Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Ogletree ran a tax preparation service. Robtrel and Larryl provided Ogletree with birth dates and social security numbers of individuals unlikely to file tax returns; Ogletree filed false returns using that information and her Electronic Filers Identification Number. They also generated false W2 statements to support the claims. In 2006 Ogletree filed 200 fraudulent returns, seeking refunds of $834,548. The actual loss to the IRS was $652,730.In 2007, Robtrel established a tax business and obtained EFINs for new tax preparation entities. Ogletree claims she withdrew from the conspiracy and did not file fraudulent tax returns in 2007 or later. Robtrel and Larryl continued the scheme into 2008, when they were caught. Charged with conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government, 18 U.S.C. 286, and presenting a false claim against the IRS, 18 U.S.C. 287 and 2, Robtrel and Larryl pleaded guilty, but Ogletree went to trial. Her attorney did not present any witnesses, but argued that the government did not establish that Ogletree had joined the conspiracy or knowingly filed false returns, noting that the witnesses all identified Robtrel and Larryl and that no one had identified Ogletree. She was convicted and sentenced to 51 months imprisonment, the low end of the sentencing range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed her sentence, rejecting challenges to the loss calculation, to a finding that she participated in the tax fraud scheme in 2007, and that the district court did not adequately consider the section 3553 sentencing factors. View "United States v. Williams-Ogletree" on Justia Law

Avila pleaded guilty in Wisconsin state court repeated sexual assault of an eight-year-old child, producing child pornography and 16 counts of possessing child pornography and was sentenced to 35 years in prison. Avila’s appellate counsel identified only frivolous grounds for appeal and submitted a no-merit report to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Avila responded that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney told him that if he pleaded guilty, he would receive just five years of imprisonment and 10 years of supervision. Avila said he was never informed of the true severity of the sentence he faced and he would have refused to plead guilty on those terms. The state appellate court rejected the claims as waived by his guilty pleas. The federal district court denied Avila’s habeas petition and denied him a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the state court applied a rule of law directly contrary to controlling precedent of the Supreme Court (Williams v. Taylor (2000)). The general rule that a guilty plea waives the right to appeal is subject to an exception for ineffective assistance in deciding to enter the plea. View "Avila v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Hernandez picked up a red bag in an alley. Chicago Officers Varchetto and Pierri, patrolling in an unmarked car, saw him pick up the bag and run up the alley. He saw the officers and dropped the bag. As the officers approached, he volunteered, “I just have some dope.” Hernandez handed a key holder to Varchetto, who found five small bags of heroin inside. The officers arrested Hernandez. Pierri asked him what was in the red bag. Hernandez replied that he had “ripped the guys around the corner for dope and a gun.” Pierri opened the bag and found a loaded gun, 61 small bags of crack cocaine, and 55 small bags of marijuana. The officers then gave Hernandez Miranda warnings and took him to the station. During the ride, without prompting, Hernandez volunteered that he had received fake drugs from the owners of the red bag and was beaten when he complained; taking it was retaliation. At the station, Hernandez was again given Miranda warnings. He repeated his story with more detail. Hernandez unsuccessfully moved to suppress his post-Miranda confession on the ground that it was a product of having confessed during a pre-Miranda interrogation. He was convicted of possessing a gun as a felon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the single question asked before Hernandez was given Miranda warnings falls within the “public safety” exception to Miranda.View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Peterson’s victim, 10-year-old M., claimed that when he was seven years old he slept over at Peterson’s house and that Peterson abused him sexually. Although he regularly saw Peterson after that, M. did not report the abuse until he told two friends and his older sister one day, more than a year later, while Peterson was at the boy’s house. The children told Liethen, an off-duty police officer who was also at the house visiting M.’s sister. Liethen stated that she confronted Peterson with what she assumed were recent events. Instead of denying the allegation, Peterson said, “that wasn’t when that happened.” M.’s friends, his sister, and his mother corroborated details of the boy’s testimony. The court allowed “other acts” evidence concerning three underage girls whom Peterson had abused under similar circumstances. The jury was instructed to consider that evidence only for purposes of establishing motive, opportunity, intent, and absence of mistake. Peterson did not testify and did not call witnesses. The jury found him guilty of first degree sexual assault of a child. Because of his multiple past offenses, Peterson was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. After unsuccessful attempts to obtain state post-conviction relief, the federal district court denied Peterson’s petition for habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, the state court did not unreasonably apply the clearly established law of Strickland v. Washington, in evaluating counsel’s failure to move to suppress the statement Peterson made to Leithen. View "Peterson v. Tegel" on Justia Law

