Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Baker was convicted of criminal sexual assault. He was released in 1986 and within months, had kidnapped and sexually assaulted other women. Baker was released again in 2000, but returned to custody for an aggravated fleeing offense. Upon his 2003 release, Baker was told to register as a sex offender. He was convicted in 2004 for failing to register. He violated probation on that conviction and went to jail. In 2007, Baker was working at a mall, claiming that he had no felony convictions. He was fired for inviting two 14-year old girls to the back of the restaurant and asking them to engage in sexual activity, but was not prosecuted. Baker was later involved in a domestic violence incident, arrested for violating bail and for driving with a suspended license and illegally transporting alcohol. In 2011, Baker failed to report his new employment, was incarcerated, and was released for substance-abuse treatment. Discharged unsuccessfully, he again pled guilty to failure to register. Before sentencing, Baker violated his conditions of release by using a dating website and began an online relationship. Baker moved to Michigan to live with the woman and her young children. Baker did not register or notify Illinois authorities, but failed to appear for sentencing. Baker was stopped in Michigan for speeding and returned to Illinois. He pled guilty to violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The district judge sentenced Baker to 77 months’ imprisonment, a life term of supervised release, and eight special conditions. With the government’s agreement, the Seventh Circuit vacated the supervised release term and some special conditions, noting that failure to register is not a sex offense. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

Benhoff entered into online chats with undercover agents on a file-sharing network over which he traded files containing child pornography. FBI agents obtained a warrant for Benhoff’s home and found 6,544 images and 1,683 videos of child pornography on his electronic-storage devices. Benhoff pleaded guilty to knowingly transporting child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a). The guidelines range was 210 to 262 months, subject to a 240-month statutory maximum, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1). Benhoff argued for a five-year statutory minimum sentence, based on his “unprecedented” rehabilitation success and extensive cooperation. The district court concluded that deterrence and the serious nature of the crime warranted a below- guidelines 120-month sentence, imposed a lifetime of supervised release with special conditions that prohibited Benhoff from possessing “any pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials” or having “contact with any person under the age of 18, except in the presence of a responsible adult who is aware of the nature of his background and current offense, and who has been approved by the probation officer.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, but remanded so that the court can clarify what materials are “sexually stimulating” for Benhoff so as not to unnecessarily block his access to protected speech and explain why a no-contact ban for minors is necessary in this case. View "United States v. Benhoff" on Justia Law

Daoud, an 18-year-old American citizen, had an email conversation with undercover FBI employees posing as terrorists who responded to messages that he had posted online. Daoud planned “violent jihad” and discussed his interest in committing attacks in the U.S, using bomb-making instructions that he had read in Inspire magazine, an English-language organ of Al Qaeda, and online. Daoud selected a Chicago bar as the target of a bomb that the agent would supply. The agent told him the bomb would destroy the building and would kill “hundreds” of people. Daoud replied: “that’s the point.” On September 14, 2012, Daoud parked a Jeep containing the fake bomb in front of the bar. In an alley, in the presence of the agent, he tried to detonate the fake bomb and was arrested. In jail, he tried to solicit someone to murder the undercover agent with whom he had dealt. The government notified Daoud, under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801, that it intended to present evidence derived from electronic surveillance conducted under the Act. His attorney sought access to the classified materials submitted in support of the government’s FISA warrant applications. The government supplied a heavily redacted, unclassified response and a classified version, accessible only to the court with a statement that disclosure “would harm the national security.” The harm was detailed in a classified affidavit signed by the FBI’s Acting Assistant Director for Counterterrorism. The district judge ordered the materials sought by defense counsel turned over. In an interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that in addition to having the requisite security clearance the seeker of such information must establish need to know. View "United States v. Daoud" on Justia Law

Castro, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection when he was 14 years old. He was convicted of 11 offenses while he was in the U.S. between 1979 and 2001, six times for drug trafficking-related offenses. He was convicted twice of illegal entry. Castro was removed in 1980, 1981, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1997 and 1998. He reentered illegally after his last removal and has used 23 identities in encounters with law enforcement. In 2013, he was found as part of a Fugitive Operations program that uses public records to locate illegal aliens. He pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). A probation officer assigned a base offense level of 8 and a 16-level enhancement under Guideline 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), because Castro had been convicted of a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months’ imprisonment. He had 13 criminal history points, placing him in category VI. His advisory sentencing range was 77–96 months’ imprisonment. Castro argued that his criminal history occurred many years ago and that he had rehabilitated himself, as demonstrated by his family circumstances and work history. The court imposed a 77-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by not expressly addressing his “fast-track disparity” argument at sentencing and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of his proffered mitigation factors.View "United States v. Castro-Alvarado" on Justia Law

