Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Purham ran a crack cocaine distribution ring in Quincy, Illinois. With the help of his brother he continued to manage the conspiracy while incarcerated following a 2006 felon-in-possession conviction. Purham talked to Howard using the prison telephones, giving him advice on how to manage the conspiracy and avoid detection by the police. Federal agents charged both with conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, based in part on the brothers’ recorded phone calls. Purham pled guilty and was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the district court clearly erred in including certain prior conduct as relevant conduct. While the government may well have evidence to establish a link between Purham’s 2008 drug transportation and the later distribution activity with which he was charged, it did not present that evidence. The court upheld a “leadership” enhancement. . View "United States v. Purham" on Justia Law

Volpendesto’s career in organized crime ended at the age of 87. Wheelchair-bound and in poor health, he was convicted of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit arson, arson, and use of a destructive device in relation to a crime of violence for detonating a bomb in a business in an effort to maintain control over illegal gambling. He and his co-defendants were also responsible for the robbery of two jewelry stores. He was sentenced to prison and to pay $547,597 in restitution to victims. The court also imposed an order of forfeiture in the amount of $1,878,172 in favor of the government and authorized the United States to take over a residential property and all funds in Volpendesto’s name. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1963(l)(1), the order provided that anyone (other than Volpendesto) claiming an interest in the seized property could petition the court within 30 days. Volpendesto appealed, but died before his appeal was heard. The Seventh Circuit held that Volpendesto’s death mooted his case and that the criminal restitution order abated along with everything else covered by the judgment, but noted that victims may sue the estate. View "United States v. Volpendesto" on Justia Law

Clark committed six armed bank robberies in the Milwaukee area in 2008-2010. On October 8, 2010, Milwaukee police officers who knew that Clark was wanted attempted to pull him over. He fled and was apprehended after a two-mile vehicle chase. Four days later, he was charged in state court with the state felony of eluding an officer. That same day, federal authorities brought armed robbery charges against him in federal court for the last bank robbery, on August 18, 2010. A magistrate issued a warrant for Clark’s arrest. The FBI used that warrant to file a detainer with the Milwaukee Sheriff, who was holding Clark, who was convicted of the state offense and sentenced to seven months in jail on November 23, 2010. While he was incarcerated for that crime, a federal grand jury returned a 12-count indictment on February 8, 2011, charging him with armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2213(a) and (d)), and using a firearm in furtherance of an armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)). He was arraigned on February 25 and convicted on all counts and sentenced to an aggregate of 1,951 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of violations of the Speedy Trial Act and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

From 2005-2008, Arojojoye and seven codefendants operated an identity theft and bank fraud operation that resulted in over a million dollars in losses to financial institutions and adversely impacted people whose identities were stolen. Arojojoye acquired information, including social security numbers, and manufactured false identification documents and created fictitious businesses. He opened fraudulent credit card accounts and bank accounts, and completed fraudulent transactions. He bought valid credit card numbers from internet hackers and ran up fraudulent charges using credit card processing machines provided to him on the mistaken belief that he was operating legitimate businesses, created false invoices, and stole checks. Arojojoye was arrested after presenting a stolen credit card and fraudulent driver’s license to purchase money orders and prepaid phone cards at Wal‐Mart. An inventory search of his Mercedes produced voluminous evidence of fraud and identity theft. A grand jury returned a 42‐count indictment, Arojojoye pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1344 and to one count of aggravated identify theft under 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The district court imposed a below‐Guidelines sentence of 85 months’ imprisonment on the bank fraud count and 24 months on the identity theft count, to be served consecutively. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Arojojoye" on Justia Law

Clay’s supervised release began in May 2013, after he served a seven-year sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and using a gun during a drug-trafficking crime. In June, Clay fled on foot during a traffic stop and tried to hide a bag of marijuana in his sister’s house. He pleaded no contest to obstructing a police officer and received a suspended sentence. In September, Clay was arrested again during a traffic stop and was issued a municipal citation. Between May and October, Clay continued using drugs, failed to take three drug tests, lied about his whereabouts, did not make a good-faith effort to find a job, did not cooperate with child support enforcement, failed to submit monthly supervision reports, and continued associating with felons. The district court held that Clay’s conviction for obstructing an officer was a Grade B violation because Clay faced up to two years’ imprisonment as a repeat offender. The court revoked Clay’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months, relying on a factor from the sentencing statute: “the need for the sentence imposed … to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment,” that is not listed in the statute governing post-revocation sentencing, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, joining the majority of circuits that have addressed the question and holding that consideration of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A) in revoking supervised release is not a procedural error. View "United States v. Clay" on Justia Law

One defendant in consolidated appeals was convicted of child sexual abuse. His conditions of supervised release, imposed for life, included a ban on possession of legal or illegal material that “contains nudity” and the use any mood-altering substance, and a requirement that he undergo a sexual-offender treatment program. The other was convicted of distributing illegal drugs. His conditions, imposed for eight years after his release from prison, included a ban on the use of mood-altering substances and on excessive use of alcohol, and a requirement that he undergo substance-abuse treatment and cognitive behavioral therapy. Apart from a few conditions required by the Sentencing Reform Act, section 3583(d), and U.S.S.G. 5D1.3(a), conditions of supervised release are discretionary, but must comply with policy stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), considering: the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, just punishment, deterrence, protecting the public, and providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. The Seventh Circuit vacated, recommending five “best practices” for conditions of supervised release: Require the probation service to communicate recommendations to defense counsel at least two weeks before the sentencing hearing; Make an independent judgment regardless of the opinions of the prosecutor, defense counsel, and defendant; Determine appropriateness with reference to the particular conduct, character, etc., of the defendant, rather than based on generalizations about the crime and criminal history, and where possible, refer to criminological literature; Make sure that each condition is simply worded; Require that before release, the defendant attend a hearing to be reminded of the conditions and consider changed circumstances brought about by the defendant’s prison experiences. View "United States v. Norfleet" on Justia Law

