extortion, using interstate communications. A presentence investigation report indicated that Farmer had a 2003 conviction for using interstate communications to transmit extortionate threats, three convictions for obtaining property by false pretenses (involving customers of his sports-schedule business), and a conviction for larceny. Neither the PSR nor any document disclosed proposed conditions of supervised release. Farmer was sentenced to incarceration for 22 months, plus three years of supervised release, with conditions that Farmer submit to the search of his person, vehicle, business, and residence, and property, including computer devices, and to the seizure of any contraband, and warn other occupants that the premises may be subject to searches. The prosecution suggested that Farmer be barred from self-employment during supervised release. Farmer’s counsel, objected that “I don’t think this Court should restrict his ability to earn a living. If he wants to be an entrepreneur and be in business for himself.” The district court overruled that objection and did not solicit objections to the other conditions. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that the search and self-employment conditions did not bear a reasonably direct relationship to the underlying crimes. View "United States v. Farmer" on Justia Law

Groves was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and the district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 240 months in prison, 120 months on each count, to run consecutively. The Seventh Circuit court affirmed in 2009. In 2011, Groves filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255). The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the Presentence Investigation Report’s characterization of his 1995 burglary conviction as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a), 4B1.2(a)(2) and “in failing to fulfill movant’s intention to plead guilty.” The court noted extensive evidence that Groves wanted to go to trial and looked at counsel’s performance “as a whole.” View "Groves v. United States" on Justia Law

Valley, age 29, posed on the Internet as a teenage boy and persuaded more than 50 underage girls to send him sexually explicit photos of themselves and convinced at least one of those girls to meet for sex. While executing a search warrant at his mother’s home, where he lived, agents had learned that Valley was using file-sharing software to distribute child pornography and the photos received from the girls. Valley made incriminating statements during the search and, after his indictment, the court denied his motion to suppress. Before trial, an examining psychologist concluded that Valley, although a grandiose liar, did not suffer any mental illness. Valley’s public defender was permitted to withdraw, and substitute counsel was appointed. He entered conditional guilty pleas to two counts of receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), reserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Valley was not in custody when he made incriminating statements and that the explanation for the sentence was adequate. The judge acknowledged Valley’s struggles with mental illness and behavior disorders, yet expressed concern about the danger he presents to the community, describing Valley as a “conniving, manipulative, self-absorbed young man,” interested in only his own pursuits, from whom the community needs protection. View "United States v. Valley" on Justia Law

Henderson has been an inmate since 1995. He was diagnosed with high blood pressure and diabetes 1999-2000. He received medical treatment. In 2009, he suffered diabetic hypoglycemia and tremulous convulsions and was taken to Stateville’s emergency room. A month later Henderson had surgery in order to undergo hemodialysis several times a week. In 2010, Henderson sued, alleging that health care providers and prison officials acted with deliberate indifference; that testing revealed that his toxic waste levels were “out of range;” but he was not notified nor treated until he had reached Stage 5 kidney disease. Henderson sought to proceed in forma pauperis and moved for recruitment of counsel (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1)), noting that he had a fifth grade education and a low IQ. The district court allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis, but denied recruitment of counsel. Henderson filed an amended complaint and a motion for a discovery order, with a request to depose defendants, and a settlement proposal. After problems during discovery, Henderson filed another motion for recruitment of counsel. Henderson’s discovery motions were denied. Henderson claimed that his documents had been confiscated during a shakedown. The court ultimately rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that Henderson needed counsel at every phase of litigation and there was a reasonable likelihood that counsel would have made a difference in the outcome. “In the sea of indigent litigants without counsel, Henderson should have stood out as someone who needed counsel the most.” View "Henderson v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

