Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Based on a real estate financing fraud scheme during the housing bubble, Brunt, Farano, Murphy, and Scullark were charged with mail and wire fraud; Brunt and Scullark with money laundering and Farano with theft of federal government funds, 18 U.S.C. 641, 1341, 1343, 1957(a). The scheme involved buying HUD-owned properties at a discount by using a “front” nonprofit corporation that received kickbacks. The properties were resold, with false promises that the defendants would rehabilitate the properties and find tenants. The defendants obtained the mortgages for buyers by submitting false information regarding the conditions of the properties and buyers’ assets, income, employment, and intentions to occupy the properties. A loan officer and appraisers were bribed. The judge refused to severe the trials. A jury convicted the defendants, and the judge sentenced Brunt to 151 months in prison, Farano to 108, Murphy to 72, and Scullark to 78. He ordered them all to pay restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed except regarding an order of restitution to refinancing lenders, which it vacated for consideration of whether the refinancing banks that are seeking restitution had based their refinancing decisions on fraudulent representations by the defendants. The court expressed concern about how long the case has taken.View "United States v. Scullark" on Justia Law

Bryant, a cocaine‐running “general” in the Black P. Stones gang, was indicted in 2007 for conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine and 500 grams or more of cocaine; possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and possession of a firearm by a felon. Due to Bryant’s two prior drug felonies and the allegation that at least 50 grams of crack were involved, he faced mandatory life imprisonment without release, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Bryant pled guilty in an effort to avoid that sentence. An agreement set forth Bryant’s plea and the government’s sentencing recommendation; a letter from the assistant U.S. attorney to Bryant’s lawyer immunized Bryant from the direct use of the statements he would provide in cooperating. Bryant also provided information to Illinois authorities under a separate agreement to which the U.S. was not a party. Illinois promised that his statements would not be used against him directly in “any criminal prosecution,” but required that he tell the truth. Bryant confessed to state authorities that he participated in a triple murder. Illinois shared Bryant’s statements with the U.S., which used the confessions directly, over his objection, to convict him of three murders. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his pretrial motions, noting that the plain language shows that the U.S. never immunized statements Bryant would make in cooperation with other authorities.View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

In 1998 Ambrose was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1)), based on his alleged sexual penetration of his five-year-old daughter and her friend. In 1999, the state successfully sought civil commitment of Ambrose under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILCS 205/0.01-205/12, which allows for the indefinite commitment of a person who had not yet been convicted of a sexual offense by establishing that the person has a mental disorder that renders him sexually dangerous. Ambrose sought release by filing a recovery application in 2005. The state court denied that application in 2008. Ambrose filed a federal petition for habeas relief in 2010, alleging that his due process rights were violated when, at the hearing on his recovery application, evidence was admitted of allegations of abuse made against him in Arizona and Indiana, and that the ruling compromised his right to a fundamentally fair trial. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given that Ambrose failed to acknowledge the history that formed the basis for the commitment, and refused to participate in treatment for that disorder, there was no basis to conclude that, absent the reference to the out-of-state abuse allegations, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. View "Ambrose v. Roeckeman" on Justia Law

Rymtech, a mortgage reduction program, purported to provide financial assistance to homeowners facing foreclosure. Daniel, its Vice President, recruited homeowners to place their properties in the program and instructed them to sign over title to straw purchasers called “A buyers.” Homeowners were told that title would be placed in trust, that A buyers would obtain financing to pay off the mortgage, and that they would regain clear title in five years. Daniel instructed loan officers to prepare fraudulent loan applications on behalf of A buyers. Even if Rymtech had invested all of the owners’ equity, implausibly high rates of return would have been required to make the mortgage payments. The equity was actually primarily used to operate Rymtech. When its finances started to disintegrate, Daniel continued to recruit homeowners. After the program failed Daniel was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that the court erred in rejecting his proposed instruction, requiring the jury to agree unanimously on a specific fraudulent representation, pretense, promise, or act. Unanimity is only required for the existence of the scheme itself and not in regard to a specific false representation. View "United States v. Daniel" on Justia Law