In 1971 Cannon was convicted of murder. He was paroled and was a general in the El Rukn street gang when he became involved in a second murder and was arrested by the Chicago Police Department’s Violent Crimes division. He was threatened and tortured until he confessed that he was driving the car in which the murder occurred. Immediately after leaving police custody, Cannon recanted his confession and complained to the Office of Professional Standards. The complaint was dismissed. Cannon's confession was used at his 1984 trial; he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. In 1986, Cannon filed a federal complaint, asserting torture. By this time, there had been news reports of other incidents but it was not known that the abuse against African American men was pervasive and occurred with the complicity of then-commander Burge. In 1988, on his attorney’s advice, Cannon settled for the $3000 nuisance value offered by the defendants and signed a broad release of his claims. Cannon also appealed his conviction. By the time of a second remand, the judge who originally ruled on Cannon’s motion to suppress was caught accepting bribes and there was evidence that the officers who procured his confession regularly used torture. In 2001, Cannon agreed to plead guilty, without admitting guilt, to armed violence and conspiracy to commit murder, in exchange for a sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment. Ultimately, the state dismissed the 1983 murder charges solely because neither side anticipated the effect of the plea agreement on Cannon’s parole status for the 1971 conviction. By the time a court ordered a new hearing on that issue, Cannon had been in prison for 23 years for the 1983 murder. Cannon filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed, based on the release in the 1986 case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the case “casts a pall of shame” over the city, the officers, and the trial judge, but also on Cannon. Cannon settled knowing that the defendants were lying. There was no evidence that, at the time he settled, the purposefully concealed a broader scandal. View "Cannon v. Burge" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of engaging in a sophisticated tax-fraud conspiracy that caused a loss of income-tax revenue to the government exceeding $60 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences in 2012. The relevant change in the Sentencing Guidelines occurred in November 2001, and the conspiracy of which the defendants were convicted did not conclude until 2003. Because the district court sentenced each defendant using the version of the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of his sentencing rather than the more favorable version in effect at the time of his offenses, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Peugh v. United States, (2013). On remand, the Seventh Circuit held that no violation of the ex post facto clause occurred in sentencing any of the defendants at issue. Although between 98 and 99 percent of the tax loss incurred before the revised tax table took effect View "United States v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Defendant sold crack cocaine to his nephew, who was a paid DEA informant and who recorded the transaction and turned over 22 grams of crack purchased with $1250 of DEA money. Based on the recording, agents obtained a warrant, had the nephew execute another controlled buy, then search the house and found large quantities of drugs. Defendant acknowledged ownership of the drugs. The nephew later signed an affidavit and recorded a video, swearing that he had obtained the crack on the night of the search not from defendant, but from someone outside the house, and that he had lied in stating that defendant was a drug dealer. The nephew left the state and refused to cooperate. No party sought a material witness warrant. The judge rejected the recantation as hearsay. Convicted of possession of at least 280 grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, defendant was sentenced to 288 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that defendant’s statement about ownership should have been excluded because he had not received his Miranda warnings; that showing the videotape of the second buy to the jury, in the absence of the nephew, violated defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him; and of ineffective assistance. View "United States v. Wallace" on Justia Law

DEA task force members went to Beltran’s two-unit residence. Ramirez came to the front porch. He did not speak English well but had the building owner (Beltran) on the phone; he gave the phone to an agent. Beltran indicated that it would take him an hour to get home. Beltran and Ramirez agreed to a search if the officers waited until Beltran arrived. Ramirez remained on the porch with the officers. Ramirez placed several calls (speaking in Spanish). He appeared nervous. Ramirez said that there was no one in the building, but officers heard sounds of human movement. In garbage cans, outside of a fence and marked for Beltran’s building, an officer discovered packaging that looked like it had been used to wrap “bricks” of narcotics. Posted behind the residence, an officer saw Beltran emerge through the back door, stopped and frisked him, felt something in Beltran’s pocket, and confirmed that it was substantial cash. Beltran withdrew his consent for a search. A Spanish-speaking agent obtained Ramirez's consent to search. In the Ramirez apartment they found bins containing more than a million dollars, packaging material like in the garbage cans, nine kilograms of heroin, a loaded gun, and other items consistent with narcotics trafficking. Beltran stated that he would cooperate and agreed to a search, which produced a shotgun, scales, a heat sealer, drug-cutting agents, packaging material, and baggies. A drug-sniffing dog alerted to the baggies. A dryer on the second floor landing contained another large stash of money and three kilograms of cocaine. Beltran claimed that his consent was the product of coercion, as he was handcuffed. The district court denied his motion to suppress. He was convicted of possessing and conspiring to possess, with the intent to distribute, 500 grams or more of cocaine and one kilogram or more of heroin, 26 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 and sentenced to 168 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Beltran" on Justia Law