Chicago Officer Brown submitted a probable cause affidavit, stating that confidential informant “Doe” had stated that a felon, known to Doe as “T.Y.,” possessed a semiautomatic and a .38-caliber revolver; that Doe had seen the guns in T.Y’s house the day before and many times during the last six weeks; that T.Y. needed the guns because he sold heroin; and that T.Y. was a member of a gang and part of a crew that robbed people. The affidavit described corroboration of the address and Does’ identification of a police photograph of Glover as “T.Y.” Glover had two felony convictions. Doe identified the house at Glover’s address. The affidavit did not include any information on Doe, an informant for six years. He had been affiliated with a gang; had 14 convictions, including four for crimes committed while working as an informant; had used aliases when questioned by police; and had previously been paid for information. That evening officers executed the warrant and found guns, ammunition, 14 grams of heroin, and drug paraphernalia. Doe was paid $450. After the district court denied a motion to suppress, Glover entered a plea, reserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a Franks hearing. The affidavit provided an insufficient basis for the warrant; it omitted all information regarding the informant’s credibility. The affidavit was not so “bare bones” that officers’ good faith reliance on it was unreasonable, but that omission is sufficient to raise an inference of reckless disregard for the truth that could undermine the good faith exception. View "United States v. Glover" on Justia Law

Mendoza convicted of drug conspiracy and other drug offenses, was sentenced to multiple terms of life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mendoza then petitioned for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that he was denied due process when the district court moved one of his Spanish-speaking interpreters from the defense table to interpret for a Spanish-speaking witness at trial and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to this interpreter arrangement and failing to translate discovery and adequately review it with him. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and took testimony from Mendoza, his trial counsel, and the three interpreters who participated in the trial, then denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that none of the alleged errors changed the outcome of the trial. View "Mendoza v. United States" on Justia Law

A couple, driving through Madison, saw a man in a Jeep holding what appeared to be a handgun pointed at the ceiling of the Jeep. They called the police. Asked whether the driver was threatening anyone, the caller replied, “[N]o … we couldn’t tell if it was real.” She stated that the man had parked at Dexter’s Pub and that he had been driving “badly.” Officers Lomas, Chaney, and others arrived. As they approached the Jeep, Gibbs walked out of the bar. He matched a description that had been provided. Gibbs complied with instructions to put his hands on the wall. Lomas handcuffed Gibbs. Chaney frisked him. Gibbs stated that he was the driver of the Jeep. Lomas placed Gibbs in the squad car and explained that someone had seen him pointing a gun in the car. Gibbs stated that he had airsoft guns in his car and had been returning from an airsoft event where he had been a referee. Airsoft guns are replicas of firearms. Lomas claims that Gibbs consented to her looking in the Jeep. Gibbs testified that he had denied permission, but had offered to get the items for her. Lomas searched the Jeep and found airsoft guns and a plastic knife. The officers issued a misdemeanor citation for disorderly conduct, which was later dismissed. Gibbs sued Lomas under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He did not sue any of the other officers. The district court denied Lomas’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Even if Gibbs had a constitutional right to be free from this arrest and search, that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident. View "Gibbs v. Lomas" on Justia Law

Newman and Misleveck escaped from a Wisconsin prison. Misleveck stole a shotgun and ammunition. They stole a car and kidnapped its driver. Newman kept control of her for five hours while Misleveck drove. They released her and stole a pickup truck. Pursued by police, they fled on foot and made it to Florida before being caught. Both were prosecuted in state court for escape, kidnapping, armed robbery, and other crimes. The sole federal charge was possessing the shotgun as felons, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Both pleaded guilty. After changing lawyers, Newman moved to withdraw his plea, asserting that the record did not establish a factual basis for it. He claimed he did not touch the gun. The district court denied that motion and sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to decide Newman’s argument that in entering the plea he believed erroneously that simply being in the presence of a person with a gun was constructive possession of that gun. Newman and Misleveck undertook joint criminal activity: they engaged in a conspiracy. Every conspirator is liable for acts of other conspirators within the scope of the agreement. Misleveck used the shotgun to advance the joint venture of fleeing. Newman, well aware of this, remained his confederate. View "United States v. Newman" on Justia Law