Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Ruhl and Serio were convicted of the first-degree murder of Neubauer in separate trials in Illinois. After exhausting his state court remedies, Ruhl sought federal relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his conviction was the result of violations of various constitutional rights. The district court denied his petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate as to Ruhl’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and affirmed, rejecting claims concerning the attorney’s failure to present testimony from two detectives who had voiced concerns about the credibility of a witness; interview and present testimony of several witnesses who would have impeached that witness; investigate telephone records to show that the witness had not called Neubauer’s cell phone; investigate facts surrounding a traffic stop on the morning of the murder; present expert testimony, which counsel had referenced in his opening statement, that would have undermined the state’s case; object to hearsay testimony inculpating Ruhl; and present corroborating witnesses at the pretrial hearing on the state’s motion to exclude testimony that another admitted to shooting Neubauer. View "Ruhl v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Carter, a police officer for 13 years, was with other officers outside a residence while a Tactical Enforcement Unit went inside to check for threats to the officers who would perform a search. Carter was taking Colonix, a nonprescription supplement to clean his colon, in an effort to lose weight. Carter went to his car after the tactical unit gave the all clear and drank Colonix, knowing that it made him need to frequently use the restroom. During the search, the resident complained that cash was missing. A supervisor ordered the officers to “freeze everything” until the Professional Performance Division arrived. Officers were not to leave. About 30-45 minutes later, Sergeant Eccher arrived. Feeling the Colonix and sweating profusely, Carter told Eccher that he needed to use the bathroom and did not want to use the residence bathroom because of its filthy condition. Eccher put his palm straight out, and said, “You can’t leave until I search you.” Eccher patted Carter down; he did not pat down Carter’s genital area and did not take Carter’s badge or police identification. Officer, Lopez, also needing to leave, was searched, but was allowed to keep his boots on. The searches were in plain view of the residents. The officers left. After PPD arrived, another officer was allowed to leave without being searched. The district court rejected a suit by Carter and Lopez under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging illegal search and seizure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable officer in Carter’s position would have feared arrest or detention if he did not comply with the search request.View "Carter v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Dachman was indicted on and pled guilty to 11 counts of wire fraud for stealing funds elderly individuals had invested in his sleep‐related illness‐treatment companies. By selling shares in those companies, he had raised more than $4 million from 51 people. Although Dachman had a history of seven bankruptcies, he represented that he was a successful businessman and researcher and that he had obtained a Ph.D. from Northwestern University. He actually used the money for personal expenses. At sentencing, the district court denied him credit for acceptance of responsibility and sentenced him to 120 months’ incarceration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges that the court erred in calculating the loss amount, by denying him credit for acceptance of responsibility, and by imposing an “objectively unreasonable” term of imprisonment in light of his severe infirmities. View "Unted States v. Dachman" on Justia Law

Shannon pled guilty to possessing child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)) and received a sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment followed by a lifetime of supervised release. About 13 months after he began his supervised release, Shannon’s probation officer filed a petition alleging that Shannon violated conditions of his supervised release by having a web camera connected to his computer without prior permission and by accessing several websites, including those with “teengal” and “teenplanet” in their domain names. The government proceeded only with respect to the web camera because it could not determine the exact ages of the persons in the websites Shannon viewed, but expressed its concern that Shannon viewed sexually explicit websites where the models were intended to depict teenage girls and that Shannon had at one point wiped his hard drive clean. The district court revoked Shannon’s supervised release despite his contention that the websites contained disclaimers that the sites did not actually depict any minors. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that the condition banning possession of any sexually explicit material was not restricted to material involving minors, nor was it limited to visual depictions, and that there were no findings or explanation for such a lifetime ban. View "United States v. Shannon" on Justia Law

Convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Molton was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment, which is substantially higher than the advisory guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. The judge determined that a guideline sentence was insufficient punishment for a 23-year-old convicted of his third firearm offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and the sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court should have excluded evidence of Molton’s gang affiliation, and that his above‐guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Molton" on Justia Law

Officer Prado of the Chicago Police Department, while on duty, funneled towing business to certain tow truck companies in exchange for bribes. After an FBI investigation, Prado was indicted on three counts and pled guilty to one count of attempting to commit extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951. At sentencing, Prado asked the court to consider the sentence of another former officer, Wodnicki, whom Prado believed was similarly situated. The district court refused to consider Prado’s argument because it believed it could only consider sentencing disparities if they were presented on a nationwide basis and prevented Prado and the prosecutor from introducing information related to Wodnicki’s sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The procedural error in the court not realizing that it had the discretion to deviate from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and could consider others’ individual sentences was not harmless. It is impossible to determine whether Prado would have received the same sentence absent the error. View "United States v. Prado" on Justia Law

In 2003, Perry shared child pornography with an internet group. A search of his apartment uncovered discs containing hundreds of child pornography images. Perry pleaded guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) and (a)(5)(B). The district court sentenced Perry to 60 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release with a concurrent 46- month term and three years of supervised release on the second count, and imposed 15 standard conditions of supervised release and six special conditions. In 2009, Perry was in the unsupervised company of a 12-year-old female in violation of those terms. He admitted fault and was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment and four years of supervised release. In 2013, a probation officer found child pornography on Perry’s computer, a violation of supervised release. Perry admitted the violation. The probation officer (mistakenly) reported that Perry was subject to the statutory minimum five-year term mandated by 18 U.S.C. 3583(k). Perry’s attorney and the prosecution agreed. The district court orally sentenced Perry to five years’ imprisonment plus 10 years of supervised release. In its written judgment, the court added four special conditions of supervision that were not mentioned at the revocation hearing. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to sentence Perry to no more than two years’ imprisonment and to determine Perry’s conditions of supervision. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

Pineda was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 115 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court violated his right to a fair jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when it struck the sole Hispanic member of the jury for cause and replaced him with an alternate during trial and committed procedural error by failing to adequately consider all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1) at sentencing. View "United States v. Pineda" on Justia Law

Sanders pleaded guilty to possessing more than 50 grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute. The district judge found that he possessed more than 500 grams of cocaine or cocaine base and calculated an offense level of 26, producing a recommended range of 110 to 137 months’ imprisonment, and sentenced Sanders to 120 months. Most of the cocaine that was included for the purpose of calculating the offense level had been seized from Sanders’s home, which the police searched with a warrant following his arrest. The district judge concluded that the warrant was invalid and ruled that the evidence seized from his home could not be used against Sanders at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the judge should have also prohibited use of that evidence at sentencing. All evidence is admissible at sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3661. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Over 40 years, Rachuy accumulated almost 30 convictions, mostly for fraud. In a recent scheme, he “purchased” six vehicles by writing bad checks drawn on bank accounts that he knew were closed or had no funds. He was indicted for five counts of transporting stolen vehicles across state lines, 18 U.S.C. 2312, and pled guilty to one count in exchange for the government’s agreement to recommend that the court calculate loss amount based only on checks returned on four bank accounts involved in the purchase of the vehicles; recommend a five‐year prison sentence; and not oppose Rachuy’s request for the return of his property held by authorities. The district court rejected the parties’ recommendation, sentenced him to 90 months’ imprisonment based on its determination that he “is the epitome of a career offender.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the government breached the plea agreement: by referencing Rachuy’s lengthy criminal history, by failing to recommend that his loss amount be based solely on the checks used to purchase the vehicles charged in the superseding indictment; and by reminding the court that it did not have the power to command local and state authorities to release Rachuy’s property. View "United States v. Rachuy" on Justia Law