After drinking vodka, Ford rode with Grace to Ford’s home. The men passed 15-year-old Hodge, sitting next door. Ford and Hodge greeted each other. Inside Ford’s house, Ford said, “I can’t stand that mother fucker. I’ll be back.” Ford left the house; Grace soon heard a popping sound. He looked out and saw Hodge lying in the street. Ford came inside and said, “I got to get the fuck out of here … meet me … and pick me up.” Grace located a police officer and led him to the crime scene. Hodge, shot in the back of his head, died the next day. Gary Police Officer Quasney immediately spoke with witness Simmons, who stated that he had seen the victim talking to a black male in a black hooded sweatshirt, who shot Hodge. At a second trial, following a mistrial, Simmons was unavailable. The trial court denied the state’s request for admission of prior testimony, but admitted Quasney’s testimony recounting Simmons’s statements under the excited utterance exception. During closing arguments, Ford’s attorney argued that the state had failed to explain why Ford would shoot Hodge. In response, the prosecutor asserted that motive could not be known because the victim was dead and “If that person who committed the offense don’t talk, how would we ever know?” Convicted, Ford was sentenced to 50 years. Direct appeals and petitions for state post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. The federal district court dismissed his habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify. Even assuming that an objection would have been sustained, Ford failed to show prejudice.View "Ford v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Olson shared a cell with Russell for about a week in 2007. Olson approached Sergeant Schneider and stated: “[M]y celly, Russell, has twice tried to swing off on me and I want him moved … I fear he’s gonna try to do it again … he isn’t taking his meds and hears voices that tell him to attack people.” Schneider asked other officers about Russell, but nobody had heard of any problems or of any issues with Russell’s medication. Schneider asked the officer supervising distribution to be sure Russell took his medication. The next evening Russell attacked Olson, damaging one of Olson’s teeth. The nurse on duty recommended that the tooth be pulled, but about a month passed before Olson saw a dentist. Olson filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit, alleging deliberate indifference to the risk of an attack by Russell and to his dental needs. The district court declined to appoint counsel, finding that Olson was a competent pro se litigant and that his claims were not complex, and ultimately granted summary judgment against Olson on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that Schneider was subjectively aware that Russell was dangerous or that the staff failed to act promptly once aware of Olson’s serious medical needs.View "Olson v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Haldar, an Indian citizen, came to the U.S. in 1999 and has been a permanent resident since 2006. He founded GVS-Milwaukee, a Hare Krishna religious society and, from 2004 to 2007, GVS sponsored 25 applicants for religious-worker “R-1 visas,” 8 C.F.R. 214.2(r)(1), 17 of which were approved. In 2007 the State Department advised the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that GVS-Milwaukee might be involved in visa fraud. DHS also received a similar anonymous tip and began an investigation that included temple visits, surveillance, searches of Haldar’s luggage on international trips, and interviews with GVS-sponsored visa recipients. In 2010 Haldar was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. under 18 U.S.C. 371. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments (not raised in the district court) that certain statements from the prosecutor and a government witness improperly called into question the validity of his temple and were unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403; the prosecutor misrepresented testimony during his closing argument and relied on facts outside the record; and the district court on its own initiative should have instructed the jury not to scrutinize the religious qualifications of the visa recipients. View "United States v. Haldar" on Justia Law

A 13-year-old girl reported that she had been molested by Carroll, her father’s co-worker, when she was eight years old. Detective Spivey presented a search warrant affidavit in which he explained his 16 years of experience; that child pornography collectors retain their collections because the images supply sexual gratification, are difficult to obtain, and are used to obtain new images, so that it is common to find discarded or outdated computers; and that deleted images may be retrieved years later. The victim reported that Carroll had touched her in a sexual way and shown her sexual images of younger children on his camera. She believed he had taken pictures of her bare genitalia. She did not open her eyes, but Carroll and her father were the only adults in the residence and Carroll was a professional photographer. The father indicated that Carroll took his camera from the office to his residence on a daily basis and used electronic devices in conjunction with one another. The judge found probable cause and issued the warrant. Analysis of Carroll’s computer and other digital media found in his residence revealed numerous images of the victim in various states of undress engaged in sexually explicit conduct. During the search Carroll made incriminating statements. Carroll unsuccessfully moved to suppress, arguing that the information in Spivey’s affidavit was stale. He then pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), and six counts of sexual exploitation of a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and was sentenced to 360 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Lee was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide plus two counts of armed robbery, based on evidence that he and Thomas traveled to Meyers’s residence in Oshkosh, to collect a drug debt. Four people were present when they arrived: Meyers’s half-brother Johnston, Meyers’s friend Paez and her two-year-old daughter, and Meyers. A fight broke out; Lee pulled a gun and fatally shot Meyers in the abdomen. Lee and Thomas left the apartment and drove to Milwaukee where they met with Johnson. Johnson drove them to a gas station and then dropped Lee off at a street corner. Shortly thereafter, Johnson and Thomas were pulled over by Milwaukee police and arrested. Lee was apprehended in Chicago a month later. Lee’s conviction was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. State courts denied post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that an in-court identification of Lee violated his rights to due process and that admission of an out-of-court statement at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. An adequate and independent state ground precluded consideration of Lee’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Lee v. Baenen" on Justia Law

In 1998, a jury found Stevenson guilty of various counts relating to his possession of crack cocaine in connection with a Chicago drug ring. The district court treated the Guidelines as mandatory, found that he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, which would have made his offense level 34 had he not already exceeded it, and imposed a 292-month sentence. In 2010, Stevenson filed his first section 3582(c) motion, based on Amendment 706 to the Guidelines. The district court reduced his sentence to 262 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the sentencing range for an offense level of 34 and criminal history category of VI. Stevenson filed a second 3582(c) motion, based on Amendment 750. The district court denied the motion because Stevenson was a career offender. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it would contradict the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements to sentence Stevenson below the applicable career offender guideline. View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law