Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

More than 10 years ago, Vitrano pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon and possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic abuse injunction and was sentenced to 30 years in prison under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), because he had prior convictions for escape and reckless endangerment. In 2008, Vitrano sought a sentence reduction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, because his business partner, Valona, had allegedly found a discharge certificate relating to his 1977 conviction for reckless endangerment, which would have purged that conviction from Vitrano’s criminal history for ACCA purposes. The certificate was not valid. After determining that the certificate was fake, the government charged Vitrano with perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1623(a), attempting to corruptly influence official proceedings, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2), and threatening a witness, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(1). The government presented Valona’s testimony and played two phone calls Vitrano made to Valona from prison. The court ruled the calls admissible, finding that there had been enough testimony to establish that they were Vitrano’s calls and Vitrano was convicted on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a Confrontation Clause challenge. View "United States v. Vitrano" on Justia Law

After she was unable to sell her Henderson, Kentucky house, Hargis solicited Vashaun to burn it down for a payment of $10,000, so that she could collect a settlement from her insurance company. White burned down the house in December 2007, and both were charged with conspiracy to use fire to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 844(m), and unlawful structuring of cash withdrawals, 31 U.S.C. 5313, 5324(a)(3), 5322(a). After first denying her involvement, Hargis pleaded guilty to conspiracy in exchange for the government dismissing the structuring charge. The district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 60 months imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred when it applied upward adjustments for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, and her aggravating role in the offense, View "United States v. Hargis" on Justia Law

Davis, in prison following a guilty plea, sought federal collateral relief more than a year had expired, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d) had expired. He claimed equitable tolling, asserting that his mental limitations excused untimely filing. A magistrate judge found that ability to make such a motion indicated mental competence. The Seventh Circuit vacated, referring to “Catch 22” reasoning and noting that someone else may have drafted and mailed the motion. Davis claimed that a fellow prisoner had done so. Mental incompetence can support tolling of federal statutes of limitations; the likelihood that mentally marginal prisoners will lack the assistance of guardians or lawyers means that, for them, such tolling is especially important. Something more than general inability to cope with legal matters is required, such as inability to understand the charges and assist in one’s own defense. The court declined to limit the range of possibilities, but noted that a report prepared by Wisconsin’s prison system concluded that he has an IQ of 49, is illiterate and uneducable, and cannot cope with any legal subject. The court remanded to allow the district court can take evidence and determine Davis’s abilities. View "Davis v. Foster" on Justia Law

Hicks led a large organization that distributed crack cocaine in Chicago. He oversaw acquisition, processing, and packaging with help from Coprich, Williams, and others. Once processing was complete, Hicks sold the cocaine to distributors, including Long and Island. Hicks often sold drugs to his distributors on credit. The government wiretapped phone conversations between members of the conspiracy and trial evidence also included testimony from participants in Hicks’s organization, including Masuca, Hicks’s former right-hand man, and Williams, Hicks’s former girlfriend. Masuca testified that Long and Island were only customers of the conspiracy, not members of it. The government presented Masuca’s handwritten ledger, which listed the organization’s drug deals over a few months in 2008. The jury convicted the five defendants of conspiracy with intent to distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine and other offenses. The judge declined to apply the Fair Sentencing Act’s higher quantity thresholds for mandatory minimum sentences and concluded that facts neither included in the indictment nor found by a jury could trigger an increased mandatory minimum sentence. The Seventh Circuit rejected all challenges except relating to application of the Fair Sentencing Act. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

Malone owned a cattle feedlot. He cared for cattle, including some owned by GLS, and worked as an agent of GLS to buy cattle. Anderson was president of GLS, which was owned by others. GLS’s cattle were collateral for its loans. In 2008, the feedlot started losing money, jeopardizing Malone’s business and GLS’s loans. Malone and Anderson began kiting checks; one would write a check to the other, and before it was collected, the other would write a check back to the first. Malone was overdrawn by $400,000 in 2009. Malone and Anderson arranged to sell O’Hern 700 cattle. O’Hern paid $400,000, which Malone deposited to his overdrawn bank account. In reality, there were no cattle. Malone gave O’Hern $115,000. Unsatisfied, O’Hern visited the feedlot and removed cattle that did not belong to Malone; obtained liens on property owned by Malone and Anderson; and filed a state court civil suit. Malone pled guilty to bank fraud and money laundering. He urged the district judge to refrain from ordering restitution, arguing that O’Hern had already received full recovery and that the judge exercise her discretion under 18 U.S.C. 3663A(c)(3)(B), because the need to compensate O’Hern was outweighed by the burden of determining complex issues regarding his losses. The judge imposed restitution of $285,000, stating that she had no discretion under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award as supported by the preponderance of the evidence regarding O’Hern’s loss and the cash returned to him, the only relevant factors. It would have been error for the judge to consider other amounts O’Hern may be adjudged to owe Malone or Anderson in the state court litigation. View "United States v. Malone" on Justia Law

