Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Kerr shot his wife’s lover at point‐blank range, turned himself in, was convicted of first degree intentional homicide, and was sentenced to life in prison, with eligibility for parole after 21 years. His petition for habeas corpus claimed that assistant district attorney Williams offered a plea agreement under which Kerr would plead guilty to first degree reckless homicide, a Class B felony. Kerr claims that his attorney, Boyle, failed to advise him correctly about the penalties he would face if he accepted. Kerr says that he rejected the alleged offer because the sentencing range was the same as the one for intentional homicide. Following a remand, the district court heard from four witnesses: Kerr, Williams, Boyle, and Boyle’s co‐counsel, his daughter Bridget Boyle. Boyle and Williams testified that there was no offer at all. Kerr, some of Bridget’s statements, and letters between Bridget and Kerr since his incarceration, supported Kerr’s position. A sealed transcript, created after Kerr’s sentencing, recounted a discussion between Kerr, Williams, Boyle, and the trial judge concerning the issue. The district court found that the state never offered Kerr a plea bargain and again denied Kerr’s petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kerr v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Convicted of conspiring to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, Brown was sentenced to life imprisonment based on his criminal history. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have prevented the prosecution from introducing evidence traceable to information gleaned from a GPS monitor that investigators attached to a car in 2006. The Supreme Court held in 2012 that the intrusion on the property interest of a car’s owner is a “search,” valid only if reasonable, but the case did not hold that monitoring a car’s location for an extended time is a search even if the car’s owner consents to installation of the GPS unit, so that no property rights have been invaded. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 60 months in prison. He possessed the gun in Indiana. To convict him the prosecution had to prove that the gun had been “shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce” and presented expert testimony by a special agent of the federal ATF that the gun had been manufactured in Connecticut. She had based her research on a search of an ATF database; on other sources, such as the Blue Book of Gun Values; and on a phone conversation and an exchange of emails with the manager of the plant that manufactured the gun. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the brevity and lack of detail of the expert’s testimony; that the expert was giving impermissible hearsay evidence in testifying to what the manager had told her; and that the manager should have been called to testify. A reasonable jury could, despite the absence of other evidence, conclude from the expert’s testimony that the defendant’s gun was manufactured outside of Indiana. View "United States v. Brownlee" on Justia Law

Kingsley was a pretrial detaineel. A deputy noticed a sheet of yellow paper covering the light above Kingsley’s bed and ordered him to take it down. Kingsley refused, stating that he had not put the paper there. When the deputy later returned, he again ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. During morning rounds, another officer ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. Kingsley did not comply. Minutes later, an officer delivering Kingsley’s medication ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. After several requests, Kingsley still refused. Kingsley refused an order from the administrator, who said jail staff would remove the paper and would transfer Kingsley to another cell in the interim. Five officers arrived, ordered Kingsley to stand up and to back up to the door with his hands behind his back. After being warned to follow the order or be tasered, Kingsley continued to lie facedown on his bunk. The parties dispute what followed, but an officer applied a taser for five second. Kingsley was placed on a medical watch, but refused the attention of a nurse. Months later, Kingsley, pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants; a claim of excessive force against two officers proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court conflated the standards for excessive force under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and wrongly instructed the jury to consider the defendants’ subjective intent. View "Kingsley v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law

Debenedetto was arrested for transmitting threatening communications (18 U.S.C. 875(c)). The district court ordered a mental competency evaluation. After a hearing, the court determined that Debenedetto suffered from mental disease or defect that rendered him incompetent to stand trial and ordered that he be placed in a federal medical center, Butner. Months later, the court reviewed the result of a second examination and held a hearing regarding the need to medicate Debenedetto without his consent. Defense counsel argued that he believed that Debenedetto, already in custody for 16 months, had already served the guidelines range for his offense and raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of the drugs. After an adjournment, counsel represented that Debenedetto had agreed to go back to Butner and, “if they feel involuntary medication is appropriate, that should be done, but they should also review or consider less intrusive measures.” Debenedetto spoke, expressing concerns that he had previously had seizures and indicated his belief that medication was not necessary. Debenedetto filed a pro se appeal from the subsequent commitment order. After the government indicated intent to execute the order promptly, his attorney moved to stay the order and to withdraw as counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the hearing and written findings did not establish the elements necessary to justify involuntary medication.View "United States v. Debenedetto" on Justia Law