The Latin King gang operated under a constitution that included an elaborate governing hierarchy. Zambrano had the highest post, Corona, 2000 to 2008. Several defendants had the next-highest position, Regional Inca, and others were called “Section Inca.” Regional Enforcers reported to the Regional Incas. Criminal activities fell into categories: murder; attempted murder and indiscriminate shootings; drug distribution; extortion; and violent punishments of disobedient gang members. In an 80-count superseding indictment returned in September 2009, nine gang members were charged with participating in a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). The underlying crimes included conspiring to commit extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951 assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(3), using and carrying a firearm during an assault, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), conspiring to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). A jury found Zambrano, Vicente Garcia, Guzman, and Chavez guilty on all counts. The other five defendants pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced all nine to substantial prison terms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of Zambrano, Garcia, Guzman, and Chavez, and the sentences of King, Garcia, and Ramirez, but vacated the sentences of Zamora and Gutierrez. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The government claims that McGill spent most of his free time in his apartment and rarely socialized except with Elliott, who had befriended McGill in 2006 after they met through an acquaintance who shared their sexual attraction to young boys. Elliott introduced McGill to child pornography, yet during their three-year friendship, he had never known McGill to give child pornography to anyone, not even when Elliott took him to a 2008 swap meeting. Elliott regularly attended such events and used the Internet to distribute child pornography, including photos he took of himself sexually assaulting a young boy. Elliott was arrested in 2009 and, offered hope of leniency, became an FBI informant and targeted McGill. After weeks of pestering, McGill allowed Elliot to bring a USB flash drive to his apartment to copy child pornography from his computer. McGill was charged with distributing child pornography and possession, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2), (a)(5)(B). The judge declined to give an entrapment jury instruction. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A rational jury could have found in favor of McGill on the issue of entrapment. View "United States v. McGill" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board found that HH3 Trucking had committed unfair labor practices and ordered back pay for its workers. HH3 failed to comply. The NLRB petitioned for judicial enforcement. HH3 did not reply to the petitions. The Seventh Circuit we enforced the orders summarily. HH3’s liability is $190,000 plus interest. After finding that HH3’s owners, the Hudsons, could comply but had chosen not to do so, the court held the Hudsons in civil contempt, and ordered them to pay at least $600 a month until the full judgment had been satisfied. Nothing happened. The court directed the Marshals Service to place the Hudsons in custody until they paid. They promised compliance and were released. They paid $600, then stopped. They went back to jail. After they asserted that they are no longer able to comply, the court allowed them to be transferred to home confinement and investigated. Finding that, although Gretchen Hudson considers herself retired and William Hudson had (recently) become medically unable to work, they remain able to pay something by drawing on savings and sources of current income that include benefits from a retirement plan. They argued that money received from a pension plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as their plan is, is free of all legal claims by third parties, 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument and, noting that the “scofflaws” have begun to receive Social Security benefits, which themselves exceed $600 monthly, ordered them to pay at least that amount. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. HH3 Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to using the mail to implement a fraud consisting mainly of a Ponzi scheme involving real estate, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Between 2006 and 2011 the scheme raised more than $21 million from 267 investors; $2.4 million was raised after the Illinois Department of Securities ordered the defendants to stop selling investment contracts in 2009. Investors recovered only about $3.2 million. He was sentenced to 120 months in prison and to pay restitution of more than $18 million and appealed the prison sentence, arguing that part of the loss to investors, for which he was held responsible, occurred as a result of market conditions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that “federal prisons should not be made to double as old-age homes,” but stating that any errors made by the sentencing judge were minimal. View "United States v. Morawski" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to a federal drug offense and was sentenced to 144 months in prison (his guidelines range was 188 to 235 months). He appealed. His lawyer filed an Anders brief to which the defendant did not respond. The Seventh Circuit dismissed after noting a number of problems with conditions of supervised release, including that the judge gave no reasons for imposing 13 of the 15 possible standard conditions that he imposed; that there was no indication that any of the conditions were shown to the defendant’s lawyer before the judge imposed them, or that the lawyer discussed supervised release with her client; and that, in two of the conditions the defendant, though a man, is referred to as “she” or “her.” However, because the attorney did not raise those issues and the defendant did not respond to the Anders brief, the court concluded that it had no basis for reversing the sentence.View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Petty was arrested on the suspicion that he, along with another person, shot and killed Counsel and wounded two others. Petty was identified as the shooter and was indicted for murder, but was found not guilty. After his acquittal, Petty filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the city and individual Chicago Police Department officers arguing that the officers violated his due process rights by intentionally mishandling the shooting investigation and prosecuting him for murder based on falsified evidence. Petty alleged that officers held a witness, Tarver, in a room for more than 13 hours without food, water, or access to a bathroom until he implicated him. He also alleged that they concealed evidence and failed to disclose their misconduct in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district court rejected the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Petty was aware of the alleged misconduct before trial and had ample opportunity to make use of the information at trial. Petty’s “coerced evidence” claim was not cognizable under the Due Process Clause. Petty did not suffer a constitutional injury sufficient to support his claim that the city was liable for the officers’ conduct because it had a policy of detaining people believed to be witnesses for extended periods against their will. View "Petty v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law