South Bend police responded to a report that Davis was being held against her will at the Henderson house. Winfield showed Sergeant Wolff text messages from Davis. Wolff confirmed that the woman sending the texts was in Henderson’s house, called the SWAT team, and set up a perimeter of officers and spotlights. Winfield got a text: “he’s got the door bolted, I can’t get out.” The officers did not attempt direct contact, but set up a loudspeaker and demanded that Henderson exit the house. Several minutes later, Davis came out and stated that all the exits had keyed deadbolts and the keys were in Henderson’s possession and that Henderson threatened her with a handgun. About 30 minutes later, Henderson voluntarily left the house, locking the door behind him. Officers did not find any weapons in his possession. Unable to unlock the door, officers forced entry and conducted a five-minute protective sweep. They did not find anyone else in the house, but saw remnants of a marijuana growing operation and firearms in plain view. Police then obtained a warrant and found crack cocaine, powder cocaine, marijuana, and five firearms. Charged as a drug user in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), Henderson unsuccessfully moved to suppress the firearms. Convicted, he was sentenced to 39 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Bey and three others conspired to rob Associated Bank, where one of them (Thompson) worked. Bey gave Schoenhaar a pellet gun for use in the robbery and waited in a getaway car with Gregory, while Schoenhaar entered the bank, displayed the gun, and demanded money. Thompson and a (coerced) coworker retrieved $221,000 from the vault and gave the money to Schoenhaar, who led the two to a bathroom while pointing the gun and saying he would kill them if they left the bathroom. He left the bank, but found that Bey and Gregory had gotten cold feet and fled. All four conspirators were apprehended, and charged with bank robbery and with conspiracy to commit that offense, 18 U.S.C. 371, 2113(a). Bey, entered an “Alford plea,” maintaining his innocence, but hoping for a lighter sentence. The district judge imposed a 92‐month sentence. After his lawyer advised the court that he could find no nonfrivolous ground for appealing the sentence, the Seventh Circuit allowed him to withdraw and dismissed the appeal. View "Unted States v. Bey" on Justia Law

May and Collier sold crack cocaine to an FBI informant three times. For each sale, May and the informant discussed quantity and price and May told the informant to pick up the cocaine at Collier’s house. May instructed Collier to accept payment and waited outside until each sale was complete. Collier turned the money over to May, who gave Collier a share but kept a larger portion for himself. May pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. The plea agreement noted that May satisfied four of five requirements for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), but noted the parties’ disagreement over whether May was an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor,” eligible for a two-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1. The probation officer argued for the safety-valve reduction, so that May would not be subject to the 10-year statutory minimum, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The district court found that May held a supervisory role in the offense and applied the adjustment, holding that May did not qualify for the safety-valve provision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that May was a supervisor and rejecting an argument that the safety valve remains available to a defendant who supervised only one person. View "United States v. May" on Justia Law

From 2008 to 2011, Valdovinos obtained cocaine from Mexico and delivered it to Gonzalez’s Chicago house. At Gonzalez’s direction, others picked up the cocaine, sold it, and returned to pay Valdovinos. In 2010 Gonzalez went to Mexico for six months and instructed Barahono, who primarily transported the cocaine, to work directly with Valdovinos. Officers stopped Barahono for a supposed traffic violation, searched the vehicle, and seized $205,000 in cash. Later traffic stops yielded $85,000 and $91,000. Valdovinos suspected that the reported seizures were a ruse hatched by Barahono and Gonzalez to keep the cash. He threatened them, but gave Gonzalez money to return to the U.S. All 23 co-conspirators were arrested in 2011. Valdovinos pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine and to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1). The presentence report recommended a three-level upward adjustment under Sentencing Guideline 3B1.1(b) on the ground that Valdovinos was a supervisor or manager. The judge found that he had exercised control and played an organizing role, based on transcripts of calls between Valdovinos and others, Barahono’s testimony that Valdovinos gave orders during Gonzalez’s absence, and on Valdovinos’s threats to his co-conspirators. The judge also applied a two-level upward adjustment for credible threats of violence, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(2), found that multiple threats warranted more, and imposed an above-guideline sentence of 327 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed application of the section 3B1.1 adjustment. View "United States v. Ruelas-Valdovino" on Justia Law

In 2007 Donelli’s family rented a house from the elderly Viguses. Donelli falsely told the Viguses that her minor daughter would receive a $750,000 settlement because of a car accident with an oil company employee. She persuaded them to “lend” her money 500 times, signing promissory notes for $443,000. Most was spent on vacations. None was reported to the IRS as income. The Viguses never saw any repayment. Donelli pled guilty to tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The presentence report said that Donelli sought treatment for drug abuse in 2012 from a psychiatrist, who diagnosed Donelli with “Type II Bipolar Disorder.” The report included no further information about the illness or its impact on Donelli. The court adopted the report, including an uncontested guideline range of 41 to 51 months. Donelli did not submit a sentencing memorandum or any evidence. Donelli orally attributed her crime to her addiction to prescription opioids. The district judge acknowledged the reference to Donelli’s diagnosis of bipolar disorder and imposed a sentence of 60 months, stating that the guidelines did not “capture the extent of the harm here.” Donelli’s lawyer repeated that the guidelines already accounted for the nature of the harm, but did not object to the sufficiency of the court’s explanation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Donelli failed to present her diagnosis as a principal argument in mitigation and waived her claim of a Cunningham procedural error by stating that she had no objection apart from the sentence being above the guideline range. View "United States v. Donelli" on Justia Law

An inmate challenged his conviction, alleging that he was made to wear visible shackles at trial. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, reasoning that the “sight of a shackled litigant is apt to make jurors think they’re dealing with a mad dog.” There was no indication that other methods of security or concealment would have been infeasible or that the inmate is so violent that he had to be manacled at all. His handcuffs were removed, without incident, when he testified. The “curative instruction” that the judge failed to give would not have eliminated the prejudice arising from the visible manacles, the prison uniforms, and the guards’ uniforms. View "Maus v. Baker" on Justia Law