As a mortgage broker, Chandler was able to falsify documents, close fraudulent loans, and judge what a house would appraise for after cosmetic work. In 2005, Causey and Rainey founded a construction company to make minimal changes to houses. They recruited real estate novices to buy houses. Chandler would fill out a mortgage application, falsifying income, down payments and other information to make the buyer a viable loan candidate. She would order appraisals, title work and pre‐approval from the lender. A “trainee” appraiser reported a greatly inflated price. Chandler gave false information to the lenders on HUD‐1 statements. Chandler made up false construction invoices for the remainder of the loan after expenses were paid. Before the participants were arrested, they had executed the mortgage scheme 25 times. Causey, the only co‐conspirator who did not plead guilty, was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court improperly admitted prejudicial photographs taken of the houses around the time of trial rather than at the time of the sale and evidence of a fraudulent sale that took place outside of the conspiracy. A defense witness’s testimony was properly excluded as undisclosed expert testimony. The court also upheld admission of testimony by a co-conspirator and a two‐level sentencing enhancement for being an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor.”View "United States v. Causey" on Justia Law

Sandoval, a Mexican citizen, illegally entered the U.S. in the 1990s. After five illegal reentries and removals, Sandoval again attempted to re-enter and, in 2005, was convicted of attempted illegal entry by means of false misrepresentation. He was removed again. Sandoval illegally re-entered and was arrested after providing a false name during a traffic stop. He was removed, but re-entered in 2006. In 2009, Sandoval met Quinonez at a truck stop to purchase 20 kilograms of cocaine that he believed Quinonez had transported from Texas. Sandoval gave Quinonez $500 for fuel and said that he would pay $300,000 for the cocaine the next day. Quinonez was actually cooperating with law enforcement and the meeting was surreptitiously recorded. After Sandoval took the sham cocaine, law enforcement stopped his vehicle. A search revealed cocaine as well as the bags full of sham cocaine. Sandoval denied knowing what was inside the bags. Sandoval was charged with attempted possession of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846. He gave a false name and continued to invoke the alias at his pretrial services interview, initial appearance, and other court proceedings. The district court granted Sandoval bond and released him on his own recognizance. When the government learned his true identity he was taken into custody. He eventually changed his story and entered a plea. The district court imposed an obstruction of justice enhancement, denied credit for acceptance of responsibility, and denied safety-valve relief from the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Grady told Wolf that he wanted to blow up a Planned Parenthood clinic, then drove to a gas station and put some gas in his van and a smaller amount in a bottle. He drove to the clinic, broke a window with a hammer, poured gasoline into the building, and set it on fire. After seeing news reports of the fire, Wolf informed police that Grady may have been responsible. The police questioned Grady in a videotaped interview. Grady admitted that his “intention was to light the building,” and that he told friends that “I thought it f... burned right down.” Grady was charged with arson and intentionally damaging the property of a facility providing reproductive health services. At trial, Grady reiterated his desire to burn the clinic and referred to his anti-abortion views. The parties disputed how to define the term “maliciously” under 18 U.S.C. 844(i) for jury instructions. Neither the Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions nor the court has defined the term. The district court used the government’s definition, explaining that Grady’s proposed instruction would shift the burden to the government to prove that the defendant acted without justification. The jury found Grady guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court’s decision to omit the words “without just cause or reason” from the instruction was supported by the record. A jury instruction should address an issue reasonably raised by the evidence. Grady did not point to any cognizable legal justification for starting the fire. View "United States v. Grady" on Justia Law

Morales operated IPS to defraud small businesses. His sales agents contacted business owners and offered to collect on bad checks for a small commission. The agents would tell the owners that they worked for another business, not IPS, and asked them for personal information and a voided check, ostensibly for wiring funds. With that data, IPS made unauthorized withdrawals from bank accounts through financial intermediaries, stating that the withdrawals covered payments for credit card processing equipment. IPS neither collected bad checks nor leased credit‐card processing equipment. IPS fraudulently withdrew $645,000. In 2004, a team led by Secret Service Agent Kane executed a search warrant on IPS’s office and found extensive evidence. Morales was indicted for mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. At trial, the government presented witnesses including 10 victims, forensic analysts, the IPS receptionist, and Agent Kane. Convicted, Morales was sentenced to nine years in prison. Three weeks after the trial, an assistant U.S. attorney sent Morales’s lawyer two emails from Agent Kane to government attorneys that had not previously been disclosed. One attached a screenshot from the laptop as it appeared when discovered in Morales’s office; the other responded concerning picking up a grand jury subpoena for Paulina Morales. The email included a threat to "taze" Morales’s pet, although that never happened. The court denied a motion for a new trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding any Brady violation harmless because evidence implicating Morales was overwhelming. View "United States v. Morales" on Justia Law

Walker was involved in a mortgage fraud scheme involving at least 10 loans and seven Chicago-area properties. Walker served as both a fraudulent buyer and seller and used his then‐girlfriend as a straw purchaser in some transactions. The loans went into default and the properties were foreclosed on, causing an estimated $956,300 in loss to the lender. Walker’s attorney entered his appearance just weeks before trial and sought to investigate whether illegally-seized material from an unrelated state case (involving Walker’s arrest for possession of a gun and the ensuing search of his home) may have been the basis of the federal case The government maintained that its evidence came from lenders, title companies, financial institutions and eyewitness testimony, not from the state search. The government informed the district court that a suburban police department held the evidence and had affirmed it had no connection with or knowledge of the federal case. Walker did not attempt to obtain that evidence and was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that failure to turn over the state case evidence constituted a Brady violation and that the court erred when it refused to give Walker’s proposed buyer‐seller jury instruction and in ordering restitution.View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law