Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1984, Richardson was convicted of armed robbery and murder. A Chicago Police Department firearms examiner testified that rounds fired at the scenes of two 1980 Chicago shootings came from the same gun, and eyewitnesses from both scenes identified Richardson as the gunman. The court sentenced Richardson to death. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed without addressing any jury selection issues, although the U.S. Supreme Court had decided Batson in the interim. In post-conviction proceedings, the state lower court found that Richardson had not made out a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection and that counsel was not ineffective. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Richardson had waived the Batson claim. After a remand, the federal district court granted habeas corpus on the Batson claim. “Other crimes evidence” and ineffective-assistance claims were denied. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the state’s use of peremptory strikes, finding the claim had been waived. Richardson’s judge conducted voir dire and did not allow the parties to question members of the venire. The judge excused, for cause, 24 of 61 persons questioned. Richardson used 20 peremptory challenges. The state used 16. Richardson did not object to the prosecution’s use of peremptories. The court affirmed rejection of the ineffective assistance claim.View "Richardson v. Hardy" on Justia Law

While at Big Muddy, inmate Roberts broke his hand in a fight. He claims that he received inadequate treatment and that he filed an “emergency” grievance and received no response. Defendants claim there was no grievance. He was transferred to Pinckneyville. He says he told the receiving officer (Alvis) that Big Muddy staff had authorized him to be assigned to the bottom bunk, but that Alvis said to work it out with his cellmate. He claims to have filed a grievance, but Pinckneyville officials deny receiving it. The district court dismissed his pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Roberts forfeited claims against Alvis; his grievance neither mentioned a name nor provided information that should have identified Alvis. Dismissal of the hand-injury claim was too abrupt, absent inquiry into what Roberts could reasonably know about how to proceed against a prison employee in a different prison through the Administrative Review Board, but that grievance was also defective. Regarding other Big Muddy defendants, it was unclear whether Roberts’s emergency grievance, which would bypass normal procedures, was in records that were searched, so the untimely filing with the Review Board is irrelevant. If the defendants want to contest whether the grievance was filed, an evidentiary hearing will be necessary. View "Roberts v. Neal" on Justia Law

Deputy Stanley pulled over Hille for an expired vehicle registration sticker. The Secretary of State’s record was different than the date on the sticker. Stanley was unable to resolve the discrepancy at that time and let Hille go. The Secretary of State’s office later notified her that the sticker was stolen. Possession of a stolen sticker is a felony in Illinois. Stanley proceeded to Hille’s registered address to arrest her, arranging for Deputy Morrison to meet her there. The deputies knocked on the door. Iit was answered by White, Hille’s boyfriend, who owned and lived in the house. White refused to allow them entry without a warrant. Stanley and Morrison claim to have smelled burning marijuana from inside the house. Hille had been smoking marijuana and was later found in the house with a half‐burned joint. White attempted to close the door and retreated into the house and up the stairs. Stanley blocked the door. The deputies tackled him on the stairs. Morrison forced White’s arm behind his back and told White to stop resisting. White claims to have suffered a shoulder injury. The deputies arrested White for resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a charge later dismissed. White filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, claiming false arrest and excessive force. The court found that there was no exigency and that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated a clearly established right. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting “fractured case law” concerning entry after smelling marijuana. View "White v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Huff was driving and Seaton was the passenger in a car with Ohio license plates that was stopped in Illinois, as recorded by Officer Reichert’s dashboard camera. Huff provided his driver’s license, insurance, and registration. Reichert explained that Huff crossed the center line without using a signal and then moved back into his own lane. Dispatch related that Huff had been arrested for battery and for marijuana cultivation in 2001, but had no convictions. Seaton had no criminal history. Reichert requested backup, but told Huff that he was letting him go with a warning. Seaton seemed nervous, so Reichert then asked if Huff objected to a search. Huff replied that he would “like to go.” Reichert said that he wanted to walk his drug‐sniffing dog around the car. Huff asked Reichert if he was free to go. Reichert responded, “not in the car.” Huff stated that he felt he had no choice but to consent and that Reichert could use the dog but could not search the car. Reichert repeatedly said, “show me! Find it!” The dog barked. Reichert replied, repeatedly, “good boy!” Reichert later admitted that he was trained not to say these things to his dog. Reichert told Huff that he was going to search his car. Huff responded, “do what you gotta do.” Reichert searched the car, but did not document the presence of drugs nor collect any evidence. About 50 minutes after the stop Reichert told them that they were free to leave. In their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court denied Reichert’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Huff v. Reichert" on Justia Law