Bryant, riding his bike on a Chicago street, was stopped by police officers, searched without a warrant, and arrested for possessing a controlled substance. He was arraigned in September, 2010. He was released after the evidence was suppressed and the case dismissed. He is now in custody for a different crime. In 2012, Bryant filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and state law claims. He sought to compel disclosure of the identities of the police officers. The district court screened Bryant’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. 1915A) noting that the section 1983 claims were subject to a two-year limitations period. Bryant had until August 20, 2012, to file his false-arrest claim, September 23 for the false-imprisonment claim and December 13 for the malicious-prosecution claim. The filing date of the complaint was unclear. The court deemed it filed on September 18, the earliest date that Bryant could have given it to jail officials for mailing. The court observed that. Bryant’s malicious prosecution claim was not time-barred, but was not actionable in federal court, and that his remaining federal claims were time-barred. The court expressed doubt that Bryant could identify the arresting officers within the limitations period. The court ultimately dismissed, stating that incarceration did not constitute a disability to toll the limitations period, that Bryant’s “belated attempts” to identify his arresting officers were not grounds for equitable tolling, and that identifying the officers as Doe and Roe was insufficient. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that Bryant exercised reasonable diligence and that the court erred in disregarding his discovery request. View "Larry Bryant v. City of Chicago, et al" on Justia Law

Peters was a passenger in a Scion on I-70 in Indiana, traveling behind a Denali. Both cars displayed Ohio license plates. The cars aroused the suspicion of Officer Borgman, who followed the Denali and enlisted Deputy Ernstes to watch the Scion. Borgman stopped the Denali, which was found to contain heroin and other evidence of drug trafficking. Ernstes believed that the driver of the Scion, Adams, was following too closely and activated his emergency lights, Adams pulled over, denied that he was traveling with another vehicle, and stated that he had left his license at home. When his passenger, Peters, lowered his window, Ernstes smelled burnt marijuana and saw small green particles that he believed to be marijuana. Peters told the deputy that they were traveling with the Denali and that he had previously been arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. During a pat-down, the deputy recovered $2500 cash from Peters’ pocket. He found a marijuana stem in the front passenger area and encountered a marijuana odor in a storage compartment that had a cracked lid and screws that appeared not to be original equipment. The deputy also found a cordless drill that contained a sticky substance, later found to match a substance found on the screws of a panel concealing a kilogram of heroin in the Denali. Peters and the Denali passenger were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846; and possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court concluded that probable cause existed and denied a motion to suppress. Peters entered a conditional plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Peters" on Justia Law

The police saw Johnson with a gun. He threw it away, but the police recovered it and charged him as a felon-in-possession. Prosecutors charged that at least three of his convictions were for “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). After Johnson pleaded guilty, the district judge determined that his convictions for robbery, domestic battery, and resisting law enforcement met the Act’s definition of violent felony and sentenced Johnson to 180 months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum. But for his history of violent felonies, the maximum would have been 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a claim that only a jury can determine whether a person’s criminal history justifies an enhanced penalty. A 1997 conviction for resisting law enforcement was not too old to count under the Act. A conviction for domestic battery in the presence of a child, in violation of Ind. Code 35-42-2-1.3, was a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). Although Indiana law does not require a serious injury, the court looked at statistics and determined that domestic battery is at least as dangerous to its victims as purse snatching or attempted burglary and is properly classified as “violent.” View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Hunter, Adams, Gill, and Bostic were charged (with 10 others) in a multi-count indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and distribution of 1000 grams or more of substances containing a detectable amount of heroin (21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1)). All four pleaded guilty, but appealed either their convictions or their sentences. Because Hunter entered a blind plea, waiving his right to appeal pre-trial rulings, the Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal. The court also rejected Adams’s contention that the district court erred in calculating the quantity of heroin for which he was responsible. The court remanded for resentencing of Gill and Bostic because the court erred in enhancing their guideline offense levels for maintaining a “stash house.” That guideline provision was not in effect during the commission of their offenses. The court rejected Bostic’s attempt to challenge his plea; the change of plea hearing established that his plea was knowing and voluntary. The court also rejected his assertion that the court erred in considering, as a sentencing factor, violence engaged in by his gang without specifying what acts of violence it was holding him responsible for. A district court is not required to make specific findings concerning the section 3553 factors; the court clearly considered those factors. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Castaldi, involved in fraudulent schemes since high school, operated a Ponzi scheme that collapsed in 2008. Net losses to investors and the IRS totaled about $40 million. When the scheme was near collapse, Castaldi turned himself in to the government. He eventually pled guilty to just one count of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and one count of corruptly impeding the IRS, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). The district court imposed the longest prison sentence possible under the plea agreement: consecutive sentences of 20 years on the mail fraud charge and three years on the tax charge, about 50percent longer than the high end of the agreed Sentencing Guideline range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, finding that the court adequately considered the fact that Castaldi told the government about his scheme and cooperated with its investigation, but also considered the devastating financial harm Castaldi inflicted on family members, friends, and neighbors of modest financial means. View "United States v. Castaldi" on Justia Law