Pittman, a pretrial detainee, stated, during intake, that he had no major medical problems, no thoughts about killing or injuring himself, no previous suicide attempts, and no psychiatric history. Weeks later he stated that he was suicidal and was placed on a 15-minute suicide watch. During subsequent evaluations, he denied suicidal thoughts. Staff members were unaware that evaluations for suicidal tendencies had been conducted in connection with an arrest two years earlier. Pittman continued to complain about health issues and to act out in an effort to be housed outside lockdown. The night he attempted to hang himself, Pittman was seen crying in his cell. His guardian claims, but staff denies, that he requested to talk to CRISIS staff. The attempt rendered him severely brain-damaged and disabled. His guardian alleged deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide and willful and wanton failure to provide adequate medical care and to protect him. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that there was a genuine issue of triable of fact with respect to the claims against two defendants and that the county may have vicarious liability on the state law claim for the actions of those defendants. View "Pittman v. Cnty. of Madison" on Justia Law

A Milwaukee police officer submitted an affidavit and application for a warrant to search for heroin, guns, items affiliated with heroin or guns, and other evidence that could be used to demonstrate control over the premises. He averred that a reliable confidential informant had seen Reed armed and delivering heroin at the home within the prior 72 hours and that he believed the informant to be credible, based on previous dealings. The informant supplied a physical description of Reed and identified Reed through booking photographs. The officer corroborated the information by verifying that Reed had a prior felony conviction for possession with intent to deliver heroin and that Reed was currently on probation. The district court rejected a challenge to the warrant. Reed was convicted of possession with intent to distribute heroin, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant; that the court erred in allowing the government to present details concerning a 10-year-old conviction for heroin distribution to demonstrate propensity for committing heroin-related crimes; and that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he possessed the guns or drugs seized from the home or that he used the guns in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

From 1993-1999 the Hallahans ran a fraudulent scheme that bilked investors out of more than $1,000,000. In 2000, they pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, 1341 & 1344, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), in exchange for dismissal of other charges and recommendation of a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and of a sentence at the low end of the guidelines. The plea agreements included appeal waivers. They did not appear for sentencing. They were finally arrested in 2012. They pled guilty to willfully failing to appear for sentencing, 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1) and argued that the court should use the version of the U.S.S.G. in effect at the time of the offenses, rather than the version in effect at the time of sentencing. The district court calculated the sentencing range using the 2012 Guidelines, arriving at an advisory range of 210 to 262 months for Nelson and 135 to 168 months for Janet. Under the 1998 Guidelines, the range would have been 121 to 151 months for Nelson and 97 to 121 months for Janet. The court imposed a sentence of 270 months on Nelson and 195 months on Janet based after consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Hallahan" on Justia Law

Torres-Chavez was convicted of conspiring with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846; possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and three counts of using a cellular telephone to facilitate the distribution conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). The district court sentenced him to a total of 168 months’ imprisonment, plus five years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the admission of testimony from a co-conspirator concerning that co-conspirator’s prior uncharged drug-dealing activity with Torres-Chavez; denial of the defense motion attacking the sufficiency of the evidence identifying the defendant as the individual recorded on a series of incriminating telephone calls; and the court’s refusal to consider post-verdict statements made by several jurors in subsequent voir dire proceedings concerning their ability to follow the court’s instructions. View "United States v. Torres-Chavez" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers used file‐sharing software to discover that Poulin had been downloading and transmitting child pornography in the basement of his mother’s house. He pled guilty to receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A), (b)(1); and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), and received a below-guidelines-range 115‐month prison term, followed by a lifetime term of supervised released subject to various conditions. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing, finding that the district court did not adequately explain the sentence. View "United States v. Poulin" on Justia Law

Woodard was the director of a non‐profit grant organization, Gideon’s Gate, which provided educational and tutoring services to children. The Department of Education, not satisfied with Gideon’s performance, stopped providing funds. Woodard then enrolled Gideon as an Indiana Medicaid provider for outpatient mental health services, but continued to operate as an educational service provider. To fraudulently bill Medicaid, Woodard illegally obtained clients’ personal information from a welfare‐to‐work provider operated by a friend. Woodard submitted 2,437 false claims for $8.9 million worth of services to 378 patients. Woodard was charged with health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. Before trial Woodard filed several motions to change counsel. After appointing a third attorney, the court ordered a competency examination. A doctor concluded that Woodard was competent to stand trial. Two years later, after more delays and new attorneys, Woodard asked for another competency evaluation, which was denied. She pled guilty and was sentenced to 80 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing because the court applied the wrong version of the guidelines, but otherwise affirmed. The district court reached a reasonable conclusion after reviewing a previous psychological evaluation, considered advice from two mental health professionals, and considered Woodard’s interactions with her attorney. Although Woodard claimed that she did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, the record shows that she did and that nothing would have alerted the court to the contrary. View "United States v. Woodard" on Justia Law